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SUMMARY 
Global Equity versus Public Interest? The Case of Climate Change Policy 
in Germany 
 
The paper attempts to shed some light on the kind of role equity norms play 
in German sustainable development policy and the related discourse, focus-
ing on the issue of global climate change. Especially the tensions between the 
public discussion of equity among and within nations are investigated. Atti-
tudes and commitments of the general public and the main actor groups 
towards global climate change policies and related equity issues are ana-
lyzed. One of the central findings of the analysis is that the norm of global 
fairness enjoys broad (rhetorical) support by all actor groups and the public. 
However, the support by the public must be characterized as uninformed 
consent because the effects of the various global climate policies within 
Germany are either not discussed or played down by the proponents of a 
progressive climate change policy. The debates are framed by two different 
but overlapping discourses informed by the concepts of sustainable develop-
ment or ecological modernization. While with respect to global climate change 
policy the sustainable development discourse dominates at the programmatic 
level (concerned with norms, values and fairness principles), it is clearly the 
concept of ecological modernization that underlies the concrete policies. 
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ZUSAMMENFASSUNG 
Globale Gerechtigkeit und Gemeinwohl am Beispiel der Klimapolitik in 
Deutschland 
 
In dieser Studie geht es um die Frage, welche Rolle globale Fairness-Normen 
in der deutschen Nachhaltigkeitspolitik spielen. Sie wird am Beispiel der 
Klimapolitik Deutschlands, und zwar auf der nationalen und der lokalen 
(Lokale-Agenda-21-Prozesse) Ebene untersucht. Fokussiert werden insbe-
sondere die Spannungen, die zwischen Fairness-Konzepten auftreten, die 
einerseits auf den globalen Raum und andererseits den Nationalstaatsraum 
bezogen sind. Das betrifft insbesondere Spannungen zwischen konsensba-
sierten Normen globaler Gerechtigkeit und nationalen Gemeinwohlerforder-
nissen. In der realen Klimapolitik erweist sich, dass diese Bezüge selten 
systematisch analysiert und diskutiert werden. Das gilt für die öffentliche 
Diskussion ebenso wie für den Wissenschaftsbereich. Hieraus folgt unter 
anderem, dass es zwar eine breite öffentliche Unterstützung für eine progres-
sive Klimapolitik auf der Basis globaler Gerechtigkeitsnormen gibt, diese 
Unterstützung aber in weitgehender Unkenntnis über die sozio-
ökonomischen Verteilungsfolgen einer solchen Politik für die Bevölkerung 
innerhalb Deutschlands erfolgt. Die negativen Equity-Konsequenzen der 
Klimapolitik innerhalb Deutschlands stehen völlig im Schatten der dominie-
renden globalen Fairness-Debatte. Gleichwohl sind die konkreten Politiken 
vom (pragmatischen) Konzept der „ökologischen Modernisierung’ bestimmt, 
das weitgehend mit konventionellen Gemeinwohlvorstellungen überein-
stimmt. Das „Nachhaltigkeitskonzept“, dem das Ziel globaler Gerechtigkeit 
zugrunde liegt, beherrscht hingegen die programmatisch-rhetorische Ebene 
der globalen Klimapolitik beherrscht. 
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0. Introduction 
This paper attempts to shed some light on the kind of role equity norms play 
in German Sustainable Development (SD) policy and the related discourse on 
global climate change and in particular, carbon dioxide (CO²) emissions. 
The scientific and political discussion on climate change is still charac-
terized by major uncertainties concerning the causes and impacts of climate 
change as well as the most effective mitigation strategies. With respect to the 
(natural) scientific aspects my premises are based on the reports of the 
Intergovernmental Panel of Climate Change (IPCC), which, in my opinion, 
reflect state-of-the-art knowledge1, although I am aware that some experts 
strongly disagree with this assessment (e.g., Boehmer-Christiansen 2003; 
Boehmer-Christiansen and Kellow 2002; see also Miller and Edwards 2001). 
According to the IPCC reports, there is increasing global warming due to the 
cumulative emissions of various greenhouse gases (most prominently CO²), 
and a significant part of this effect is ‘human-made.’ If excessive global 
warming is not prevented, it will have destructive consequences for humans 
and nature, although in an asymmetric way: those who are, by social and 
economic standards, already worse off (primarily in developing countries) will 
suffer most (IPCC 2001a, 2001b). 
In spite of more than two decades of intensive international negotiations, 
CO² emissions are on the rise worldwide: in 2003 they were almost 20 per-
cent higher than in 1990. About half of all emissions are produced by indus-
trial countries. However, there also has been a strong increase in CO² emis-
sions in developing countries. Currently their share is about 45 percent of 
global emissions, and it is projected that there will be a dramatic rise in their 
emissions in the near future due to a large increase in their energy consump-
tion and their strong reliance on coal and other fossil fuels. This is especially 
the case in Asia, where China and India are particularly large energy con-
sumers because of their large population sizes.2 At present, the United States 
is the world’s largest CO² emitter while Germany ranks sixth (after China, 
Russia, Japan and India). In contrast to the U.S. government, the German 
                                                   
1 The IPCC represents the international scientific consensus of governments and independ-
ent scientists. 
2 Cf. Energy Information Administration/International Energy Outlook 2004 (IEO 2004) by 
the U.S. Department of Energy, published in April 2004. 
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government accepted rather early on the responsibility to strongly reduce the 
country’s emissions of greenhouse gases as a contribution to global equity.3 
The primary questions this paper seeks to answer include the following: 
What are the political and practical implications of normative concepts, such 
as equity, for German climate change policy? What role do the crucial ques-
tions of global justice and local fairness play in German local sustainable 
development activities (Local Agenda 21 processes)? And how are evolving 
‘cosmopolitan’ norms, like global environmental justice, influenced by exist-
ing fundamental values embedded in the political culture of a country? 
Equity is a key element of the sustainability discourse which evolved 
from the SD concept that was popularized by the so-called Brundtland 
Report of 1987 and the Rio Conference of 1992. It has become a ‘metafix,’ a 
central ethical referential norm intended to guide international and national 
climate change mitigation policies. Equality, ‘futurity,’ and equity—defined as 
social or distributional justice/fairness—are the leading moral and political 
requirements of the SD concept, i.e., they are norms not only to be observed 
but to be actively pursued. This follows from the ideas of intergenerational 
and intragenerational justice that are constitutive elements of the SD concept 
(WCED 1987). 
As both SD and equity are vague and contested concepts or ideas, it is 
necessary to take a closer look at their relationship to each other as well as 
to other norms and values in a given society with which they might conflict. 
Moreover, cross-cultural variances in the definitions and importance of these 
concepts might affect politics and policies. Furthermore, the acknowledgment 
of fundamental or universal ethical norms is crucial for the success or failure 
of global policy, because “in a situation in which co-operation of many ra-
tional and self-interested agents [is necessary], it will always pay for the 
individual to defect, rather than to collaborate” (Rothstein 1998: 157; see 
also Olson 1965). 
Not only varying norms might clash and need to be reconciled, policy 
concepts resulting from international negotiation processes usually also have 
to face established policy approaches ‘at home’ that are embedded in the 
broader context of politico-administrative institutions. Thus, the compatibil-
                                                   
3 Within the framework of the EU’s ‘burden sharing’ system, Germany has committed itself 
to lower its greenhouse gas emissions by 21 percent (on the basis of 1990 values) until 
2008/2012. 
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ity of new and old, imported and existing ‘soft- and hardware’ institutions is 
decisive for the functioning of the political process and often explains why 
new policies sometimes succeed and sometimes fail. The potential trade-off 
between generally accepted norms and policies from ‘outside’ and ‘inside’ will 
usually be the more important the more trade-offs are recognized by the 
actor groups concerned and the more they realize that policies will be intro-
duced that will affect them. Even if it is widely acknowledged in a country 
that principles of (global) fairness and not instrumental rationality, based on 
a narrowly defined national self-interest, should guide governmental policy, it 
makes sense to look at the extent to which these principles are congruent 
with existing practices and their underlying norms. Therefore, an analysis of 
the ‘new’ global climate protection policy must not only consider established 
norms of cooperation, solidarity, equity, etc., but also existing environmental 
policies and their political context. In Germany, for instance, ‘public interest’ 
and ‘ecological modernization’ are examples for such established institu-
tions.4 
The first part of this paper aims at a brief clarification of the meaning 
and significance of equity (social/distributive justice/fairness, focusing on 
the distribution incidence of policies and norms) with respect to SD and 
policies addressing climate change. The analysis will focus, in particular, on 
differences in what is meant by equity between and equity within nations. 
This will lead to a discussion in section two of the tensions and congruencies 
between the leading environmental policy paradigms in Germany, namely 
ecological modernization (EM) and sustainable development (SD), as well as 
the idea of public interest (‘common weal’, bonum commune, Gemeinwohl in 
German) and the various forms of equity demands contained in the SD con-
cept. These clarifications will serve to inform section three, which describes 
and analyzes German environmental policy, focusing on EM, SD, climate 
change mitigation and related energy policies, and Local Agenda 21 proces-
ses. In the more empirical section four attitudes and commitments of the 
general public and main actor groups with respect to global climate change 
and equity issues will be analyzed. Taking Local Agenda 21 processes in 
Germany, which typically involved a multitude of stakeholders, as examples, 
                                                   
4 The term “institution” is used here in the broader sociological sense of organizations with 
a physical structure as well as traditions, customs, norms and principles of conduct that 
shape human interaction, stabilize expectations and influence the resolution of disputes: 
also over common property resources. 
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the role equity issues are playing in concrete policy activities related to SD at 
the local level will be considered. Finally, in section five the findings of the 
analysis will be discussed from the perspectives of global equity and 
(national) public interest. 
1. Climate Change Policy and the Concept of Equity 
Sustainable Development (SD) could be seen as a global ‘regulative idea’ (in 
the Kantian sense) that addresses especially the inequities related to the use 
of global common goods. ‘Global Commons’ (cf. Kaul et al. 2003) are goods 
everybody has an unwritten equal right to use. Like public goods, they are 
characterized by non-rivalry in consumption and unlimited access. They are, 
thus, “public goods with benefits—or costs, in the case of such ‘bads’ as 
crime and violence—that extend across countries and regions, across rich 
and poor population groups, and even across generations” (Kaul et al. 2003: 
3). The atmosphere (the global climate) is perhaps the best example of a 
global public good in the environmental area. However, usually those who are 
most disproportionately hit by the consequences of environmental pollution, 
resource depletion, and supposed climate change are economically and 
socially disadvantaged and live mostly, but not exclusively, in developing 
countries (the ‘South’). And, as a rule, they have contributed least to global 
environmental problems (IPCC 2001a5). Consequently, “the contemporary 
challenges of global environmental change are those of displacement across 
time and space. They are, therefore, intimately bound up with questions of 
justice and equity” (Elliott 2002: 61). Correspondingly, among the central 
questions in designing climate protection policies ought to be the following: Is 
there any unjust inequality leading to unfair distribution of burdens and 
benefits (equity) and, if so, how should it be dealt with, acknowledging that 
equal treatment does not necessarily result in fair outcomes? This inevitably 
involves issues related to distributional fairness and re-distributional pol-
icy—usually the most conflict-prone aspects of governance (Lowi 1972). 
There are many competing and controversial principles and concepts re-
lated to equity that are based on different normative arguments and axioms 
                                                   
5 See also DIW-Wochenbericht, No. 42/2004, pp. 615-622 (‘Die ökonomischen Kosten des 
Klimawandels’); WBGU (2004b). 
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stemming from a discourse on justice that is more than 2000 years old.6 
Equity—as used in economics and political science—usually means social 
and distributive justice, which generally refers to the ‘fairness’ of distributing 
benefits and burdens among individuals and within and between groups, 
communities, and nations. A definition of the notion of ‘international envi-
ronmental equity’—attempting to capture most of the various interpretations 
of equity used in international environmental deliberations and agreements—
is provided by Harris (2001: 25) as “a fair and just distribution among coun-
tries of benefits, burdens, and decision-making authority associated with 
international environmental relations.” 
One of the important landmarks in the process of international climate 
change negotiations—the Framework Convention on Climate Change (FCCC) 
of 1992 (in force since 1994)—addresses the equity issue by confirming 
‘common but differentiated responsibilities’ of all nations. Based on this 
formula, it established a specific obligation for industrialized countries to 
take the lead in mitigation efforts since they are responsible for the largest 
share of emissions and can better afford action. Furthermore, the advanced 
industrial countries accept the additional obligation to support developing 
countries with their climate policies and their adjustments to climate change. 
The qualification “common but differentiated responsibilities …” could be 
traced back to the Aristotelean principle of proportionality “which entails 
parties making concessions and accepting burdens in proportion to their 
ability to do so” (Albin 2003: 267). Notwithstanding the need to qualify ‘eq-
uity’ and the lack of a widespread agreement on its meaning among various 
actor groups (in that sense it is as vague and contested a concept as SD and 
public interest are), as early as 1992 (Rio Summit and FCCC), the interna-
tional community agreed that the climate system must be conceived of as a 
global public good and that policies should be guided by concerns for equity 
between present and future generations. Perceptions of justice and equity 
have become an important, if not the most important feature of global envi-
ronmental politics and play an important role in the design of climate protec-
tion policy (cf. Eckersley 2004).7 At the very core of the international climate 
                                                   
6 Equity issues are dealt with in depth, for example, in Barry (1991), Dworkin (1983), 
Elster (1992), Franklin (1997), Kersting (2000), Miller and Walzer (1995), Rawls (1971), 
Roemer (1996), Walzer 1983 and 1994, and Young (1990). 
7 However, notions of (negatively affected global) equity/fairness were not the most impor-
tant driving force for initiating international climate policy negotiations but evidently the 
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policy regime that has been evolving since the 1980s are the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UN FCCC) of 1992, the Kyoto 
Protocol of 1997 and the Marrakech Accords of 20018 (see Meadowcroft 
2002). The FCCC states in Article 3.1: “The Parties should protect the climate 
system for the benefit of present and future generations of humankind, on 
the basis of equity and in accordance with their common but differentiated 
responsibilities and respective capabilities. Accordingly, the developed coun-
try Parties should take the lead in combating climate change and the adverse 
effects thereof.”9 
It was the original United Nations Conference on Environment and De-
velopment (UNCED) objective to stabilize greenhouse gas emissions at 1990 
levels by the year 2000. The Kyoto Protocol of 1997 then fixed in more detail 
the objectives, tasks, and responsibilities of nations by, inter alia, 
• defining which gases are to be dealt with, 
• dividing the world into groups of countries with different responsibili-
ties for emission reductions, 
• setting the reference units of greenhouse gases as total emissions per 
country (but as a result of bargaining, not pure application of a princi-
ple of equity), 
• fixing the year 1990 as the base year for measuring reductions, and 
• fixing the period 2008-2012 as the time frame within which the agreed 
reductions are to be achieved by industrialized countries. 
Under the Kyoto Protocol the European Union (EU) is responsible for an 8 
percent reduction of greenhouse gases relative to 1990 levels by 2008-2012. 
Based on this goal, the EU member countries calculated individual obliga-
tions for emission abatements. Germany, by pledging to achieve a 21 percent 
reduction relative to its 1990 emission levels by 2008-2012, has taken (vol-
untarily) the largest share of the burden on the EU. This EU-related target is 
even excelled by the earlier voluntary national commitment made by the 
                                                                                                                                                  
concern to mitigate the expected (primarily indirect) negative consequences of climate 
change for industrial countries (see Oberthür and Ott 1999, O’Riordan and Jäger 1996; 
see also Rose and Stevens 1998, Rose et al. 1998). 
8 The Marrakech Accords (2001), reached at the 7th Conference of the Parties of the 
Framework Convention on Climate Change, contain, inter alia, agreements on detailed 
rules for the actual operation of the Kyoto Protocol and establish three new funds to as-
sist developing countries with their climate change policy. 
9 One of the reasons the U.S. Government gave for why it did not ratify the Kyoto Protocol 
was that no ‘meaningful commitment’ to greenhouse gas reduction has been made by the 
developing countries. 
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German government to reduce CO² emissions by 25 percent of 1990 emis-
sions levels by 2005. 
All in all, since the 1990s Germany has not only been a pusher in global 
climate protection policy (see Jänicke and Weidner 1997) but also—judged by 
its policy objectives and concrete measures—a strong supporter of the prin-
ciple of international environmental equity as the guideline for international 
negotiations (cf. BMU 2000a). This put Germany at the forefront of an equity-
based global climate change policy. 
Germany’s progressive attitude is generally applauded by the proponents 
of environmental and development policy, especially the various NGOs, 
unless they demand even stricter commitments. Furthermore, surveys show 
that a majority of the German people support or at least accept the govern-
ment’s engagement in climate policy based on equity principles (Grunenberg 
and Kuckartz 2003: 169 ff.). At a general level, there seems to be a broad, 
but mostly tacit consensus about the fairness of governmental policy with 
respect to climate change. This, however, could be largely the result of lack-
ing information on the actual equity effects that related policy measures have 
or can have within Germany. Anyway, it is noticeable that distributional 
effects of climate policies for all groups in German society are hardly ever 
discussed broadly and in detail10 in the scientific and political public, and 
government-commissioned studies on these issues are very rare and not 
comprehensive (see, for instance, UBA 2003). The government, NGOs and 
large parts of the scientific/expert community seem to imply that distributive 
effects of international commitments within the country are negligible (or 
even desirable to change consumption and production patterns). Only busi-
ness groups and trade unions sometimes utter worries, though not about 
equity effects but potential negative repercussions on competition and em-
ployment.  
All in all, it seems to be central to the general discussion of the principle 
of equity (distributional justice) at the international level of climate policy 
negotiations that it is mainly concerned with equity between states (or ‘North’ 
and ‘South’) and that the consequences of climate policy on equity within 
                                                   
10 This is the case although there is a lack of “consensus about the effect of different policies 
and mechanisms on various distributional issues” (Wiegandt 2001: 127), which could be 
termed the indirect effects of equity-related policies: Distributional effects are not only a 
result of ‘pure’ equity-related decisions; they also vary according to the type of instrument 
selected for implementation (see Sprenger 2004). 
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countries are widely (and, for political reasons, sometimes deliberately) 
ignored (Wiegandt 2001: 140, Boehmer-Christiansen 2003). Although some 
governments, especially the U.S. Government, have thematized this issue, 
they could not provoke a differentiated discussion on equity consequences 
within developed countries. Usually—and by and large quite correctly so—
their arguments are perceived as being used to cover up selfish interests 
which guide their negotiation strategy.11 Furthermore, the distributional 
impacts of international commitments (including the concepts, objectives, 
mechanisms, and instruments of climate policy) are mainly framed as a 
problem of fairness and retributive justice between developed and developing 
countries, the ‘North’ and the ‘South.’12 This kind of problem framing is 
backed by sophisticated arguments that boil down to the conclusion that the 
developed countries have a comprehensive, long-term and general duty to 
shoulder the burdens of mitigating climate change and to enter far-reaching 
general obligations to help the poor countries (see Shue 1993, 1999). How-
ever, this position, as a rule, ignores or plays down the fact that the “juxta-
position of ‘developed’ and ‘developing’ countries” (Ott and Sachs 2000: 10) 
does not fully reflect social and economic realities. The assumption “that 
states are relatively homogeneous internally shields the fact that huge dis-
parities among social classes exist within states” (ibid.), no matter if they 
belong to the South or to the North. 
The ethical-normative debate on climate change within Germany’s scien-
tific community tends to view the equal per-capita right to CO² emissions as 
being the most equitable. Most environmental and developmental NGOs as 
well as ecclesiastical groups and institutions also take this stance. Despite a 
                                                   
11 “Equity is an intriguing aspect of the climate change issue. One can witness a strange 
mixture of well-taken and fully justified arguments about historical responsibility, current 
ability to pay for climate policies, and future vulnerability and long-term benefits of emis-
sion abatement. Yet, equity principles are often used as a veil to hide the real interests 
associated with greenhouse-gas related resources or production capacities and to avoid or 
delay action. Attempts to manage the climate change problem often appear to be a battle 
field of conflicting interests. Fairness concerns offer almost unlimited possibilities to sup-
port diverse camps!” (Tóth 1999: 8). 
12 This judgment is based on the ‘moral framing’ of the issue. However, the setting of targets 
for emission limits and time tables in developed and transition countries (Kyoto Protocol, 
adopted in 1997) was informed by a multitude of criteria (e.g., differing historical respon-
sibilities for creating the greenhouse effect, the countries’ different economic, technologi-
cal, and energy situations). All in all, the differentiations made cannot be traced back to a 
consistent rule but predominantly to the objective of the driving countries in the negotia-
tions to achieve an acceptable result, covering as many countries as possible. Thus, the 
reduction targets are widely recognized as purely political (cf. Babiker and Eckaus 2000). 
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more implicit than explicit rejection of this position by most politicians, 
public administrators, entrepreneurs and many economic experts for being 
politically impractical, “it remains the most persuasive argument on ethical 
grounds” (Paterson 2001: 124). Currently, due to a lack of empirical data, it 
is uncertain how the general public in Germany views this question. It must 
also be kept in mind that the distributive consequences of this approach are 
not clear and that Germany has for quite some time been experiencing a 
deep economic recession, a loosening of the ‘social security net’ and an 
erosion of the national ‘intergenerational contract’, a core element of Ger-
many’s social security system. There are not a few who are afraid that these 
trends could lead to a significant decrease in solidarity between the German 
majority and weaker groups inside and, especially, outside national bounda-
ries. 
According to Gallopín and Nilsson (2000), distributional effects are politi-
cally highly sensitive in all kinds of policy-making settings. Even in cases 
where the macroeconomic effects of public policies are believed to be small or 
even generally positive, usually some sectors and groups will suffer (unless 
compensatory policies are designed to minimize negative and regressive 
distributional effects).13 Distributional effects of CO² policy can be categorized 
roughly along three dimensions: 
• “Income structure: depending on the socio-cultural structure of the 
population, and whether energy consumption is somehow related to 
income … [often affecting] low-income groups. 
• “Sectorial: CO²-intensive industrial sectors and products will suffer 
initially; over the longer-term, effects will ripple through the economy 
and all sectors will be affected. However, it is also believed that the 
economy will be able to adjust in the long-run, altering the sectorial 
structure. 
• “Regional impacts: there are three hypotheses regarding these im-
pacts. First, remote areas may suffer due to the large transportation 
distances and potentially increased transportation costs. Second, to 
the extent there are regional income differences, regions with lower in-
comes will suffer according to the first point above. Third, regions with 
                                                   
13 A regressive distributional effect describes a greater negative impact on the personal 
income of lower income groups than on higher income groups (or, in other words, the 
lower income group benefits much less from a certain policy). 
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carbon-intensive industrial sectors will suffer according to the second 
point above” (Gallopín and Nilsson 2000: 49; see also Gallopín 2000, 
Sprenger 2004, Böhringer, Finus and Vogt 2002). 
Whether and how potential effects are communicated and handled by rele-
vant actor groups will be analyzed and discussed in Section 4. In order to 
obtain a balanced view, the direct and indirect positive effects of climate 
change policy measures, such as improved employment rates, health, amen-
ity, etc., will be considered. 
2. The Concepts of Ecological Modernization (EM), Sustainable 
Development (SD), and Public Interest: Basic Differences and 
Similarities 
In order to remain effective, a sustainable climate/energy policy in Germany 
must be based on citizens’ motivation to accept a burden on themselves for 
the sake of remote objectives. The potential consequences of a specific policy 
on equity depend, inter alia, on the ‘paradigm’ (the overall policy concept) 
chosen to guide activities in a particular policy area. It makes, for instance, a 
difference in income distribution if socioeconomic policy is based on social 
market economy or neoliberal ideology. The same applies to the mode of 
internalizing external effects with selected environmental policy instruments 
(e.g., polluter-pays principle versus the-public-pays principle) and the core 
strategic concept underlying governmental policies to manage global envi-
ronmental challenges and natural resources. 
In most countries with an advanced environmental policy, the paradigms 
of either EM or SD (or a combination of both) form the environmental policy 
framework (Jänicke and Weidner 1997, Weidner and Jänicke 2002). In 
Germany, both ideas enjoy, cum grano salis, high acceptance at the various 
governmental levels, among most NGOs, environment-related and develop-
mental institutions, and also many corporations.14 For example, the current 
‘red-green’ government (coalition of the Social Democratic Party and Alliance 
90/The Greens), in office since 1998, and the ‘leading ministry’ in this policy 
                                                   
14 A survey on ‘sustainable management’ indicated that more than half of the 309 corpora-
tions included do also consider social and ecological effects in their decision making proc-
esses. The most important motives for this policy are: motivation of employers, advan-
tages in competition, expectations of customers and legal regulations. Ethical reasons 
and good neighborship rank 7 and 10, respectively (see iwd, Vol. 30, No. 47, 18 November 
2004, p. 8). 
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area, the Ministry of the Environment, have made a combination of both 
ideas the leading paradigm of the official government strategy: “The Federal 
Government … responded [to environmental challenges] with a policy of eco 
modernization … Germany’s modernization is based on the model of sustain-
ability” (BMU 2002a: 12). A brief sketch of an EM program was already an 
element of the coalition contract of 1998. Although the general idea of SD 
enjoys wide rhetorical support in Germany, the concrete policies of admini-
strations, institutions, and organizations are much closer affiliated to the 
idea of EM than to SD as will be shown below. 
The two ideas, despite some similarities, have quite different historical 
roots and different frames of reference. They are related to different dis-
courses, directed towards different problems and contain divergent goals and 
targets as well as approaches for implementation. And—as an inevitable 
consequence—they will result in partly highly different impacts (including 
equity effects) on various social groups, both nationally and globally. These 
are convincing arguments, “why ecological modernization and sustainable 
development should not be conflated” (Langhelle 2000: 303). Therefore it 
makes sense to clarify briefly the meaning and the main characteristics of 
the two concepts, although this is not an easy task. As yet, both ideas have 
not been cast into clearly defined and widely accepted concrete concepts. 
There still are many competing definitions. This especially concerns SD. 
Since this is not the place to give a broad and in-depth discussion of the 
various forms currently discussed (see Christoff 1996, Mol and Sonnenfeld 
2000, Lafferty and Meadowcroft 2000, Weale 1992, Hajer 1995), I will con-
centrate on the (‘mainstream’) concepts that influenced the German envi-
ronmental policy discourse. The concept of SD will be given more room as it 
is the reference concept for the discussion of equity issues. 
2.1 Ecological Modernization (EM) 
The idea of EM is defined in various ways. Some use the idea to characterize 
changes in the environmental policy discourse, others relate it to an upcom-
ing system of new beliefs and values, and for others again it is nothing more 
than a description of a special kind of technology-oriented policy.15 
                                                   
15 See the excellent comparative analysis of EM concepts by Langhelle (2000). 
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In Germany, the definition with the greatest influence on politics and pol-
icy and for the ongoing theoretical debate dates back to political scientist 
Martin Jänicke who had introduced this concept in the early 1980s. In a 
recent paper (Jänicke 2000), he distinguishes between two interpretations of 
EM, a broader ‘cultural’ one and a narrower ‘technocratic’ one (see also 
Christoff 1996, for versions of ‘weak’ and ‘strong’ EM). Jänicke pleads for 
reserving the term EM for the narrower technocratic interpretation, especially 
in order to avoid disguising its weaknesses. According to him the original 
‘economic-technical core’ (Jänicke 2000: 5) of the EM concept is the devel-
opment and application of ecologically sound and future-proof technologies 
by using the inherent mechanisms of the capitalist industrial system to strive 
for innovation. He recommends restricting the use of the term EM to (mostly 
incremental) innovations (and their diffusion) to increase eco-efficiency in all 
sectors of society. 
From an historical perspective, EM appears as an evolutionary step in 
environmental policy development, representing the new paradigm that 
succeeded the concept of advanced end-of-pipe approaches (Jänicke and 
Weidner 1997, Weale 1992). It evolved as a reaction to the obvious shortcom-
ings of its predecessor. Thus, EM as a modernist, technology- and efficiency-
oriented approach to environmental problems implies a shift from a remedial 
to a more anticipative (precautionary) strategy. EM, according to Jänicke, 
should also be distinguished from the “more difficult, … often unsuccessful, 
but indispensable path of ecological restructuring beyond the merely techni-
cal options” (Jänicke 2000: 7). The main distinguishing feature of structural 
ecologicalization is that it is not based on “marketable technologies and thus 
cannot use the inherent logic of the economic system” (ibid.) as its driving 
force, i.e., where the development of marketable technological solutions is 
evidently impossible in a short- to medium-term perspective. This politically 
highly demanding concept of ‘ecological restructuring’ must be based on 
‘radical innovations’ directed at the roots of environmental (!) problems, 
because incremental increases in eco-efficiency do not guarantee a sustain-
able solution. As this approach in most cases will face opposition by powerful 
actor groups and usually does not relate to win-win strategies (and rather 
results in zero or minus sum games), there is a strong need to develop ade-
quate strategies for dealing with potential ‘modernization losers.’ 
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The analysis of the mainstream EM model—the ‘economic-technical ver-
sion’ according to Jänicke—demonstrates that equity concerns are peripheral 
to the concept. Distributive and re-distributive—national or global—
consequences of EM receive only little attention from its proponents. Equity 
issues only come to play an indirect and implicit role in two different ways. 
First, from a strategic point of view, the concept suggests to mitigate social 
and economic impacts of EM plans or activities and to win consent from 
potential ‘losers’ and their supporting groups. This addresses primarily the 
‘big players’ with strong veto power, like the coal mining industry and related 
trade unions. Secondly, from a macro level perspective, it is assumed that 
EM policy will in balance be a positive sum game, resulting in gains for the 
society as a whole, both in economic (increased employment, income, profit, 
etc.) and environmental terms (reduced pollution loads, less pollution-related 
health problems, better quality of life, etc.). This overall gain would also allow 
for compensating losers, which is particularly necessary if they belong to 
powerfully organized groups. The (narrow) EM concept already puts more 
emphasis on future generations than conventional environmental policy, and 
the broader concept of ‘structural ecologicalization’ strengthens the futurity 
aspect to such a degree that one might speak of sustainable EM (or ecological 
sustainability). Yet, this stronger emphasis on long-term effects is mainly a 
result of the previous concept’s failures to stabilize achieved improvements 
and not of considerations of intergenerational justice. In principle, Langhelle 
is right in saying that ecological modernization as such “has no established 
relationship neither to the global environmental problems nor to social 
justice. There are … no explicit references or connections at all to the global 
dimension of developmental and distributional problems. As such, ecological 
modernization is neither concerned with social justice within our generation 
(intragenerational justice) or with social justice between generations (inter-
generational justice)” (Langhelle 2000: 309). 
The next section will make clear that there are substantive differences 
between EM (even if taken in its broad version as ‘ecological restructuring’) 
and SD but will also point at enormous differences between SD and the idea 
of public interest, the latter having much more in common with the EM 
concept. 
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2.2 Sustainable Development (SD) and Public Interest: 
Differences and Similarities 
While ecological modernization is, at its core, a market-oriented policy con-
cept focused on environmental issues, sustainable development is a global 
societal reform concept, in which ecological aspects play an important but 
not the dominant role. SD could be defined briefly as a framework concept to 
realize global public welfare, embracing economic, social and ecological well-
being. This could be seen as shorthand for global public interest. Of course, 
the protagonists of EM would claim that this concept will also contribute to 
global public welfare if it diffuses globally. However, the decisive point here is 
that this effect is envisaged as a related side-effect but not as the central goal 
of EM. 
Relating SD to the concept of public interest might suggest a harmonious 
relationship between both, which is not the case. Public interest (Gemeinwohl 
in German) is a well-established albeit contested norm or ideal standard in 
many societies. It represents key values, aspirations, and objectives of a 
community or polity, and it “calls for the readiness of the citizen to make 
sacrifices if necessary and to share responsibility for sustaining values of the 
polity” (Herring 1972: 171). It “is viewed as the objective of the duly author-
ized organs of government …” (op. cit., 170). Issues of general relevance in 
social interaction are often debated in terms of the public interest and at the 
same time in terms of associated ideas and values, such as equity. If public 
interest is conceived as assuring the provision and some equitable distribu-
tion of certain basic (especially common) goods, its closeness to the basic 
idea of the SD concept becomes clear. 
This leads to the question of what the relationships between the two con-
cepts (or visions) are like. Do they conflict with each other or are they mutu-
ally supporting? This question is of normative and practical relevance, and it 
can help clarify how equity concerns will be dealt with in a given society. One 
can assume that the acceptance of a new collective norm that calls for ac-
knowledging the interests of ‘others,’ implying (re-)distributional effects, will 
face fewer difficulties if the new norm corresponds to already existing norma-
tive systems and values. On the other hand, if such a fundamental concept 
like public interest conflicts with new norms, we may expect low acceptance. 
A comparison of the similarities and differences of both concepts can help 
identify potential conflicts related to the implementation of the SD concept. 
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The analysis of the kind of potential conflicts and their degree of severity can 
also show what kind of capacity building is still needed to mitigate these 
conflicts. 
In the rhetoric of public interest, the sustainability discourse has so far 
left hardly any trace. In terms of origin and age public interest and SD are 
like old nobility and parvenu. While public interest has a tradition going back 
at least to antiquity—an imposing number of the greatest philosophers of all 
time (like Plato, Aristotle, Seneca) have contributed to shaping the concept—
sustainability has its historical roots in the timber industry of the early 18th 
century.16 But the concept was to gain popularity only in 1987 with the final 
report of an international expert commission chaired by the then Norwegian 
Prime Minister, Gro Harlem Brundtland. Nevertheless, the two concepts 
relate in many dimensions in a more than loose and accidental manner. They 
share the meta-reference norms equity, equality, public welfare, and public 
goods; this unites them both in their ambivalent relationship with the idea of 
individual freedom and with regard to the fundamental liberal notion that the 
pursuit of self-interest benefits the whole. Both are cases of practical phi-
losophy directed towards ensuring a ‘good life’ for all. The two almost inevita-
bly diverge at the realization level; the type and amplitude of goal conflicts 
can vary considerably depending on the specific conceptions of public inter-
est and sustainability at issue. Since, by their nature, both concepts are 
based on values in progress and often react to different challenges, there is a 
state of tension between them that cannot in principle be resolved in ad-
vance.  
2.2.1 Sustainable Development 
In 1987, the World Commission for Environment and Development (WCED) 
set up by the United Nations (UN) presented its final report under the title 
‘Our Common Future’ (WCED 1987). Basically, the goal of the commission 
was to elaborate a social development concept linking ecology and economy 
in a socially acceptable manner and offering attractive future prospects for 
both wealthy and (especially) poor societies. The expert group, also referred 
to as the Brundtland Commission after its chairperson Gro Harlem 
                                                   
16 The concept of sustainability (Nachhaltigkeit ) was coined in 1713 by the kursächsischer 
Oberberghauptmann (chief mining official for the Electorate of Saxony) Hans Carl von Car-
lowitz. 
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Brundtland, coined the famous formula stating that sustainable development 
was the form of economic, ecological, and social development that “meets the 
needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations 
to meet their own needs” (WCED 1987: 8). 
The leap from an environmental and development concept that had at-
tracted worldwide attention (Brundtland Report) to the principal guiding 
vision of a new global policy was prepared by the UN Conference on Envi-
ronment and Development (UNCED) held in Rio de Janeiro in 1992 (‘Rio 
Conference’). At this conference 178 countries, among them Germany, agreed 
to make sustainable development a basic element of their national and 
international policy. 
The Brundtland Report did not limit the sustainability concept to the 
preservation of an intact environment but applied it generally to safeguarding 
the life basis of humanity (cf. Hauff 1987: 10); with this in mind, even expo-
nential economic growth was considered necessary (op. cit.: 54-55).17 Al-
though the industrial countries managed to put environmental issues high 
on the agenda at the second environmental summit in Rio (as they did at the 
first summit in Stockholm 1972), economic and social (including distribu-
tion) issues were given a great deal of space. This is reflected in the Rio 
Declaration: “The right to development must be fulfilled so as to equitably 
meet developmental and environmental needs of present and future genera-
tions” (Principle 3). The two poles of the modern notion of sustainability are 
thus environmental and resource protection and socially equitable economic 
development. 
In comparison with all, including progressive, variants of ‘environmental 
policy,’ the sustainability concept is much more normatively charged. Taking 
a cosmopolitan perspective, it is directed towards structural change and re-
distribution in world society, and—extending beyond the intersection of 
ecology and economy—is integrative and even holistic in application. How the 
                                                   
17 As regards the status of conventional environmental issues in the framework of the 
mandate, the Brundtland Commission stated clearly that an anthropocentric concept of 
the environment underlay their sustainability concept: “When the terms of reference of 
our Commission were originally being discussed in 1982, there were those who wanted its 
considerations to be limited to ‘environmental issues’ only. This would have been a grave 
mistake. The environment does not exist as a sphere separate from human actions, ambi-
tions, and needs, and attempts to defend it in isolation from human concerns have given 
the very word ‘environment’ a connotation of naiveté in some political circles” (WCED 
1987: xi). 
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concept of sustainability relates to that of public interest depends on which 
variant is taken. 
Three types of concepts (see Pearce and Barbier 2000, Neumayer 1999, 
Turner 1993) have become established in the discussion among experts 
(hardly noticed by the public): ‘weak’, ‘strong’, and ‘reasonable sustainability.’ 
Common to all three sustainability concepts is that they describe the econ-
omy, the natural environment, and the social sphere as capital stocks which 
in varying measure can be considered mutually substitutable. 
In general, an understanding of sustainability as a framed process, based 
on the concept of reasonable sustainability, is likely to find the broadest 
consensus in politico-social practice. In this sense sustainability serves as a 
‘regulative idea’18 in an ongoing process of societal search, learning, and 
discovery, which—inevitably in multifactor optimization tasks—is essentially 
open-ended and weakly determined, even though the range of options is often 
restricted by discourse ‘guardrails.’ 
The three concepts make highly divergent demands on scientific and po-
litical competencies and on societal capacities for compromise. Similarly, 
their intersections with the public interest concept vary, as does their inte-
gratability in the public interest discourse. A strong conception of sustain-
ability, for example, which seeks to limit access to natural resources for 
today’s societies strictly in obedience to a natural-law logic would inevitably 
create major centers of socioeconomic conflict in affluent societies and espe-
cially in poor societies. The same is to be expected from a physiocentric 
sustainability approach. Under the current conditions of welfare production 
and the affluence gap, a combination of these two demands would amount to 
inviting social strife. Admittedly, relations between a pragmatically modified 
sustainability concept and the public interest are also not free of conflict, as 
will be shown in the following. 
Mainstream Concept of Sustainability 
Characteristic of a sustainability concept apt to attract broad acceptance in 
all relevant groups of society are the following requirements and criteria (SRU 
                                                   
18 As far as I am aware, the Kantian ‘regulative idea’ was first introduced into the sustain-
ability discussion by Homann (1996); Fraenkel (1964), in particular, has used this figure 
in the public interest debate. 
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1994; DIW, WI and WZB 2000)—over and above the basic postulate that the 
central development parameters for humanity and the environment must 
ensure the lasting capacity of the human community to survive and develop: 
• moderate anthropocentrism; 
• improvement in the present balance of material and immaterial living 
conditions in the developed and underdeveloped countries and be-
tween them (intragenerational equity); 
• ensuring that future generations can satisfy their needs (intergenera-
tional equity); 
• an integrative view of the social, economic, and ecological development 
conditions and problems, since these areas are regarded as being so 
closely interrelated that permanently satisfying development cannot be 
achieved in any one field if others are neglected; 
• the endeavor to conserve and develop different, to some extent inter-
changeable and mutually compensative capital stocks; 
• the assumption of equality between the three central dimensions ecol-
ogy, economy, and social affairs as prerequisite for the sociopolitical 
discourse; 
• change in the present path of economic and social development be-
cause it does not do justice to the criteria of permanently environ-
ment-friendly development. 
The sustainability concept thus described reflects crucial core elements of 
sustainability as conceived by the Brundtland Commission, the important 
international organizations (from OECD to World Bank), and national institu-
tions—in Germany, for example, the Council of Environmental Experts, and 
the Bundestag Enquête-Kommission (Inquiry Commission) ‘Protection of 
mankind and the environment.’19 This understanding is more controversial 
                                                   
19 All the institutions mentioned—and others—have further differentiated these core prin-
ciples to make them practicable for political purposes. Varying progress has been 
achieved in the consensual operationalization of the concept. The greatest headway has 
been made on the ecological dimension, followed by the economic dimension; the social 
dimension, in contrast, was long neglected in both the scholarly and societal debate, so 
that the least advances in knowledge have been attained in this domain (cf. UBA 1995: 
22 ff.; Deutscher Bundestag 1997; Weidner and Brandl 2001). The joint research project 
‘Work & Ecology,’ in which the WZB participated, was particularly concerned with social 
aspects. The social dimension of sustainability was specified with reference to the norma-
tive social philosophy concept of the ‘good life,’ defining sustainability as enabling a self-
determined ‘good life’ with a commitment to the precautionary conservation and im-
provement of the natural environment; individual preferences are to be taken into ac-
count in such a way that permanent incentives are provided to ensure economic perform-
ance directed towards this goal in a global perspective (DIW, WI and WZB 2000: 46). 
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among scholars than among societal practitioners and the general public. 
The broad consensus of the latter may ultimately be attributable to the fact 
that the distributive and re-distributive consequences of the intragenera-
tional equity postulate (even the global ones!) are difficult to envisage, and 
are ignored, suppressed or considered avoidable. 
Despite the much censured ‘empty-phrase’ nature of the concept (the 
criticism being that everyone can interpret into it whatever suits him or her) 
and disregarding low public awareness, the sustainability idea set in motion 
a worldwide diffusion of institutional innovations without precedent in the 
environmental policy field during the last two decades or, for that matter, in 
other policy areas (Weidner and Jänicke 2002; Weidner 2002a; Lafferty and 
Meadowcroft 2000; Carter 2001: 194 ff.; Dodds 2000). Sustainable develop-
ment has progressed to become a major, cross-cultural guiding vision for 
shaping national, regional, and local development processes and world 
society as a whole. With few exceptions (e.g., Attac), the SD concept is, at the 
same time, the greatest common platform for criticizing neo-liberal tenden-
cies of globalization processes. 
2.2.2 Environmental Interest, Public Interest, and Sustainability: 
Tensions and Interaction 
In the course of its development, the initially mercantilist concept of sustain-
ability has evolved into a cosmopolitan public-interest concept. The un-
bounded nature of ecological relationships and the consequent interdepend-
ence of all people and places on Earth create a real (not merely morally 
constructed) common social context of global dimensions in the sense of “an 
overarching relational and social space between rich and poor” (Habisch 
2001: 259). 
While the ‘environmental interest’ is increasingly thematized as a re-
source for safeguarding the survival and quality of human life, sustainability 
is coming ever closer to becoming a public-interest idea, measured primarily 
in terms of social equity (with strong equality and solidarity postulates) (cf. 
Diefenbacher 2001; Langhelle 2000). A sustainability concept that vests the 
natural environment with absolute intrinsic rights (‘co-world’ concept) equat-
ing it with other collective (or constitutional) protected goods, would, in 
contrast, run counter to the predominant understanding of public interest 
(cf. Neidhardt 2002). 
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How does the sustainability concept that has emerged from a global dis-
course—in which, it must be said, the countries of the North have had the 
loudest say—relate to the more Western concept of the public interest? 20 The 
question is of more than abstract, conceptual-systematic interest. The op-
tions and desiderata for political practice vary depending on the constella-
tion. They help towards finding passable paths to intercultural understand-
ing and compromise. 
For modern pluralist societies, a minimum of understanding among the 
various groups about the idea of public interest is prerequisite for any com-
promise reconciling the public and private interest21: “The public interest in 
the State under a democratic constitution arises from the equitable balance 
between the various interests, the result of compromises that are achieved in 
accordance with generally recognized rules in the framework of a regulative 
value idea (idea of consensus)” (Fraenkel and Bracher 1970: 73-74). If public 
interest is understood as a ‘regulative idea’ (Fraenkel 1964: 42), the decisive 
question is not what the public interest actually is but who decides it when 
and where. The focus shifts to procedures within the space of its political 
scope of application. Its purpose is to further the general welfare and, by 
ensuring equitable opportunities for individual groups, to help settle differ-
ences and establish societal integration. On the other hand, the public 
interest concept is to curb individualistic sectional interests that run counter 
to this goal: “[T]he public interest stands for the broad versus the narrow, the 
more inclusive versus the limited” (Herring 1972: 170). 
The prerequisite indispensable minimum of common values and the bal-
ance of interests among all involved in the framework of a recognized proce-
dure based on the rule of law restrict the idea of the public interest as a 
maxim for political action to the nation state and its subdivisions,22 where, 
according to the prevailing view, a sense of community can (still just) develop 
in a robust manner. This is reflected, for example, in the acceptance of 
personal disadvantages in the general interest, in the setting aside of utility 
                                                   
20 On the notion of public interest and public interest concepts, see Münkler and Fischer 
(2002), Schuppert and Neidhardt (2002). 
21 The radical rejection of a public interest notion as a moral point of reference for criticizing 
and shaping societal conditions and processes—as espoused by Marxists and ‘hard’ plu-
ralism theoreticians—has remained a minority position. 
22 The public interest is defined as “the general and common welfare of the citizens of a 
community organized as a state,” its realization is considered “the supreme task of gov-
ernment and quasi-governmental action” (Görres-Gesellschaft 1986: 859). 
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considerations in favor of equity objectives, or in the prioritizing of ‘sociability 
aspects’ over merely individual benefit calculations. Central to this is a rather 
strong belief or trust in (at least the fiction of) reciprocity: Namely that those 
benefiting from the change of cost-benefit calculations made deliberately by 
others in their favor will (1) acknowledge the norms and values underlying 
their benefactors’ refraining from a possible realization of their own interests 
and advantages and (2) strive to act in accordance with these norms (i.e., 
demonstrating cooperative behavior) in the medium or long term by them-
selves. 
Comparing Public Interest and Sustainability 
Social equity and equality are among the basic reference values of both 
public interest and sustainable development. Both approaches seek to place 
the utilitarian homo oeconomicus in a normative shell that not only safe-
guards freedom but also secures social integration. The two concepts also 
exhibit differences, sometimes considerable. They are due primarily to differ-
ent space and time perspectives, both of which are far more limited in the 
case of the public interest concept. The national public interest ranks higher 
than the global common good, the interests of current generations come 
before those of future generations. This limits the willingness to recognize 
universal equity and solidarity as binding yardsticks for personal action, or 
to restrict oneself today for the benefit of a distant posterity and accept the 
risk of economic structural change. In times of rampant globalization with its 
turbulent consequences for national economies, social security systems, and 
individual lifestyles, this willingness tends to diminish despite a growing 
realization that complex global effect chains increasingly impact national 
welfare (cf. Beckert et al. 2004). The public interest concept appears norma-
tively under-complex and deficient in the face of global challenges, while the 
sustainability concept seems normatively insensitive to domestic welfare 
interests of industrial countries. 
If the public interest concept would incorporate SD, then globality (con-
cern for more than one’s own national community) and futurity (concern 
about future generations) must be among its systematically constitutive 
elements. Its internal logic would have to provide a promising global civil-
society prospect—without double standards on addressees and the time 
horizon. However, these are peripheral aspects in the mainstream public 
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interest discourse, which has attracted criticism from various sides (Görres-
Gesellschaft 1986: 858 ff.; Sommer and Westphalen 1999: 370).23 Although 
the ‘bundling concept’ of public interest (Ossenbühl 1994) now embraces 
both environmental protection and the interests of coming generations, these 
issues are not really addressed at the cosmopolitan level. The postulate that 
realization of the public interest in the 20th century “is no longer a matter of 
government and governments alone but a task of the world population as a 
whole and of supranational activities and organizations” is largely alien to the 
prevailing understanding of public interest in the 21st century, too.24 Ade-
quate acceptance of the sustainability idea remains a major challenge for the 
covert, internal, functional logic of universally garnished particularism 
associated with the public interest concept. This is the case for the majority 
of Western industrial countries, and still more so for developing countries, 
which generally have a much more limited concept of ‘public interest com-
munity’, where close local, family, or religious relations set the limits to the 
sensus communis. It has therefore rightly been asked: “will the ties of kinship 
or loyalty to village tribe, community, or region permit an awareness of larger 
configuration of ‘public’? … The answer to such questions will determine 
whether the term public interest has a universal applicability or whether it 
will remain a feature of Western jurisprudence and political thought” (Her-
ring 1972: 174). 
Even in affluent ‘Western’ societies, the “conviction that the public inter-
est principle cannot be universalized is … clearly general,” as soon as it is a 
question of who is to benefit from specific public interest policies (Neidhardt 
2002: 172). From a global point of view, the exclusion question is likely to 
become still more urgent, not least of all because the moral impetus for 
universalization is much weaker owing to the operation of other cultural 
norms. Moreover, it is opposed by sound political realism. Why should the 
poor and poorest nations worry about the public interest of, for instance, 
OECD industrial countries if the latter are not even prepared to obey the 
                                                   
23 Attention is drawn, for example to “issues of survival that are now becoming more and 
more urgent, like peace and environmental protection”; “… in view of worldwide destruc-
tion, the survival of all depends on public interest in this sense of the term, also of those 
who have hitherto been largely spared ecological changes …” (Drechsler, Hilligen and 
Neumann 1995: 332). 
24 The Stoics’ public interest concept, in contrast, was cosmopolitan in nature, i.e., it 
included all human beings, and for scholasticism the public interest was “what is good 
for all creatures” (Meyers Kleines Lexikon 1987: 158). 
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principle of give and take? Besides, many developing countries are more 
interested in catching up than in sustainable development. 
Underlying the sustainability concept is a universal system concept. The 
point of reference is the whole of humanity without regard for person, origin, 
or affiliation. The concern for future generations issuing from the ‘futurity 
aspect’ goes far beyond the ‘grandchild perspective’ of the public interest 
concept. 
Compared with the cosmopolitanism of sustainability, the public interest 
concept is almost provincial. Its spatial reference—the community—is gener-
ally the nation state, whose internal organization is based on the construct of 
the ‘alien,’ the non-citizen (Albrow 1998: 271). And even within the nation 
state double standards apply; for example where certain groups of the popu-
lation are excluded from the sensus communis (Neidhardt 2002: 171-71). 
One function of the sustainability concept could be to strengthen a politi-
cal and social development dynamic which is already in motion, gaining 
acceptance and establishing new institutional arrangements for inevitable re-
distribution policies. This would prove as well to be a radical criticism of the 
anachronistic interpretation of the public interest concept. For in the long 
term the effects of the public interest concept will quite certainly bring harm 
to the public interest as such—through diverse feedback mechanisms of an 
ecological, economic, and political nature, as long substantiated by empirical 
and scientific evidence (cf. WBGU 2001, 2003; IPCC 2001b). 
However, in a world that, despite globalization, continues to be domi-
nated by national interests, and in the growing competition between systems 
on account of globalization, it would be politically unwise to play the sustain-
ability idea off against the achievements of national welfare systems, which 
are regarded as constitutive elements of democratic policy and its legitima-
tion. The public interest concept would have the function of integrating the 
strong demands for self-restriction and re-distribution derived from the 
worldwide equity ideal of the sustainability concept into democratic legitima-
tion processes that still operate largely at the national level: of containing 
them and making them more realistic.25  
                                                   
25 “Although it certainly makes sense to describe a lifestyle directed towards sustainability 
as an alternative form of a gratifying life …” (Renn 2001: 95-96), in democratic societies it 
is inevitable that majorities for this vision have to be sought in nationally organized politi-
cal contexts: a genuine zero-growth strategy as a political electoral program “would be po-
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For a long time to come, the emerging global governance institutions and 
regimes are unlikely to be an adequate substitute in generating and legiti-
mating majority decisions on key policy issues with a strongly re-distributive 
impact—for reasons similar or even more complex to those advanced in the 
discussion on the democratic legitimation of European policy in the frame-
work of the European Union (cf. Kielmansegg 1996: 55 ff.; Scharpf 1999: 
16 ff., 167-168). 
As we have seen, not only positive relations but also strong tensions exist 
between the sustainability and public interest concepts. They result from 
different referential bases, which in simplified form can be described as 
national versus global, present versus future: the public interest concept 
emphasizes the Here and Now, the sustainability concept the There and 
Later. This is a particular problem in designing policy strategy. It is argued 
that there is no way to avoid giving equal weight to both concepts in the 
politico-social discourse. In an increasingly boundless world that is increas-
ingly interdependent in questions of survival, a concept for the development 
of society needs to be elaborated, in the sense of a visionary pragmatism, 
that promises a decent life for all even in the distant future (cf. also Jonas 
1984). 
Conclusion: No Public Interest without Sustainability, no Sustainability without 
Public Interest26 
Goal conflicts between the two ideas can in principle occur at all levels of 
action (local, national, global) and at any time. As governments’ duty to take 
formative action and their responsibility for the consequences become less 
and less limited in space and time, the potential for conflict tends to grow, 
especially in the industrial countries. In the conventional understanding of 
the public interest, the more faithfully and devotedly policies are geared to 
                                                                                                                                                  
litical suicide in Europe” (von Weizsäcker 2001: 23). The basic principles and arrange-
ments laid down by the German constitution for finding a balance in complicated con-
flicts of interest or values—for example, the precept of a balance of interests, the ban on 
excessive and inadequate measures (cf. Schuppert 2002)—could be guiding principles for 
a discourse on ‘sustainability and the public interest.’ Given the not infrequent abuse of 
discourses to legitimate inactivity on an issue, the relevance for practice cannot be em-
phasized strongly enough. In this regard D. C. Esty (2001: 75) is very apodictic: “The time 
for grand vision and flowery rhetoric has passed. The challenges ahead require sharper 
focus, real commitment, and concrete action.” 
26 Variation of a postulate by W. Sachs (2002: 28): “No equity … without ecology … no 
ecology without equity”; see also Sachs, Loske and Linz 1998: VIII. 
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the principle of sustainability, the more seriously are they seen to threaten 
the (national) public interest. This is evident in the so-called global environ-
mental challenges like climate change and how governments react to them. 
Only meager progress has been made in international climate policy de-
spite considerable input in negotiations and research. The countries that 
have substantially lowered their emissions of greenhouse gases by policy 
measures can be counted on one hand.27 The majority of climate researchers 
expect global warming to have disastrous effects, especially for the popula-
tion of poorer countries.28 The main offenders, the industrial member coun-
tries of the OECD, have less dramatic repercussions to fear; their economic 
and technical capacities give them greater scope for limiting damage. Not 
only their presumed lesser vulnerability but also the anticipated costs and 
socioeconomic consequences have so far hindered a climate policy which 
would take more appropriate account of the problem and those who cause it. 
For, despite the interest-motivated dramatization of the economic impact of a 
strict policy to reduce greenhouse gases, there can be no doubt that high 
costs would generate considerable short and medium-term distribution 
effects at variance with public interest goals. And if measures to protect the 
                                                   
27 According to the 3rd report of the Intergovernmental Panel of Climate Change published in 
spring 2001 (‘Climate Change 2001’), the mean global temperature will rise by up to six 
degrees Celsius in this century alone, if the course of climate policy is not corrected 
worldwide. The main cause of global warming is seen in the enrichment of the atmos-
phere with greenhouse gases through the growing consumption of fossil fuels and defor-
estation. Between 1990 and 2000 alone, the OECD countries, with an average economic 
growth rate of 16.5 percent, increased their CO2 emissions by almost 15 percent. The 
Kyoto Protocol adopted in the context of the UN Climate Convention (1992) in Kyoto in 
1997 (but not yet in force) requires the industrial countries, which bear the main respon-
sibility for climate warming, to reduce their emissions of greenhouse gases by 5.2 percent 
below the 1990 level by 2010. According to a recent study, from 1990 to 2003 total global 
CO2 emissions increased by almost 20 percent; in the same period developing (‘non-
annex-I’) countries show a steep rise in CO2 emissions of 58 percent—they now account 
for about 45 percent of global CO2 emissions (DIW-Wochenbericht, No. 37/2004, pp. 526-
527). 
28 A number of industrial countries are among those that stand to gain from climate 
change, whereas most developing countries will be among the losers. Within Europe, 
southern countries are likely to be worse affected than the northern nations, and poor pe-
ripheral regions will suffer more than well-off regions. For the poorest countries like 
Bangladesh, according to calculations by Münchener Rückversicherung, the economic 
damage caused by climate change could amount to 20 percent and more of the national 
product (Wirtschaftswoche, No. 29, 12 July 2001, p. 25). As a whole, the negative effects 
will chiefly be borne by the countries and population groups that have contributed least 
to the emission of greenhouse gases and thus to creating the problem (cf. the article by 
H. E. Ott and B. Brouns in Das Parlament, No. 46, 9 Nov. 2001, p. 3; for a comprehensive 
treatment of the issue “Consequences of Climate Change,” cf. IPCC 2001b; also Kluger 
and Lemonick 2001). For estimates about costs of climate change in Germany, see DIW-
Wochenbericht, Vol. 72, No. 12-13/2005, pp. 209-215. 
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climate are governed by a concept of global ecological distributive equity like 
the ‘environmental space concept’—which lays down a worldwide, uniform, 
per capita right to use (and stress) natural resources—the industrial coun-
tries would have to expect far-reaching domestic changes in socioeconomic 
distribution patterns owing to the reductions imposed. Maintenance of the 
Western resource-intensive lifestyle would appear impossible (DIW, WI and 
WZB 2000: 371).  
Despite the economic and societal consequences of an equality-based eq-
uity principle, with their almost paralyzing effect on political sustainability 
initiatives, there is no convincing moral meta-reason why a distribution rule 
deviating from the per-capita principle (and thus sanctioning inequality) 
should apply with regard to essential global common goods (like the atmos-
phere). Political realism and not moral dignity is behind arguments in favor 
of unequal distribution.29 Nor is it a matter of solitary sacrifices on the part of 
the advanced industrial countries but of the consequences of their ecological 
imperialism. 
However, especially in the industrial countries, subordinating public in-
terest policy to a radical sustainability idea would, at least in the short and 
medium term, bring growing internal conflict. This would be caused, among 
other things, by curbing the scope for prosperity-oriented public interest 
policy in conjunction with the prospect of a gigantic re-distribution program 
in favor of a geographically, temporally, or ‘emotionally’ distant environment, 
‘co-world,’ and posterity. Even weak sustainability policies show clearly that 
prospective losses in welfare meet with heavy opposition. This is the case 
even in some of the wealthiest countries whose level of prosperity is based in 
not inconsiderable measure on the global externalization of the ecological 
and social follow-up costs of their way of pursuing economic affairs. The 
present American administration, for example, is among the most adamant 
opponents of a coordinated global climate policy. It consistently rejects 
international agreements as being contrary to the American ‘public interest’ 
(cf. Brown 2002). In Germany, once a pioneer in environmental matters, the 
                                                   
29 On the various arguments that have been advanced in the discussion about political 
strategies for action in favor of an unequal distribution of global resources among the 
countries of this world (like safeguarding existing development paths, different basic cli-
matic/geographical conditions, the danger of bureaucratized quota systems, etc.); cf. 
Knaus and Renn (1998: 68 ff.); Helm and Simonis (2001: 215-217). For a general discus-
sion, see Shue (1993). 
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so-called eco-tax has, since its internationally belated introduction in 1999, 
been a source of constant annoyance for a considerable number of people—
blown up out of all proportion by opposition parties, industrial and motoring 
associations—despite far-reaching exemptions and compensations for par-
ticular industries and frequent drivers. Critics have decried the economic 
incompatibility of the tax (damage to international competitiveness due to 
higher energy prices and the consequent risk of a fall in the general level of 
prosperity in the country) and its social inequity (higher petrol prices for 
frequent car drivers and motorists in rural areas). Leaving aside the ecologi-
cal goals (reducing private transport levels, promoting environmentally more 
efficient mobility, etc.), the principal socioeconomic goal—actually a public-
interest objective—of creating jobs by using revenues to lower charges on 
labor has been pushed into the background in the public discussion. The 
problems that occur even in a wealthy country like Germany, with a com-
paratively high level of environmental awareness, when a modest contribu-
tion to sustainability is demanded—and one that is not even lost to the 
country but reallocated for the benefit of the nation as a whole—give some 
idea of how high the obstacles would be for attempts to introduce the more 
demanding climate policy measures that would be necessary from an ecologi-
cal point of view, not to mention transfer payments to countries using a low 
proportion of common ecological goods. Moreover, an international compari-
son of environmental policies shows that even a consistent ‘ecological mod-
ernization policy’ in many industrial countries would at present overburden 
the environmental policy capacities at hand, since the necessary cognitive-
emotional, technological-economic, and sociopolitical/institutional capacities 
are not yet available (Weidner and Jänicke 2002). 
These few examples alone demonstrate that the public interest idea can 
be mobilized without contradiction in opposition to sustainability goals 
recognized as necessary and legitimate. The more restricted temporal and 
spatial perspective of the public interest idea benefits from the fact that 
charity begins at home. The (at least plausible) positive long-term effects of 
initially costly sustainability measures on one's own well-being are appar-
ently difficult to comprehend cognitively and emotionally, and new groups of 
winners and losers would soon make their appearance. In these circum-
stances it is little wonder that, in the public debate on the demands of sus-
tainable development the more evident public interest concerns are played off 
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against a supposedly cosmopolitan utopia of ‘pursuing world happiness into 
the blue beyond.’ 
Nevertheless, keeping in mind the most general questions that, according 
to Martin Albrow (1998: 267), “the idea of the State had to answer from the 
outset: Whose public interest is meant? How far does it go?”30 The answer 
with regard to the behavior of rich towards poor societies is clear31: in es-
sence, the sense of community is limited, first, to those who live within an 
organic historico-cultural community and, second, to the foreseeable future. 
In modern conceptual terms, the prevailing understanding of public interest 
corresponds to the position taken by an etatist communitarianism, not a 
liberal universalism (cf. Ballestrem 2001: 8). However, the underlying di-
chotomies of Here and There, Now and Later have in fact long since been 
cancelled by global ecological challenges. Advancing globalization is progres-
sively eliminating the distinctions in other dimensions, too (economic, politi-
cal, social, cultural): “The image of concentric circles—the farther away a 
person is from us the smaller is our obligation towards him—appears no 
longer to apply” (Ballestrem 2001: 7). 
2.3 The Relationship with Equity 
The concept of ‘ecological modernization’ (EM) takes up basic mechanisms of 
modern capitalist societies—an interest in expansion, efficiency, innovation, 
and profits—which it seeks to instrumentalize to protect the environment 
and natural resources. Intragenerational and intergenerational equity play a 
peripheral role; such issues are regarded more in realpolitik terms as limiting 
factors that have to be taken into account by astute environmental policy in 
the globalization age rather than as primary normative goals. Global envi-
ronmental problems play an important role, but they are not per se at the top 
of the agenda. Priority is usually given to those problems that lead to the 
most detrimental effects at the national level or if their solution corresponds 
in other respects with the national interest. 
                                                   
30 The two other questions that need to be asked are: “Who guarantees it? And How?” 
(Albrow (1998: 267). 
31 This is by and large the case: a few countries like the Netherlands, Sweden, and until 
recently Denmark have shown that social and economic self-interest and global ecological 
and other goals can be linked in a socially acceptable manner. Incidentally, these coun-
tries do well in overall comparison with other countries in the dimensions environmental 
policy, societal integration capacity, social peace, and level of welfare (cf. Jänicke and 
Weidner 1997). 
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The equity issue constitutes the most crucial difference between EM and 
SD. I agree with Langhelle’s results of an analysis of the Brundtland Report 
‘Our Common Future’ (WCED 1987) that the satisfaction of human needs, in 
particular the essential needs of the world’s poor, “must in light of both the 
definition and the first key concept be seen as the primary objective of devel-
opment.… The qualification that this development must also be sustainable 
is a constraint placed on this goal, meaning that each generation is permitted 
to pursue its interests only in ways that do not undermine the ability of 
future generations to meet their own needs. … [S]ocial justice—understood 
as need satisfaction—is in this perspective at the core of sustainable devel-
opment … [It] is the primary goal of sustainable development” (Langhelle 
2000: 307). Furthermore, and also in contrast to the concept of EM, sustain-
able development introduces the global perspective on ecological, develop-
mental, and distributional problems within the existing generation (intragen-
erational justice) as well as between generations (intergenerational justice). A 
fair allocation of global goods, of the costs for environmental policy measures 
and the costs of coping with the social and economic consequences of un-
avoided environmental problems is given overriding priority. Due to the 
global perspective of the SD concept, global environmental problems enjoy 
top priority and, among these, the issue of climate change ranks first. Finally, 
the SD concept explicitly recognizes that, on the one hand, the legitimate 
developmental aspirations of developing countries cannot be met if they 
follow the growth path taken by industrialized countries, and that, on the 
other hand, industrialized countries must reduce sharply the stress they 
impose on the ecological system in order to allow for the economic growth 
necessary to satisfy the need of the poorer countries. The SD concept could 
be characterized by the well-know slogan, “Think globally, act locally”; the 
EM (and also the public interest) concept, in turn, is broadly reflected in the 
slogan, “Think locally/nationally, act globally.” 
The comparison of the central characteristics of the SD and EM concepts 
shows clearly that the most crucial difference of both concepts is related to 
the issue of equity/social justice. From this follows that the need for re-
distributive policies on a global scale is inherent to the SD concept. Although 
equity concerns are also central to the concept of public interest, they are 
confined to a specific community, usually within the borders of a region or 
country. Because the public interest concept lacks a global perspective and 
has a rather narrow understanding of ‘futurity’, it has much more in com-
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mon with the EM concept than with SD. In section 4 of this paper, I analyze 
whether these different notions of equity matter in environmental policies 
and Local Agenda 21 activities in Germany. Beforehand an overview of the 
basic characteristics and development of German SD and environmental 
policy is given. 
3. Environmental Policy and Sustainable Development Policy in 
Germany 
Although Germany was not among the pioneers in establishing a modern 
institutionalized environmental policy in the 1960s it became a close and 
highly effective follower of the then leading forerunners (in particular the 
U.S., Sweden, and Japan; cf. Schreurs 2002, Jänicke and Weidner 1997) and 
only a little later became a pioneer in important areas, stimulating progres-
sive developments in other countries (Weidner 2002c). With respect to the 
concept of ‘ecological modernization’—developed in theoretical terms in the 
early 1980s—Germany was the absolute forerunner in both conceptualiza-
tion and institutionalization and strongly influenced other countries with its 
approach. Since the 1990s, Germany has been among the group of pioneers 
in climate protection policy and remained one of the driving forces in interna-
tional negotiations. However, in Sustainable Development (SD) as well as 
Local Agenda 21 (LA 21) activities the country was among the real laggards 
although it has been catching up quickly with the leaders in these areas 
since the late 1990s. 
3.1 Environmental Policy 
3.1.1 General Overview 
For over 30 years now, Germany has had a systematic modern environ-
mental policy, which is both institutionally and legally well grounded within 
the general political system. A variety of factors led to some progressive 
developments. These factors included a heightened environmental con-
sciousness in society, some spectacular and widespread pollution events 
(especially ‘forest dieback’), and growing interest within the business sector 
in the expanding environmental markets. Other factors included the chal-
lenges in the political arena by the well-organized ecological movement, and 
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the founding of green parties at all levels (local to national). The measures 
taken and their outcome have assured Germany’s temporarily high standing 
in the field of progressive environmental policy (Weidner 2002c, Mez 1995). 
The onset of forward-looking clean air policy at the national level acceler-
ated the West German government’s international activities, and it also set 
the pace, more and more frequently, at the level of the EC. These activities 
were not only rational from a global perspective, but also coincided with the 
country’s own interest in spurring internationally coordinated measures 
against acid rain and long-range currents of air pollutants, since German 
industry could offer the necessary environmental technology. The concept of 
climate protection, especially the ambitious goal of reducing CO² emissions 
by 25 percent of 1990 levels by 2005 has supported a new ecological orienta-
tion in the field of energy policy, emphasizing the necessity of a long-term 
perspective. In November 1994, an amendment to the Constitution (Art. 20a 
GG) made environmental protection a ‘state goal’ (Staatsziel). 
The new challenges to environmental policy posed by the economic re-
cession, which began after the unification of the two German states, put a 
brake on the more progressive developments. However, a massive rollback in 
environmental policy did not take place and would be hard to achieve be-
cause not only has a substantial ecological consciousness become part of the 
German value system but also did a broad-based institutionalization of 
environmental policy take place, and competitive ‘green’ commercial and 
industrial sectors developed (Jänicke and Weidner 1997; Weidner 1997). The 
stability in environmental politics is consistent with the general hypothesis 
that the institutional conditions in German politics make a fundamental 
change of strategy a long drawn-out process. As a rule, major changes re-
quire broad political and social consensus, typically gained through a com-
plicated and time-consuming process. The roots of this approach lie in the 
German neocorporatist pattern of problem-solving and its associated institu-
tional fabric. This fabric includes the specific form of German federalism, 
namely the requirement for the rule of law with its entailing constitutional 
opportunities to scrutinize fundamental political decisions, and the propor-
tional voting system which seldom leads to clear-cut political majorities (cf. 
Schmidt 1990). 
The old neocorporatist mode of cooperation of the postwar period found 
among state, business associations, and unions (the ‘iron triangle’) has 
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gradually developed in the direction of a network (the ‘green rectangle’) in 
which organizations specifically representing environmental concerns are 
now also able to participate in important environment-related political deci-
sions. More and more parts of the business sector have developed a keen 
interest in stringent environmental regulations, creating new markets and 
expanding those already established. For a long time, the so-called eco-
industry has enjoyed above-average growth rates and reached a leading 
position in the world market. 
The victory of the Social Democrats and the Greens in the national elec-
tions of fall 1998, in which both parties had emphasized the ‘ecological 
modernization’ of German society and industry in their campaigns, demon-
strates that a majority of the German population supported a progressive 
environmental policy, even when the globalization debate was at its height.  
Both parties’ election manifestos stressed a strong commitment to a 
strategy of ‘ecological modernization’ of economy and society to promote 
innovation and employment. In addition, both favored, in principle, an eco-
logical tax reform. In simple terms, the objective of this reform was to shift 
the tax burden from labor to pollution. Green Party member Jürgen Trittin 
became the new Minister of the Environment. Large parts of the population 
put high hopes in the new government and the ‘green’ minister, not only with 
respect to a consolidation of social welfare and reduced unemployment, but 
also with regard to environmental policy. In particular, they hoped for a more 
active policy against ‘global environmental challenges,’ especially global 
warming. 
As early as April 1999, the first stage of the ecological tax reform, which 
attempts to reduce fossil-fuel consumption by levying higher taxes on energy 
(including gasoline), was implemented.32 Due to an imprudent political 
strategy pursued by the Ministry of the Environment (and representatives of 
the Green Party), a broad and polemic press campaign against the tax reform 
was launched. The tax reform met massive opposition from the business 
sector, and large parts of the public also protested against it because, in view 
of rising energy prices, they feared adverse social and economic conse-
quences. The ‘eco-tax’ is thought to have a number of flaws, including the 
                                                   
32 The ecological tax reform raised existing taxes on gasoline by € 0.03 per liter each year 
until 2003. Eco-taxes were similarly applied to fuel oil, natural gas and liquid petroleum 
gas. A levy on electricity was also introduced. 
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facts that tax rates for industries are much lower than those for the residen-
tial sector, that some industries are even exempted, and that the tax is not 
based on the carbon content of fuels.33 In 1999, a total of € 9.5 billion were 
levied through the eco-tax. According to the stepwise increase in tax rates, 
the amount for 2003 was € 16.6 billion. It is estimated that the revenue 
raised by the ecological tax reform will increase to about € 19 billion by 2008. 
The eco-tax revenue is used primarily to cut monthly social security contri-
butions from employers and employees in order to lower labor costs and 
encourage job creation. 34 It is also meant to act as an incentive to efficiency-
related and thus emission-reducing measures (BMU 2002a: 60 ff.). These 
potential effects are usually called the ‘double dividend’ of the eco-tax. As a 
result of nationwide protests against socially unfair effects of high fuel prices, 
in 2000 the government was forced to introduce nonrecurring compensation 
measures for those hit hardest by the eco-tax (especially commuters and low-
income households). 
Concerning general environmental and nature protection policy, the new 
government has—with few exceptions (see Rat von Sachverständigen für 
Umweltfragen, in the following: SRU, 2000)—neither achieved anything worth 
mentioning from an international comparative view nor created innovative 
programs. In spite of repeated announcements since 1999, a comprehensive 
‘national environmental plan,’ as has been set up in many other countries, 
was established only as late as April 2002. Also repeatedly announced since 
1999 was the establishment of an independent national Council for Sustain-
able Development, but only in April 2001 such a body was finally estab-
lished. 
In terms of energy policy, however, the new government set ambitious 
goals and began implementing appropriate measures to reach them (see Mez 
2004)—for example, by raising the share of renewable energy35 in power 
generation to 12.5 percent (from 4.6 percent in 1998 and 7.9 percent in 
                                                   
33 Those sectors of the economy that are exposed most to international competition (manu-
facturing, agriculture, forestry) are entitled to eco-tax rebates of up to 80 percent; from 
2003 on, these rebates are gradually reduced. 
34 A small part of the revenue is reserved for the promotion of renewable energy projects and 
energy-efficient buildings (€ 150 million in 2001; € 190 million in 2002, € 200 million in 
2003; these subsidies will be gradually raised to € 230 million in 2006). Furthermore, en-
ergy-efficient combined heat and power generation (co-generation) is exempted from elec-
tricity and mineral oil taxes. 
35 For comprehensive information on renewable energy and related technology, see 
<http://www.energy-germany.de> 
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2003) by 2010, and to 20 percent by 2020.36 Already, Germany is the world’s 
leading nation (far ahead of the United States) in wind-energy generation 
(BMU 2003). In view of the energy policy goals, it was conceivable that at 
least the objective of the Kyoto Protocol of 1997 to reduce greenhouse-gas 
emissions could be achieved. Compared to 1990, Germany succeeded in 
lowering emissions by 19 percent in 2002 (supported by industrial shut-
downs in the former GDR).37 However, the National Allocation Plan (CO²), 
established in April 2004 in connection with the emissions trading system, 
makes it very difficult to reach the reduction goal, because the industry 
(supported by the Minister of Economic Affairs) won the bargaining process. 
The Ministry of the Environment wanted to fix a reduction goal of 28 million 
tons from 1998 to 2012 but had to concede to a much lower goal of 13 
million tons. On the one hand, this means that reduction efforts concerning 
households and traffic must be increased immensely. On the other hand, the 
burden of CO² reduction policy is likely to be shifted from the producers to 
the consumers (see DIW-Wochenbericht, No. 10/2004: 121-128). However, 
among the western industrialized countries that have achieved any CO² 
reductions, Germany ranks first. In international climate policy, Germany 
continued to play an active and progressive part. 
The present German government has now been in office for about six 
years. This is a short time frame for a well-founded evaluation of its envi-
ronmental performance (cf. Mez 2003; SRU 2004). Therefore, the critical 
judgment given here must be read with caution. In addition, it is necessary 
to consider the particular restrictions with which the environmental policy of 
the ‘red-green’ government has had to cope. Although public opinion polls 
indicate that Germans still think environmental issues are very important, 
other issues (especially unemployment and social security) have gained 
higher priority during recent years. Business organizations have used the 
‘globalization debate’ in trying to fend off stricter environmental regulations, 
although so far there have been no valid indications that globalization has 
                                                   
36 These concrete goals are fixed in the 2004 amendment to the Renewable Energy Act. The 
use of renewable energy contributed to a CO² reduction of 52.6 million tons in 2003 (Um-
welt, BMU 5/2004: 262). The following types of renewable energy made up the total 7.9 
percent share of renewable energy in gross electricity consumption in 2003: waterpower 
3.5 percent, biomass 1.2 percent, photovoltaic/solar power 0.1 percent, wind power 3.1 
percent (Umwelt, BMU 4/2004: 192).  
37 Energy-related CO² emissions decreased by 15 percent in 2003 (compared to 1990); when 
taking into account seasonal changes of temperature, the reduction amounts to 17 per-
cent (DIW-Wochenbericht, No. 10/2004: 121). 
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brought disadvantages to countries with a progressive environmental policy 
or triggered a race to pollution havens (i.e., relocation of production to coun-
tries with lower environmental standards) (Weidner and Jänicke 2002). With 
few exceptions,38 Chancellor Schröder supports environmental policy only 
halfheartedly and tends to side with the interests of large industries or trade 
unions (Weidner 2002c). Last but not least, the previous successes of envi-
ronmental policy seem to have given an ‘all-clear signal,’ so that many Ger-
mans feel existing regulations are sufficient to further improve environmental 
quality. The absence of recent environmental catastrophes (forest dieback, 
smog, and so on) has reinforced this feeling of safety. However, the catastro-
phic flash flooding of some regions in the summer of 2002 have widely re-
stimulated discussions on the need for stricter and more comprehensive 
environmental policy (and, again, demonstrated the actual power of solidarity 
and equity values within Germany). They obviously have also contributed to 
the red-green coalition’s re-election in September 2002; the people attributed 
higher environmental competencies to the government than to the opposition 
parties. Especially the Green Party gained votes. 
Overall, compared to the last term of the preceding conservative-liberal 
government, the environmental policy of the red-green coalition has been 
clearly more dynamic. When focusing on energy- and climate-related areas 
(phase-out of nuclear energy, promotion of renewable energy, introduction of 
eco-taxes), a significant policy change has taken place. The German govern-
ment, again, became a driving force in international environmental policy 
negotiations, which was particularly visible at the World Summit on Sustain-
able Development in Johannesburg in August/September 2002.39 And, at 
least, Germany caught up with many other countries in establishing a na-
tional sustainability strategy in April 2002. 
                                                   
38 Chancellor Schröder was decisive in launching the global initiative on renewable energies 
during the Johannesburg Summit on Sustainable Development in 2002. He pledged to 
allocate € 1 billion for the promotion of renewable energy and energy efficiency in develop-
ing countries for the timeframe 2003-2007. At the ‘Renewables 2004’ conference in Bonn, 
the German government announced its decision to make an additional € 500 million 
available (2005-2010) for special loans. The conference was attended by about 130 minis-
ters and more than 3,000 participants from 154 counties. The main goal of the confer-
ence was to support developing countries in switching to renewable energies, placing 
equal emphasis on both climate protection and development opportunities. For the out-
comes of the conference, see <http://www.renewables2004.de/en/2004/outcome.asp>. 
39 Especially the global initiative on renewable energies goes back to an effort of the German 
government. The first international conference on the issue (‘Renewables 2004’) took 
place in Bonn in June 2004 (cf. <http://www.renewables2004.de>). 
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3.1.2 Climate Change and Energy Policy 
Germany’s strengths in air pollution control policy, acquired at an early 
stage, positively affected its commitment in climate policy matters. In the 
early 1990s Germany belonged to the leading countries taking up the global 
climate challenge (cf. Schreurs 2002; Cavender-Bares, Jäger and Ell 2001; 
Grundmann 1999). A wave of governmental activities was raised by a com-
prehensive scientific investigation on the issue of climate change and the 
anthropogenic greenhouse effect undertaken by the German Physical Society 
in 1986. This report was soon followed by a widely debated cover story of the 
weekly political magazine, Der Spiegel, that pointed at the potentially large-
scale destructive effects of an increasing global warming for the Earth, in 
general, and for Germany, in particular (especially flooding of certain regions 
and big cities). In March 1987 chancellor Kohl declared that the climate issue 
represented the most important environmental problem. On the national 
level the Committee for the Environment, Nature Conservation, and Nuclear 
Safety of the German Bundestag agreed to establish an Enquete Commission 
on Preventive Measures to Protect the Earth’s Atmosphere (Enquête-
Kommission ‘Vorsorge zum Schutz der Erdatmosphäre’), with the mandate to 
study the ozone problem as well as climate change and to make proposals for 
action. In its first report of 1989 the Commission recommended strong 
national and international efforts to reduce drastically climate-relevant 
emissions. The Commission recommended a 30 percent reduction of 1987 
levels of CO2 and methane emissions by 2005, and an 80 percent reduction 
by 2050 (German Bundestag 1991) as well as a fundamental reform of energy 
policy. In June 1990 the federal government adopted a reduction target for 
energy-related CO² emissions of 25-30 percent of 1987 levels by 2005. This 
target was changed later on to a 25 percent reduction goal based on the 
emission level of 1990. Furthermore, in June 1990 an inter-ministerial 
working group (IMA) ‘CO2 reduction’ was established, which developed a 
program proposing a broad range of measures to reach the reduction goal 
(Beuermann and Jäger 1996; Beuermann 2000). This program led to a 
variety of legal and administrative activities based primarily on energy- and 
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technology-related measures (e.g., the Electricity Feed-In Law of 1990, suc-
ceeded by the Renewable Energies Sources Act, enacted in April 200040). 
Although, due to the economic downturn and increasing unemployment 
rates, climate policy lost some of its momentum during the 1990s, it never 
suffered as much from the economic recession as other environmental policy 
areas. Chancellor Kohl and various federal environmental ministers (of all 
governments) often played an active and sometimes decisive role in getting 
progressive international climate protection policies and agreements on the 
right track (Jänicke and Weidner 1997). This holds also true for the present 
Chancellor Schröder (for example, consider his commitment at the World 
Summit on Sustainable Development in Johannesburg, 2002), although in 
other environmental policy areas he was clearly biased in favor of economic 
interests (see, for instance, the EU automobile scrap directive or the eco-tax). 
The current Minister of the Environment, Jürgen Trittin, recently announced 
a German motion for achieving an EU commitment to reduce its greenhouse 
gases until 2020 by 30 percent compared to 1990 levels. If the EU agrees, 
Germany would even strive for a reduction of 40 percent in this period (Um-
welt, BMU 1/2003: 33). 
In sharp contrast to some other industrial countries, especially the so-
called umbrella countries, there was no fundamental opposition against 
climate policy as such, either by influential interest groups and political 
parties or by other actor groups. This broad consensus on the necessity of 
strict and internationally accorded global climate protection measures is also 
reflected in the unanimous acceptance of the bill concerning ratification of 
the Kyoto Protocol by the German parliament and the upper house (Bundes-
rat) in March 2002 and April 2002, respectively. Disputes about climate 
policy mostly center around nuclear phase-out policy, questions of suitabil-
ity, rationality or feasibility of instruments, reasonable time frames for im-
plementation, distortion of competition among different ‘energy lines,’ and, 
probably most importantly, the argument that Germany’s industry would not 
be internationally competitive because of higher production costs resulting 
from the extremely demanding environmental standards and Germany’s 
position as a forerunner. Nevertheless, a group of German industrial associa-
                                                   
40 The Renewable Energies Sources Act (Erneuerbare-Energien-Gesetz, EEG ) was amended in 
2004 in order to avoid placing overly high burdens on energy-intensive industrial enter-
prises. 
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tions and individual firms has not only renewed the formerly voluntary 
commitment. Now, an agreement between the government and the German 
industry was entered in November 2002 to reduce CO² emissions by 20 
percent from 1996 to 2005, with an additional pledge to achieve even higher 
reduction rates (28 percent by 2005, compared to 1990 levels). Furthermore, 
for all six greenhouse gases listed in the Kyoto Protocol, specific emissions 
are to be reduced by 35 percent until 2012, based on 1990 levels. The 
achievements are monitored by an independent institute. Worldwide there is 
no commitment of business groups to climate protection comparable to that 
of German industry.41 The scientific community, too, did not contest signifi-
cantly the theory that global warming is mainly a result of the combustion of 
fossil fuels and that there will be dramatic impacts on mankind and nature 
unless global warming is stopped. And, as surveys show, a majority of the 
population considers global warming the most challenging environmental 
issue. 
From the very beginning, climate protection policy was given high priority 
by the red-green government that came into power in fall 1998 (see BMU 
2002a: 38 ff.; Mez 2003). In the coalition contract (Koalitionsvereinbarung), 
the parties agreed on a 25 percent reduction target for CO² emissions, and in 
October 2000, a comprehensive national climate protection program was 
launched, envisaging, inter alia, a sharp increase in renewable energy, heat 
and power (co-)generation, and a significant increase in energy productivity. 
This program is based on the 5th report of the aforementioned interministerial 
committee (Interministerielle Arbeitsgruppe—IMA), ‘CO² Reduction,’ chaired by 
the Federal Ministry of the Environment. In contrast to climate policy pro-
grams of the former conservative-liberal government, the program of 2000 
lists concrete CO² reduction targets for various sectors (e.g., households, 
                                                   
41 However, when negotiating the conditions of the German National Allocation Plan for the 
European emissions trading system, which started in 2005, industry and energy compa-
nies succeeded to fix for their sector a reduction target of only 10 million tons by 2012. 
The total allowance of CO2 emissions for both sectors was fixed at 503 million tons per 
year for 2005-2007, and 495 million tons per year for the years 2008 to 2012. (cf. BMU, 
‘Balance halten: Umweltpolitik für ein zukunftsfähiges und lebenswertes Deutschland,’ 
Berlin, September 2004, p. 21). Compared to their voluntary commitment this is a much 
weaker target (cf. <http;//www.germanwatch.org>; DIW-Wochenbericht, No. 31/2004: 
445). Consequently, in order to meet the Kyoto commitment, larger reductions than 
planned must be achieved in transport and the private household sector (space heating, 
hot water supply, electrical appliances). From this follows that the burden of private 
households to contribute to greenhouse gases reduction has been increased in favor of 
big industry. The emission trading system is regulated by the Emissions Trading of 
Greenhouse Gases Act (Treibhausgas-Emissionshandelsgesetz—TEHG ) of March 2004. 
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industry, transport, power supply). Another outstanding energy policy meas-
ure is the (highly controversial) electricity ‘feed-in’ act adopted in 1999, later 
on renamed ‘Renewable Energies Sources Act.’ It is designed to support the 
development of renewable energy by ensuring guaranteed prices to be paid by 
power companies to producers of electricity from renewable sources. Further 
measures include the ‘100,000 Roofs Solar Power Program’ (running from 
1999 to 2004), based on government subsidies. There are also several meas-
ures to cut energy consumption in private households, including stricter 
construction regulations and tax breaks for the modernization of older build-
ings; investments in public transportation; and the promotion of more effi-
cient cars. Furthermore, the federal government committed itself to reduce 
CO² emissions in its own spheres of competence by 25 percent by 2005 and 
30 percent by 2010 (based on 1990 levels). There are also manifold climate 
protection projects running at state and local levels, often in relation to Local 
Agenda 21 activities (cf. www.iclei.org; www.klimabuendnis.org). 
The highly contested so-called eco-tax legislation was enacted in 1999. It 
provided for annual increases in taxes on mineral oil, heating oil, natural gas 
and electricity in five steps, ending in 2003. The basic idea of the eco-tax is 
to make labor less expensive while raising prices for non-renewable energy 
consumption, to support a shift to ‘environment-friendly’ technologies (e.g., 
with low or zero CO² emissions), and to create new jobs (BMU 2002a: 60 ff.). 
Germany made remarkable progress in the reduction of greenhouse 
gases. It obviously belongs to the world’s leading countries in climate policy 
performance. This even holds true when disregarding any ‘wall-fall profits’ 
(i.e., CO² reductions in the course of the de-industrialization process in the 
five new states of the former GDR). Until recently—with the beginning of 
2000—a trend of declining CO² emissions started to show in the transport 
sector, indicating that the eco-tax took effect. But in spite of these favorable 
developments it is generally deemed unlikely that the 25 percent reduction 
goal can be met in 2005. This might explain why for quite some time this 
goal has not been mentioned by government representatives in official state-
ments or publications. However, chances are that the ‘European target’ for 
Germany (21 percent reduction of greenhouse gases by 2008/2012, com-
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pared to 1990 levels) might be within reach if the government takes addi-
tional energy policy efforts (DIW-Wochenbericht, 8/2003, p. 136).42 
All in all, Germany has been among the forerunners in national and in-
ternational climate protection policy, and—in spite of the increasing brake-
man’s attitude of the energy-intensive industries—the country has secured, if 
not strengthened, its leading position. Germany’s strength in this policy area 
may be explained, in part, by a ‘positive path dependency’, i.e., it is the result 
of Germany’s generally excellent performance in air pollution control (sta-
tionary and mobile sources) over many years and related energy policies that 
received their main impulses from wide-spread visible problems leading to 
broad public debates and deep conflicts some decades ago, such as forest 
die-back (Waldsterben ) and various smog episodes in larger cities and in 
Germany’s largest industrial region, the Ruhr Valley (see Weidner 2002c: 
177 ff.). 
3.2 Ecological Modernization (EM) as Conceived by the Government 
The concept of ecological modernization (in the following: EM), as used by the 
German government, is based on the pragmatic, ‘bureaucratic’ definition of 
EM, which primarily conceptualizes it as an economic-technical transforma-
tion towards an ecologically sound society, driven by technological change 
and innovation in all sectors of society, and supported by a balanced restruc-
turing or downscaling of environmentally problematic sectors (like agricul-
ture and open-cast coal mining). At the same time, the concept aims at an 
improvement of ecological and economic efficiency and emphasizes the 
importance of economic and market dynamics as well as consensus-oriented 
policies in ecological reform. The idea that EM should, in balance, be a win-
win-strategy for all social groups—saving the environment, leading to advan-
tages in global competition and creating new jobs—is the basis of the gov-
ernment’s programs (see BMU 2002a). 
EM is a key element of the red-green government’s program and one of 
the cornerstones of the coalition contract of 1998. Both parties—the Social 
Democrats and the Greens—have been strong proponents of EM for many 
years. The EM concept was introduced in the early 1980s by the political 
                                                   
42 Germany’s commitment equals about three quarters of the amount of emission reduc-
tions pledged by the European Union in the Kyoto Protocol. 
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scientist (and then member of the Berlin parliament) Martin Jänicke as an 
approach to overcome the obvious limits and weaknesses of the dominating 
(and at that time rather progressive) technocratic approach of ‘advanced end-
of-pipe’ treatment (Jänicke 1984, 2002; Mez and Weidner 1997). It also was 
the basis of the ‘Alternative Governmental Declaration’ published in the 
journal Natur (not to be confused with Nature) shortly after the general 
elections in 1983 and it had a strong influence on the political discussions of 
environmental issues in Germany, in particular in Social-Democratic circles, 
the trade unions and, later on, also within Bündnis 90/Die Grünen (Jänicke 
2000: 4). 
This essentially technology-related concept soon enjoyed broad accep-
tance by all major groups in Germany, and in a rapid diffusion process it also 
found positive acknowledgment in many other countries and became the 
leading concept for environmental policy at the EU level (Mol and Sonnenfeld 
2000; Hajer 1995). In Germany, the concept did not only attract the business 
sector but also the conservative (CDU) and liberal (FDP) parties (Weidner 
1999). EM could be characterized as a modernized, more foresighted, preven-
tion- and market-oriented version of the preceding environmental policy 
approach. It suits the vision of an eco-social market economy, and, most of 
all, it is in compliance, or at least in a non-antagonistic relationship, with the 
existing social, political, and economic structure: “The zero-sum game per-
ception of environment versus economic growth was replaced by a common 
denominator for development of industry and preservation of ecology” (An-
dersen and Massa 2000: 337). EM perceives the environmental challenges 
not as an unsolvable systemic crisis but as an opportunity to modernize the 
economy and basic social and political institutions in the era of globalization 
(see Weidner and Jänicke 2002). The core philosophy of EM is to solve envi-
ronmental problems by making capitalism less wasteful and thus more 
sustainable while retaining the basic system of capitalist production and 
consumption (cf. Loske 1997). 
The current government claims that an increase in energy and resource 
efficiency will not only lead to a (further) de-coupling of economic growth 
from resource consumption and emissions but also generate advantages in 
international competition and opportunities to tap new markets and relieve 
private and public budgets significantly. New flexible market-oriented, nego-
tiation-based, and participatory instruments as well as persuasion, consen-
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sus building, and stakeholder-oriented policies are thought to be most suit-
able forms of governance for establishing a broad ecological-modernization 
alliance in society in order to increase and safeguard welfare for all members 
of society. The eco-tax reflects this optimistic (win-win) idea perfectly. It is 
expected to return a ‘double’ (or even ‘triple’) ‘dividend’: improve the environ-
mental situation and save resources while at the same time creating the 
possibilities for new jobs (and reducing production costs through increasing 
efficiency as well as fostering innovations). 
In both of its environmental performance reviews of Germany (OECD 
1993, 2001), the OECD comes to an overall positive judgment with respect to 
environmental policy achievements. It was especially emphasized that the de-
coupling of economic growth from the flow of several major pollutants in the 
past two decades “is (an) indicator of Germany’s remarkable achievement in 
reconciling economic growth and environmental objectives” (OECD 1993: 
205). The second review of 2001 gives even a slightly more positive evaluation 
of Germany’s achievements. In particular, it highlights the improvements in 
emission reductions and the continuing efforts to reconcile economic growth 
and environmental protection. The ecological tax reform is praised as an 
important step in the right direction. The wide-ranging and successful pro-
grams of international cooperation are also acknowledged. Compared to the 
long list of laudable achievements, the list of shortcomings may seem rather 
brief. However, it contains some ‘wicked’ problems with high relevance for the 
global and national environmental situation. The OECD emphasizes the 
following areas: nature conservation, biodiversity, agriculture, transport, 
subsidy policies (with ‘perverse’ environmental effects), public participation 
and access to environmental information.43 
                                                   
43 The 2001 report also mentions the little progress in strategies for a sustainable develop-
ment. This critical view of Germany’s sustainability policy is still shared by most—not 
only environment-minded—groups, and many of them are doubting very much that the 
specific German version of the concept of ecological modernization is sufficient to pave 
the way for sustainable development (cf. SRU 2004). As mentioned above, the concept 
basically rests on expectations that conflicting goals can be resolved by consensus and by 
developing win-win strategies. However, it is already clear that transforming the most 
problematic areas—agriculture, land use (soil degradation), coal industry (subsidies), 
stabilization of resource use, and transport—in the direction of sustainable development 
will not only create ‘losers,’ but will also come up against powerful, structurally vested 
interests. As yet, the new red-green government has not systematically focused its 
environmental policy on those most restrictive areas and powerful target groups—with 
the exception of the agricultural sector, where the mad-cow disease and the fundamental 
changes of the EU strategy in agriculture policy in the course of the EU enlargement 
process (‘Agenda 2000’) opened a window of opportunity for structural change. 
 – 43 – 
Concerns of equity played—and still play—only a minor role in the gov-
ernment’s concept of ecological modernization and its implementation. 
Certainly, neither notions of intra muros fairness (distributional effects in 
Germany) nor extra muros fairness (global effects) have been the most impor-
tant driving force in governmental climate policies. The underlying assump-
tion is that the expected overall positive effects of this ecologically informed 
modernization strategy will lead, in the medium and long term, to a shift 
towards, and an increase in, sustainable (ecologically sound) welfare for all 
members of society, thereby reducing environmental and economic inequi-
ties. Only in the rare cases where equity aspects have led to intensive public 
debate—as was the case with the eco-tax—did the government introduce 
some compensation measures to alleviate the most detrimental effects for 
special groups. Yet, this was not done in a way that systematically focused 
on equity concerns but mainly to calm down heavy criticism. Obviously, 
considerations of equity within Germany will play a bigger role in the discus-
sions of envisaged structural changes which are intended to lead to a better 
integration of environmental concerns in ecologically problematic sectors, 
such as agriculture, transport and coal mining (cf. Bundesregierung 2002).44 
It seems, however, that the government in its discussions focuses more on 
compensation for losers in cases of forceful opposition and sharp conflicts 
than on equity concerns as such. 
The peripheral role of equity concerns in the government’s EM policy is 
also reflected in the kind of scientific analyses it has launched to examine the 
effects of its programs and policies. Legal, economic, and ecological effects 
are usually studied in deep detail, whereas equity aspects are mostly dealt 
with under the issue of employment effects.45 This is especially the case with 
international and global activities of the German government. 
                                                   
44 See also the report of the Enquete-Kommission des Deutschen Bundestages, ‘Nachhaltige 
Energieversorgung unter den Bedingungen der Globalisierung und Liberalisierung,’ 
Deutscher Bundestag, Drucksache 14/9400 of July 2, 2002. 
45 The highly aggregated treatment of distributional effects is, for instance, reflected by the 
statement that with the governmental promotion of renewable energy the average house-
hold will only be additionally burdened by € 8 per year, whereas in 2001 the benefits—
including ‘avoided costs’ (health damages, crop losses, etc.)—should have amounted to 
€ 2.5 billion, i.e., about € 65 per household (UBA 2002a: 5). In a recent study carried out 
by the economic research institute RWI (Rheinisch-Westfälisches Institut für Wirtschafts-
forschung) on the basis of the revised renewable energy law, the additional burden for an 
average household is estimated to be at least € 2 per month, adding up to € 24 per year 
(Wirtschaftswoche, No. 17, 8 April 2004: 26). 
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3.3 Sustainable Development Policy 
3.3.1 The Federal Government’s Sustainable Development Policy 
Germany doubtlessly is a latecomer concerning the institutionalization of a 
Sustainable Development (in the following: SD) policy based on Agenda 21 
and the Rio Declaration of 1992, informed by the so-called Brundtland 
Report of 1987 (Jänicke and Jörgens 2000; OECD 2002). When the federal 
government finally adopted the National Sustainability Strategy in 2002, 
more than two thirds of the OECD countries already had a National Envi-
ronmental Plan (Weidner and Jänicke 2002). At first sight, this may be a 
surprising development, since the German government was not only among 
the influential supporters of the basic goals of the Rio Summit but also a 
pioneer in important environmental areas (especially climate change policy) 
and still remains in the leading group of countries concerning performance 
(and not merely programmatic achievements). With Volker Hauff a German 
was the vice-chairperson of the UN World Council on SD. Moreover, the 
whole idea of SD has its historic roots in the German forestry management 
concept of the 18th century (cf. UBA 1995). The main explanation for this 
paradoxical development may be the strong ‘path dependency’ of decisive 
actor groups and the institutional setting of Germany’s rather successful 
environmental policy based on the precautionary principle. These actor 
groups embraced large parts of the public environmental administration, the 
federal Umweltbundesamt (environmental protection agency), the Council of 
Environmental Experts (SRU), and many NGOs, especially from the business 
sector (cf. Tremmel 2003). They adhered to the EM concept that, especially 
from a practice-oriented perspective, is much more coherent, institutionally 
well-embedded and allows for the development of clear-cut environmental 
strategies by the government (cf. SRU 2002). In addition, many representa-
tives of the scientific community (especially economists) have always felt a 
deep and persistent aversion towards the vagueness of the SD concept—a 
feature that furthered the almost inflationary increase of conceptual varia-
tions and the rather arbitrary inclusion of almost all societal and social 
issues (from, so to say, crime to kindergartens). It might well be that the 
negative attitude of many environmental proponents was also the result of a 
mistrust in the seriousness of the environmental commitment of economic 
interest groups and trade unions, of past experience with the strong resis-
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tance of some polluting sectors (e.g., coal mining, agriculture, transport) and 
their political clout or with the former (and later on abolished) legal clause of 
‘economic acceptability’ (wirtschaftliche Vertretbarkeit) that was used mostly 
to weaken environmental interests and can be seen as an early (but failing) 
attempt of integrating systematically economic and ecological concerns. 
As there already exist good and detailed analyses of the government’s re-
sponses (and their contexts) to SD (e.g., Beuermann 2000; Jänicke, Reiche 
and Volkery 2002), it should suffice here to point out only very briefly the 
most salient events and outcomes of the altogether slow political process and 
the basic features of the official government concept. 
The Brundtland Report, published in 1987 and immediately translated 
into German (Hauff 1987), attained in Germany only a low profile. Especially 
within the environmental administration and influential circles of the scien-
tific community the report’s core ideas and approaches were disliked 
strongly. In simple words: the SD concept was perceived as being overly 
complex, too vague, full of ambiguities and contradictions, and a potential 
threat to the achievements of environmental policy made on the grounds of 
its basis principles—especially the precautionary principle—and its legal-
institutional setting. The appointment of the ‘National Committee’ on SD by 
Chancellor Kohl in 1991 did not change this situation significantly. This 
committee was designed as a pluralistic body to ensure the participation of 
all major groups in the preparation of the national report on environmental 
policy to be submitted to UNCED in Rio 1992. It primarily described the 
German environmental policy approach of integrating the SD concept into its 
own approach. The discussion of SD grew in intensity only after the Rio 
Summit when two expert councils—the Council of Environmental Experts 
(SRU) and the Scientific Council on Global Environmental Change (WBGU)—
issued reports on the SD concept. In 1994 the government approved of the 
report ‘Environment 1994—Policy for a Sustainable Development’ (BMU 
1994). But only the publication of the study ‘Zukunftsfähiges Deutschland’ 
(Sustainable Germany) in 1995—prepared by the Wuppertal Institute for 
Environment, Climate, and Energy on behalf of two prominent NGOs (BUND 
and Misereor)—was able to trigger a broad and lively debate and put pressure 
on the government to respond with a more concrete program. 
Due to growing expectations from abroad and meanwhile also from NGOs 
and environment-related institutions in Germany, the conservative-liberal 
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government strengthened its efforts in preparing a national strategy. In June 
1996 the then acting Minister of the Environment, Angela Merkel, presented 
a discussion paper, ‘Steps towards Sustainable Development—Environmental 
Goals and Main Activity Areas for Germany,’ proposing six priority areas for 
action. One year later, the (renamed) National Committee on Sustainable 
Development—the major actor group in this process of taking ‘steps towards 
SD’—published and discussed the results of its various subcommittees. This 
paper was the basis of the SD report of 1998, which had the status of a draft 
and was published by the Ministry of the Environment.46 However, this 
report did not become an official (adopted) government paper. 
In 1997, the federal environmental protection agency published its study 
‘Sustainable Germany’ (Nachhaltiges Deutschland, UBA 1997), which put 
strong emphasis on the integration of economic, social, and ecological con-
cerns in close combination with the precautionary principle. This was in line 
with the basic idea of the highly acknowledged interim report (Concept 
Sustainability) of the Federal Inquiry Commission ‘Man and the Environment’ 
established in 1992.47 The Council of Environmental Experts had also pub-
lished three of its main reports with a strong focus on conceptual, political, 
and institutional aspects of SD (in 1994, 1996, and 1998). All the reports 
and studies mentioned strongly stimulated and framed the political and 
expert discussion on SD, but only rarely the public discourse that was 
dominated clearly by the publication of the Wuppertal Institute (see Weidner 
and Brandl 2001). 
The new red-green coalition government, which came into power in au-
tumn 1998, made sustainability the leitmotif of the whole governmental 
policy (see Koalitionsvereinbarung 1998). Partly in order to underline the 
reliability of this commitment, a so-called Green Cabinet was established in 
July 2000, consisting of the Secretaries of State of ten ministries and chaired 
by the Head of the Chancellor’s Office. This body is mainly involved in coor-
dination and integration of SD policies and strategies within the federal 
government. About one year later, in April 2001, the Council for Sustainable 
                                                   
46 ‘Nachhaltige Entwicklung in Deutschland. Entwurf eines umweltpolitischen Schwer-
punktprogramms.’ This draft of an SD strategy—as the subtitle implies—focuses almost 
exclusively on ecological aspects. However, it contained rather demanding (and quanti-
fied) goals. 
47 The final report, ‘Konzept Nachhaltigkeit—Vom Leitbild zur Umsetzung,’ was published in 
1998. 
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Development (Rat für Nachhaltige Entwicklung—RNE ) was called into being. 
Its 18 members from various ‘major’ public and private institutions and 
organizations are appointed by the government (see <http://www. nachhaltig 
keitsrat.de>). The first, and still acting, chairman of this council is Volker 
Hauff, an experienced former politician and former vice-director of the WCSD 
(Brundtland Commission). The council’s task is to do research and make 
proposals on how to achieve the goals of the government’s national SD 
strategy, ‘Perspectives for Germany,’ which was published after several 
months of organized public and expert discussion of a draft version (see 
<http://www.dialog-nachhaltigkeit.de>) in April 2002, shortly before, and as 
a contribution to, the World Summit on SD in Johannesburg. 
The SD strategy is meant to serve as a guideline for the way towards an 
economically competitive, socially fair, and ecologically sound development 
and to represent the ‘strategic response to the challenges of globalization’ 
(Chancellor Schröder in his preface to ‘Perspectives for Germany: Our Strate-
gies for Sustainable Development,’ April 2002). Four general criteria for 
coordination set the frame for the development of concrete policies: justice 
between generations (intergenerational equity), quality of life, social cohesion 
(including avoidance of social cleavages and inequalities), and international 
responsibility. Altogether ‘ten rules for managing sustainability’ are to guide 
the activities, which in the beginning will concentrate on seven areas of 
action. Three of these areas shall be given higher priority. They mainly con-
cern environment-related issues, namely climate and energy; mobility, envi-
ronment; health and food. The strategy paper states that the international 
dimension of SD will be given special consideration, in particular ‘overcoming 
the North-South divide.’ A separate chapter, ‘Taking on global responsibility,’ 
provides details on these statements (e.g., fight against poverty, intensified 
development collaboration, support of global protection of the environment 
and natural resources). With the help of 21 key indicators of sustainability 
(including eight environmental indicators) Germany’s performance on the 
road to SD will be monitored. Two of the non-environmental indicators reflect 
international equity concerns: expenditure on developmental cooperation and 
EU imports from developing countries. This SD strategy, along with the 
‘German Environmental Report 2002’ (adopted in March 2002 by the gov-
ernment), provided the programmatic and informational basis for Germany’s 
participation in the WSSD in Johannesburg in August/September 2002. 
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The first ‘progress report’ was given in October 2004 (Bundesregierung 
2004).48 Its ‘vagueness’ concerning relevant issues and the altogether nega-
tive balance compared to its goals—with few exceptions, such as climate gas 
reduction, increase of renewable energy—was criticized by various NGOs and 
also by the Council for Sustainable Development (see <http://www.nach 
haltigkeitsrat.de>). The NGOs, in particular, criticized the silent abandon-
ment of the former goal to reduce CO2 emissions by 25 percent until 2005. 
The media took almost no interest in the report and its discussion. 
The general elections in fall 2002 brought a slight majority for the red-
green coalition government. The new coalition agreement, ‘Renewal, Justice, 
Sustainability’ (Erneuerung, Gerechtigkeit, Nachhaltigkeit), highlighted again 
the importance of SD for the government’s general political activities. But, as 
a matter of fact, the continuously worsening economic situation, increasing 
unemployment rates, the success of the opposition parties in various state 
and local elections and the (then) threat of a war against Iraq gave SD a 
rather low ranking on the governmental and public agendas,49 although—at 
least so far—there have not been any drastic setbacks from what has already 
been achieved. In climate and energy policy the progressive trend generally 
subsisted; and Germany is still one of the few countries playing a progressive 
role in almost all important international programs, policies, and negotia-
tions intended to cope with global environmental challenges.50 
                                                   
48 In spring 2004, a public discussion process was started, dealing with the discussion 
paper (Konsultationspapier) on the government’s planned progress report of its SD policy. 
The discussion process was organized by the Council for Sustainable Development (RNE) 
(cf. <http://www.nachhaltigkeitsdiskurs.de>). For the first progress report, see <http:// 
www.dialog-nachhaltigkeit.de>.  
49 However, in January 2004 the national parliament established the ‘Parliamentary Council 
for Sustainable Development’ (Parlamentarischer Beirat für Nachhaltige Entwickung) con-
sisting of nine members of parliament. Among its tasks is the support and promotion of 
the implementation and further development of the national SD strategy (cf. <http:// 
www. bundestag.de/parlament/parl_beirat/arb.html>). 
50 In its 2004 report, the SRU assessed for the second term of the government (since 2002) 
slackening dynamics in environmental policy. In particular, the council criticizes the 
completely inadequate efforts of the government to reduce the use of coal in energy pro-
duction. It recommends the development of a strategy of ‘transmission management’ for 
the coal mining sector, including a phase-out of subventions for hard coal, accompanied 
by compensations for the social consequences of such a structural change. This is of spe-
cial significance since in the coming years the energy sector will enter a phase requiring a 
comprehensive modernization of power plants, including new construction (in the range 
from 40 to 70 GW). The newly increasing CO² emissions—in the energy-generating sector 
by 6.4 percent (1999-2002)—is mainly attributed to the opening of new coal-fired power 
plants. 
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Aside from clearly existing self-interests among German protagonists of a 
progressive (national and global) climate protection policy, the focus of Ger-
many’s SD strategy on this policy area is also highly justified by the SD 
concept itself, as developed by the Brundtland Commission: In the 
Brundtland Report ‘Our Common Future,’ the ultimate limits to global devel-
opment are seen as being determined by “the availability of energy, and the 
biosphere’s capacity to absorb the by-products of energy use” (Langhelle 
2000: 311), and climate change is deemed to be the potentially most serious 
of all environmental issues facing the world today (WCED 1987; see also 
Yearley 1996: 80 ff., 130 ff.). Furthermore, climate change is directly linked 
to social justice within and between generations, because the vulnerable 
countries will benefit disproportionately more from many of the positive 
effects of Germany’s climate policy, and many of the likely impacts of climate 
change will be felt rather by future generations than by the current one.  
3.3.2 Local Agenda 21 Activities 
Chapter 28 of the Agenda 21—adopted as an action program towards SD by 
more than 150 governments at the UNCED 1992 in Rio de Janeiro—deals 
with the role of local actors in SD processes. It recommends, inter alia, that 
local authorities should start a broad-based pluralistic dialogue to establish 
and implement mutually agreed action programs to contribute to global 
sustainability by achieving sustainability at the local level. As a consequence 
of the public’s low interest in SD and their limited knowledge about related 
international developments as well as a lack of support from the federal and 
state levels, German municipalities for a long time lagged behind many other 
countries in establishing Local Agenda 21 (in the following: LA 21) initiatives 
(see Lafferty and Eckerberg 1998; ICLEI 2002; BMU and UBA 1999; UBA 
2002b). 
Aside from some pioneering municipalities (e.g., Berlin-Köpenick, Mu-
nich), a significant increase in activities did not occur until 1997/98 when 
better financial and organizational support by the federal government started 
to take effect. 
In 1996 there were only 59 formal decisions by local authorities to estab-
lish an LA 21,51 1998 showed a jump to 1250, and in summer 2004 the 
                                                   
51 For general information on LA 21 in Germany, see BMU and UBA 2000. 
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number had risen to 2471 (see <http://www. agenda-service.de>), covering 
19 percent of altogether 13579 Kommunen (including villages, municipalities, 
counties). The change in government in 1998 has led to a moderate increase 
in federal support of LA 21 initiatives; the main means of support remains 
the provision of information and advice (see BMU 2002a: 24-25). However, 
only 150 Local Agendas have been fully prepared and in some form ‘enacted’, 
and of these only three have been formally enacted so far by the elected 
bodies and governmental authorities of the local level (the cities of Leipzig 
and Munich, and Köpenick, a district of Berlin). 52 Furthermore, in the late 
1990s some states started with the formulation of State Agenda 21 initiatives 
(e.g., North-Rhine Westphalia, Lower-Saxony, Bremen, Hamburg). With only 
a few exceptions (especially North-Rhine Westphalia) most LA 21 initiatives 
concentrate on environmental and related matters (e.g., climate, energy, 
transport, land use, construction). The social dimension of the (so-called 
three-pillar) SD concept usually plays a minor role. This also holds true for 
fundamental issues of so-called one-world aspects, such as international and 
intragenerational solidarity and equity considerations (see UBA 2002b; BMU 
and UBA 1999; BMZ 2002).53 These aspects will be dealt with in more detail 
in section 4.3. 
Local-level climate protection measures do not only take place in connec-
tion with LA 21 activities. For several decades they have taken place in the 
context of general environmental policy and related measures in air pollution 
control, traffic control and energy-saving policies.54 These activities, however, 
rarely have a global perspective. But the special climate protection networks 
that evolved in the 1990s do have a global perspective (in particular, focusing 
                                                   
52 It is estimated that only a small share of those local communities which had formally 
decided to establish a LA 21 are still actively involved in the process; some experts believe 
this share to be no bigger than 10 percent (cf. IFOK 2004: 71). 
53 The Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) came to the conclusion 
that in German LA 21 processes development policy still remains a highly neglected issue 
(“Innerhalb von Lokalen Agenden 21 in Deutschland stellt Entwicklungspolitik insgesamt 
immer noch ein stark nachrangig behandeltes Themenfeld dar … mancherorts [herrschen 
noch] karitativ motivierte Hilfeleistungen [vor], die eine Geber-Nehmer-Mentalität fördern 
und manchmal mehr zerstören als aufbauen” (BMZ 2002: 10) (“In German Local Agenda 
21s, development policy is still a highly neglected issue … in some instances charitable 
aid still prevails, which fosters a giver-taker mentality and sometimes destroys more than 
it constructs”; author’s translation). 
54 For local-level competencies and scope of action, see Klima-Bündnis (2000: 5-6); Blüm-
ling (2000). 
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on developing countries).55 The most important networks are the Climate 
Alliance (Klima-Bündnis/Allianza del Clima), Energie-Cités and Cities for 
Climate Protection (renamed Local Governments for Sustainability).56 Com-
munities joining these transnational networks commit themselves to espe-
cially active climate protection policy. The Climate Alliance is the only net-
work with an explicit focus on developing countries.57 Its members have even 
pledged to reduce CO² emissions from 1990 levels by 50 percent until 2010. 
In spite of this ambitious target, the Climate Alliance (founded in 1990) has—
with more than 400 communities—the largest membership; Cities for Climate 
Protection has eight members, and Energie-Cités ten (as of 2004). Since 
recent years membership in these networks has stagnated or even decreased. 
In their annual report 2002/2003 the Climate Alliance criticized the weak 
position of climate protection policy at the local level (Klima-Bündnis 2003: 
3). 
The basic idea of the LA 21 concept is to develop a local strategy through 
a broad participatory process of dialogue among citizens, the administration, 
NGOs and representatives of the local business sector. Although the com-
mitment of German municipalities to LA 21 activities strongly increased in 
the late 1990s, the general public knows little about the concept. In 2004, 
only 16 percent of the sample of a representative survey had heard of LA 21 
activities in their community (2000: 15 percent) (BMU 2004: 70). 
3.3.3 Summary: Main Characteristics of Governmental SD Policy 
Germany is a pioneer in ecological modernization (EM) but a laggard con-
cerning the institutionalization of the SD concept. After the red-green gov-
ernment came into power in 1998, some elements of the SD concept gained 
in importance in the course of a shift from formerly weak EM towards a 
concept of strong EM (see Christoff 1996, for this conceptualization). From a 
different perspective, it could be described as the ‘greening of sustainability’ 
                                                   
55 In 2001 the (small) institution ‘Servicestelle Kommunen in der Einen Welt’ (Service 
Agency for Local Communities in the One World) was jointly established by the govern-
ments of all levels. Its special task is to support North-South cooperation by networking, 
offering information and advice, etc. (see <http://www.service-eine-welt.de>).  
56 For information on Cities for Climate Protection, see <http://www.iclei.org/CO2/indes. 
htm>; on Energie-Cités, <http://www.energie-cites.org/index.htm>; on Klima-Bündnis, 
<http://www.klima-buendnis.org>. 
57 In particular, the ‘Declaration of Bolzano’ from May 2000 emphasizes the realization of 
‘global justice’ as one aim of the Klima-Bündnis. 
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as called for by the German Council of Environmental Experts and the 
Association of European Environmental Counselors (Jänicke and Volkery 
2002: 11). Compared to the 1994 coalition agreement of the conservative-
liberal government where SD was primarily related to environmental and 
development policy, the agreements of the red-green coalition of 1998 and 
2002, respectively, gave SD a broader definition and a more prominent 
position in governmental policy making. Although the three-pillar concept of 
SD is favored programmatically by the red-green government, the practiced 
concept—the ‘real-type’ SD—is better characterized as ecologically sustain-
able development or sustainable ecological modernization. This is also the 
result of the dominating role of the Ministry of the Environment in the na-
tional and international SD process. 
With respect to the weight attributed to the three dimensions of SD, the 
federal government and the ministers and institutions involved more or less 
accept the equal ranking of the three dimensions, at least rhetorically. Taken 
by their concrete activities, however, a more differentiated judgment evolves. 
The Minister of the Environment clearly points at the salient role of the 
ecological dimension; the Minister for Developmental Cooperation empha-
sizes both the ecological and social dimensions (poverty reduction as a basic 
precondition for nature protection); the Ministry of Agriculture only recently 
(after its reorganization in response to the BSE catastrophe, now: Ministry of 
Consumer Protection, Food, and Agriculture) highlights the ecological and 
also the social dimensions as does the Ministry of Transport, Construction 
and Housing, whereas most of the other ministries put economic aspects 
first. The general picture is such that the ministries interpret the SD concept 
in favor of the specific concerns of their policy area by selecting that dimen-
sion as the most or more important one that meets their interests best. This 
becomes quite evident, for example, in the compromise on the national 
allocation plan for emission trading reached in March 2004: The Ministry of 
Economy acted in the interest of international competitiveness of the German 
economy and was able to carry through its position against the Ministry of 
the Environment. 
This kind of SD interpretation, biased by organizational interests, is also 
reflected in the (although not fundamentally) different views taken by the 
Council of Environmental Experts and the Council for Sustainable Develop-
ment. While the latter supports the equality of the three dimensions (and 
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frequently stresses that SD is not environmental policy), the former puts 
environment first (‘dauerhaft-umweltgerechte Entwicklung’) and attributes 
more weight to economic rather than social aspects, at the same time calling 
for an integration (i.e., systematic consideration) of environmental concerns 
in all policy sectors (for the political-strategic reasons, see SRU 2002). In 
their concrete activities, the majority of environmental NGOs are in line with 
the interpretation of the SD concept by the Council of Environmental Experts 
and the Ministry of the Environment, but programmatically they put more 
emphasis on the objectives of international and intergenerational justice. 
Mainstream environmental NGOs also regard EM as the best means for 
transforming industrial society in a sustainable way.58 Criticism of a ‘socially 
slimmed’ concept is mainly heard from the Christian churches, developmen-
tal organizations, and some academics. 
Apart from programmatic differences between various governments and 
ministries, the bulk of concrete policies subsumed under the heading of SD 
consists of a combination of (state-of-the-art) end-of-pipe-based measures 
and of a mainly technologically oriented promotion of innovation (especially 
energy efficiency) in various sectors. However, compared to its conservative-
liberal predecessor the red-green government displays rather a trend towards 
‘strong’ ecological modernization with more consideration of long-term effects 
(and, as a consequence, planning and strategic aspects) and both positive 
and negative effects of other policy sectors, economic structures, and con-
sumption patterns on environmental performance. The greater, but rarely 
successful efforts on integrating environmental concerns in other policy 
sectors has also directed increased attention to potential ‘losers,’ their ca-
pacities for political resistance and strategies, and policies for winning their 
cooperation for an ecological structural change (ökologischer Strukturwandel) 
in a socially compatible way. A good example here is the dialogue with the 
coal mining industry started by the Council for Sustainable Development in 
2003 (see <http://www.nachhaltigkeitsrat.de>). 
                                                   
58 In a joint statement of various NGOs (DNR, Nabu, BUND) on the ‘consultation paper’ of 
the national government on the SD progress report, the government was called on to put 
more weight on ecological aspects when amending its SD strategy. See RNE, ‘Umweltver-
bände kritisieren Nachhaltigkeitspläne der Regierung,’ <http://www.nachhaltigkeitsrat. 
de/aktuell/news/2004/17-03_06/cont>. For a critical assessment of the effects of the 
national SD strategy by German ENGOs, see <http://www.nachhaltigkeits-check.de>. 
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Although nowadays aspects of integration do play a larger role, the cur-
rent SD policy of the German government is not at all based on a ‘holistic 
approach.’ Such an approach is often demanded by NGOs and some scien-
tists, although, as far as I know—apart from highly abstract (and sometimes 
highly sophisticated) models—no practice-oriented feasible ‘holistic’ policy 
concept has been developed that would be suitable for day-to-day policy 
operations. The increase in commitments to sustainability as a holistic 
approach made by the Ministry of Environment since 1998 may be less the 
result of the minister’s affiliation to the Green Party than an opportunistic 
adaptation to the pressure for convergence exerted by developments and 
discourses on SD at the international and EU levels. Finally: if Germany’s SD 
policy is (rightly) criticized for still being biased in favor of environmental 
concerns, one should keep in mind that, aside from few exceptions (possibly 
development policy), in environmental policy-making social and economic 
aspects are taken into consideration more often and in greater depth than, 
vice versa, environmental concerns are reflected in other, especially social 
and economic, policy areas. From a cross-national perspective, there are 
governments which have institutionalized a ‘purer’ SD concept than the 
‘diluted’ German version (see Lafferty and Meadowcroft 2000; Weidner and 
Jänicke 2002; for Sweden, see Lundqvist 2004). But only very rarely does 
this correspond with better performance in the three relevant SD dimensions. 
All in all, the current German ‘realtype’ of SD policy could be character-
ized as coming closer to the true content of the environmental policy concept 
of the early 1970s (see the Quick Start Program of 1970, the Environmental 
Program of 1971 and its modified version of 1976), which was based on the 
key principles precaution, cooperation and polluters’ responsibility and not 
only stressed the importance of intra-policy, cross-sectoral integration, and 
international cooperation but also raised the awareness for the effects of 
problem-shifting and problem accumulation and the need of focusing policies 
more on the causes of problems and less on their effects (Weidner 1999, 
2002c). 
Thus, the German SD policy discourse is characterized by a partly ag-
gressive (especially when specialized NGOs are involved) but mostly ‘passive’ 
competition of two (overlapping) discourses, the SD and EM discourses. The 
former slightly dominates the programmatic rhetoric level, whereas the latter 
clearly guides governmental activities. This contributes to the confusion that 
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there are different definitions of both concepts. Correspondingly, the ambigu-
ity of Germany’s SD policy is not only the result of the inherent vagueness of 
the SD concept as such and the lack of a generally accepted ‘authorized 
international version’ of SD, but also reflects different goals and interests of 
major actor groups in Germany, which leads to conceptual compromises. 
Even within the Council for Sustainable Development there is no comprehen-
sive ‘reference concept’ agreed upon by all members. As for the public, the 
broad majority is obviously unimpressed by rhetorical meta-discussions and 
judges SD policy mainly by its environmental performance.59 
4. Attitudes Towards Climate Change Policy and Equity Concerns 
4.1 Public Attitudes 
4.1.1 The Surveys ‘Environmental Consciousness in Germany’60 
In Germany, public awareness of environmental problems, especially so-
called global environmental challenges, is still high, although other issues 
have become more important since the 1990s. According to the recent repre-
sentative survey of 2004 (BMU 2004; see also Grunenberg and Kuckartz 
2003, for the 2002 survey), unemployment clearly dominates the public 
agenda (55 percent); ‘economic situation’ ranks second (20 percent) while 
‘environmental protection’ shares third rank along with ‘social justice.’ Only 
18 percent chose it as the ‘most urgent issue to date’ in Germany,61 which 
represents an increase of 4 percent compared to 2002. The importance 
attributed to environmental protection dropped from 70 percent in 1988 to a 
mere 14 percent in 2002. However, this does not indicate satisfaction with 
                                                   
59 In 2004, the term ‘sustainable development’ was known only by 22 percent of Germans—
and only half of those who knew about it had a fairly correct understanding of its mean-
ing (BMU 2004: 69). 
60 These surveys have been conducted biennially since 1996. 
61 Open question—multiple answers were possible. When people were asked about the 
relevance (‘very important’) of ten specified political task areas, environmental protection 
ranked eighth, after reducing unemployment, securing pensions, stimulating the econ-
omy, pursuing social justice, health protection, improvement of education, and more ef-
fective crime prevention (in decreasing order of relevance). While in 2000, 53 percent and, 
in 2002, 51 percent of the interviewees had stated that effective environmental protection 
was a ‘very important’ political task, in 2004, only 45 percent responded in this way. 
However, compared to the surveys of 1998, 2000, and 2002, the number of those who 
deemed environmental protection less important (seven percent) or not at all important 
(one percent) did not (or only minimally) grow. 
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the situation as it is, for 65 percent of the sample want the government to 
strengthen environmental policy (and only three percent want it to do less). 
As to the various environmental problems (see also Kasemir et al. 2000) 
to be tackled, climate policy ranks third, i.e., 59 percent say that a significant 
reduction of greenhouse gases is very important (rank one: protection of 
water, soil and air; rank two: saving energy resources and raw materials). 
When asked about climate protection in the last five years in Germany, only 
13 percent perceived ‘much progress’ while 53 percent stated that ‘no signifi-
cant progress’ was made; 28 percent even thought the situation had wors-
ened. Compared to 2000 the positive assessments (‘much progress’) slightly 
increased (by four percent) and the negative statements (‘rather worse’) 
decreased by three percent. Only 35 percent are now very satisfied or satis-
fied with the role Germany played in the international climate negotiations, 
and 56 percent (2002: 47 percent) of the sample would like to see Germany 
take the leadership in EU climate policy. The vast majority (84 percent) 
perceives the development of global environmental quality as very alarm-
ing/quite alarming, and 85 percent believe in a perceivable global warming in 
the future.62 The majority (85 percent) is also fully, or quite, convinced that a 
scenario of rising sea levels and shifts of climate zones due to rising tempera-
tures is realistic. More than half (46 percent) of the interviewees are afraid 
that the effects of global climate change will be extremely/very dangerous for 
themselves and their families; only 16 percent are hardly or not at all afraid 
of negative personal effects. Optimistic views concerning the chances to 
prevent a climate change have slightly risen compared to 2002: from 50 to 52 
percent. On the other hand, 48 percent are still less or not at all convinced 
that climate changes could be stopped. 
The surveys included no direct questions concerning national or interna-
tional issues of equity/fairness and the willingness to pay for climate mitiga-
tion or compensation measures in other countries. Yet, among ten items to 
choose as ‘very important,’ the issue of improving environmental policy in 
developing countries ranked only ninth. On the other hand, 88 percent agree 
with the principle of ‘intergenerational justice,’ i.e., the environment should 
                                                   
62 According to an EU Survey of 2002 (Flash Eurobarometer Survey), 72 percent of the 
German respondents are concerned about climate change. Nota bene: this survey also in-
cluded no equity-related questions (see <http://europe.eu.int/comm/environment/baro 
meter/index.htm>). For the German survey data, see <http://www.umweltbewusst-
sein.de>. 
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not be exploited at the cost of future generations, and 82 percent support the 
idea to save natural resources and not use more than can be reproduced.63 
With respect to developing countries 84 percent, support in general the 
principle of fair trade (“there should be fair trade between the rich countries 
and the developing countries”), and 70 percent would be prepared to pay 
more for fair-trade products. Although the reduction of energy consumption 
as a general political goal enjoys broad support, a majority of the interview-
ees of the 2002 survey (64 percent) is only prepared to pay more for energy-
efficient home appliances if there is also a personal benefit.64 This means 
that purely altruistic additional expenditures for climate protection do not 
find support from a majority. 
For the political practice the willingness to pay is more important than 
general attitudes towards abstract universal principles. With respect to the 
well-known wide gap between environmental consciousness and attitudes on 
the one hand and environmental behavior on the other hand, it provides a 
more realistic (though not yet realistic) measure of assessing how people 
would behave. Compared to the 2002 survey, in 2004 the willingness to 
accept additional personal burdens in favor of environmental improvement 
has increased by about two percent (but is still lower than in 2000). Yet still 
61 percent would accept a lower standard of living to support environmental 
protection,65 but only 48 percent (three percent more than in 2002) would 
accept higher taxes, even if they were used directly for environmental protec-
tion. But, even more important: a (rising) majority of 58 (2002: 52) percent is 
against the so-called eco-tax (26 percent—compared to 29 percent in 2002—
support it), and a clear majority of 73 percent criticizes eco-taxes for being 
                                                   
63 Correspondingly, there is a majority of 70 percent in support of the construction of 
additional wind power facilities, although quite large parts of the sample worry about 
negative side-effects, such as disturbing the beauty of landscape. 
64 Only a tiny minority of three percent buys so-called eco-electricity, although it is often 
only slightly more expensive than conventional electricity. Compared to 2002, the readi-
ness to switch to eco-electricity has decreased. This attitude is obviously a result of lack-
ing and/or wrong information about the costs and effects of a switch (BMU 2004: 86). 
65 According to the 2000 survey data, even fewer respondents (43 percent in West Germany 
and 27 percent in East Germany) were prepared to accept a lower personal standard of 
living in favor of environmental protection. The analysis of various related items comes to 
the conclusion: “… that for most citizens their readiness to contribute personally to envi-
ronmental protection stops when financial burdens and lower standards of living are 
asked for” (Statistisches Bundesamt 2002: 519-520, author’s translation). “The willing-
ness to make material sacrifices has decreased considerably between 1993 and 2000” (op. 
cit.: 521). 
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socially unfair, which is an increase of five percent compared to 2002 (see 
also Dahinden 2000). 
When people refuse to carry a relatively moderate financial burden, 
which, in large parts, is even compensated by indirect returns, how would 
they react if parts of the tax revenue were transferred to developing countries 
according to the universal fairness principle? Aside from such a rhetorical 
question, present data give reason to strongly doubt that a policy might be 
broadly accepted and supported that seriously pursues the implementation 
of the principle of international justice. These doubts are strengthened by the 
fact that public debate on Official Development Aid (ODA) is almost inexistent 
and that there is no relevant public pressure on the government to meet 
international commitments to raise ODA to 0.7 percent of Gross National 
Product (GNP).66 
4.1.2 Various Surveys on Environmental Consciousness 
This general assessment that global equity issues do not play a prominent 
role in the German climate change debate of the general public is supported 
by data of the so-called Eurobarometer surveys, which have been conducted 
since 1990 about three times a year in the EU member states. An analysis67 
of the survey data since 1995 revealed that only Eurobarometer Surveys of 
1995 (No. 43.1),68 1997 (No. 48.0), 1998 (No. 49.0), 1999 (No. 51.1), 2002 
(No. 58.0) contained questions related to environmental issues dealt with in 
this paper. Concerning issues of ‘equity/international solidarity’ as well as 
                                                   
66 When the red-green coalition government came into office in 1998, German ODA was 
0.26 percent of GNP and rose to 0.27 percent in the period of 2000-2002. The coalition 
contract of 2002 announced a further increase to 0.33 percent by 2006 as an interim step 
towards the 0.7 percent goal. About 8 percent of German ODA is contributed by the Ger-
man states (2001). However, only 1 percent of this share is ODA in its true sense because 
almost 7 percent are used to support students from developing countries in Germany. 
Since 1995, in many German states ODA is on the decrease (Reuke, Schäfer and Albers 
2003: 6-9; see also <http;//www.germanwatch.org/ez/bulae03.htm>). 
 Compared to other OECD countries Germany’s ODA (measured in percent of GNP as 
average of the period 1997-2002) ranks nine after Denmark (1.01 percent), Norway (0.86 
percent), Netherlands (0.81 percent), Sweden (0.76 percent), France (0.38 percent), Bel-
gium (0.34 percent), UK (0.28 percent), Canada (0.28 percent) and before Japan (0.27 
percent), Spain (0.25 percent), Italy (0.15 percent) and USA (0.10 percent); in absolute 
figures, however, the USA contributes about one quarter of total ODA) (see iwd-report, 
Vol. 30, No. 12 of 18 March 2004, p. 1). 
67 I gratefully acknowledge the support of Denis Huschka, M.A., for collecting and evaluat-
ing the survey data. 
68 Numbers in parentheses identify the special survey of the year in question. 
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‘willingness to pay,’ Eurobarometer offers—quite similarly to the German 
surveys—only very general and sparse information, i.e., items have not been 
surveyed systematically and continuously over several years. Because of its 
timeliness I will first describe the results of the 2002 Eurobarometer survey 
which focused on the attitudes of Europeans towards the environment. 
Eurobarometer Survey 2002 (No. 58.0)69 
With respect to environmental issues, the survey results indicate rather high 
problem awareness among Germans. Seventy-two percent of the German 
sample agree with the statement, “Modern technology has upset the balance 
of nature,” and a large majority rejects the statement, “Exploiting nature is 
unavoidable if humankind is to progress.” About 50 percent believe that 
“human activity can lead to irretrievable damage to the environment,” and 40 
percent believe that “the deterioration of the environment can be halted by 
changing our way of life.” 
Among global issues Germans were ‘very worried’ about climate change 
(44 percent), destruction of the ozone layer (42 percent), and the progressive 
elimination of tropical rain forests (41 percent); fewer were very worried about 
the extinction of animal and plant species (35 percent) and about using up 
natural resources that cannot be easily replaced (30 percent). 
A majority of the German sample had the feeling that they could indi-
vidually and effectively influence the state of the environment: 56 percent 
agreed with the statement, “My actions can make a real difference to the 
environment.” However, 36 percent claimed that the environment was an 
issue “beyond my control as an individual.”70 This relatively positive judg-
ment of individual control is partly reflected in individual behavior: 65 per-
cent said that they were making an effort to take care of the environment, 
but felt their actions would only have an impact if others would make an 
effort on their part. This shows that a clear majority of the Germans favor an 
active behavior but, at the same time, prefer their actions to be part of a 
                                                   
69 For most items of the various surveys discussed in the remainder of this paper multiple 
answers were possible. 
70 In both cases the EU average is 43 percent. This indicates that the Germans are less 
pessimistic and more optimistic than the EU average about their individual ability to in-
fluence effectively the state of the environment. Only the Finns (66 percent) and the 
Swedes (63 percent) are more optimistic in this respect  
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wider effort. ‘Purely altruistic’ behavior is favored by only 19 percent of 
respondents. 
Although only nine percent of the German sample trusted the EU with 
respect to environmental issues,71 38 percent saw the European Union as 
“the best level for taking decisions about protecting the environment.” The 
choice of national government (31 percent) was followed by the United Na-
tions (25 percent). Obviously, a large part of the German population prefers 
an international/supranational level of decision-making; the reason may be 
that the most important environmental problems (as seen by the majority) 
have a global dimension. 
The interviewees were offered a range of solutions that “could most effec-
tively solve the environmental problems” and were asked to select three (from 
eight). The ranking of choices shows that preference was given to regulations 
and constraints (making regulations stricter, with heavy fines for offenders: 
52 percent; better enforcement: 51 percent), followed by persuasion and 
education (raising general environmental awareness: 46 percent). While a 
general rise of taxes, prices, etc. to cover environmental costs was supported 
by only six percent, 35 percent would welcome taxes for those who cause 
environmental problems. Giving environmental NGOs more say in environ-
mental decision-making was chosen by 28 percent. 
A tentative interpretation of these results with respect to the theme of 
this study reveals a certain ambivalence in attitudes. On the one hand, 
policies based on a general-universal solidarity concept (e.g., a general rise in 
taxes) will probably get no support by the majority, but, on the other hand, 
organizations such as environmental NGOs, which usually support this idea, 
are highly esteemed. 
Eurobarometer Surveys 1995 (No. 43.1), 1997 (No. 48.0) and 1998 (No. 49) 
These surveys show, inter alia, the high importance attributed to environ-
mental issues and environmental policy by the German respondents. Ques-
tion 38 of the 1997 survey may serve as an indirect indicator of international 
solidarity (confined to existing and prospective EU member countries). Asked 
                                                   
71 Environmental associations have the highest trust (59 percent), followed by scientists (34 
percent), consumer associations (30 percent), national (9 percent) and regional/local gov-
ernments (five percent), ‘green’ parties (seven percent). Trade unions and private compa-
nies (one percent each) enjoy much less trust. 
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how to proceed if EU enlargement meant that EU financial aid to less devel-
oped EU regions will be shared between more countries, a majority of 50 
percent preferred an increase of the overall budget to make sure that German 
regions continue to receive as much aid as before.72 
Eurobarometer Survey 1999 (No. 51.1) 
Like the 2002 Survey, 1999 Eurobarometer also focused on environmental 
issues but put special emphasis on willingness to pay. More or less in line 
with the 2002 results, only a minority of ten percent supported higher gen-
eral taxes or prices in favor of environmental protection; a clear majority of 
36 percent preferred financial instruments based on the ‘polluter-pays prin-
ciple.’ With respect to various items a larger part of the interviewees would be 
prepared to pay more for healthy food and would support higher water prices 
as an incentive to save water. The willingness to pay more for flights, gaso-
line, electricity and private cars (the climate-relevant factors), however, was 
very low. Furthermore, those who would accept higher prices in favor of the 
environment were only prepared to accept relatively small increases. 
The International Social Survey Program (ISSP) 1993 
The ISSP 1993 (covering 21 countries) put an emphasis on environmental 
matters.73 Almost 50 percent of the German respondents agreed with the 
statement, “I do what is good for the environment even if it costs more money 
or time.” According to this survey, about 40 percent would accept higher 
prices and 26 percent also higher taxes in favor of the environment. Al-
though, for methodological reasons, this survey is not directly comparable to 
the surveys presented above, a general trend of declining willingness to pay 
seems to have been taking place since 1993 (other issues, such as pensions, 
social welfare and the economic/employment situation were highly influential 
for this trend). 
                                                   
72 The alternative choice was: Keep the same budget, which implies that your country might 
receive less financial aid than before. 
73 The 2000 ISSP also gave special emphasis to environmental matters, however, the items 
selected are of peripheral interest for this study. 
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Allensbach Survey 2004 
The results of the privately organized representative survey ‘Umwelt 2004’ 
(Environment 2004),74 conducted by the Institut für Demoskopie Allensbach, 
are by and large in line with the aforementioned surveys. Although social and 
economic problems clearly are seen as priority targets for counter-measures, 
still 53 percent of the population say that environmental issues should be 
given priority.75 Seventy-seven percent are concerned about the effects of 
climate change (30 percent of these are ‘very concerned’). Sixty-one percent 
have a very strong or strong interest in environmental issues; 48 percent are 
convinced that in Germany enough is done for environmental protection (‘too 
much’: 16 percent). This may be influenced by the fact that 43 percent are of 
the opinion that environmental pollution has decreased over recent years 
(‘has increased’: 19 percent). Fifty-nine percent say that, by and large, the 
environment in Germany is satisfactory (1990: 22 percent). However, when 
asked in which areas success has been made, climate protection ranks 
rather low: only 14 percent perceive a great success, 31 percent only minor 
or even no achievements. Consequently, 69 percent (second rank) argue that 
more should be done in favor of climate protection, and 62 percent deem a 
stronger support of renewable energies necessary. Generally, a large majority 
(81 percent) supports the idea that all citizens should engage in environ-
mental protection, however, in the case of renewable energy sources 70 
percent think this should be the task of the government. Correspondingly, 80 
percent see almost no chance or no chance at all to contribute individually to 
the promotion of renewable energy (climate protection: 70 percent). 
While in 1991 60 percent of the population expected that nuclear power 
will, in the long run, constitute the largest energy supply factor, in 2004 the 
majority of the population presume that long-term energy supply will be 
secured by renewable sources. There is relatively little criticism of public 
subsidies for solar energy (18 percent) and wind energy (23 percent). A clear 
majority of 44 percent prefers the Ministry of the Environment being the 
responsible institution for energy policy instead of the Ministry of Economy 
                                                   
74 Institut für Demoskopie Allensbach: Studie ‘Umwelt 2004,’ Allensbach, published in 
spring 2004. 
75 Multiple answers allowed. Other issues related to climate change or energy policy are 
supported as follows: use of solar energy (38 percent), use of renewable resources (35 per-
cent), energy saving (33 percent). 
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(25 percent). This may indicate that quite a substantial part of the public 
wishes less consideration of economic interest groups in energy policy mak-
ing. 
As for issues on which development aid policy should primarily concen-
trate, environment-related issues rank rather low (compared to issues such 
as improvement of health service and educational institutions or food sup-
ply). The careful use of natural resources received rank eight, the promotion 
of renewable energy rank 11 and the improvement of environmental behavior 
rank 13, the second to last rank. 
The Main Actor Groups 
There are no systematic studies on the attitudes of relevant German institu-
tions and actor groups towards equity concerns with respect to energy and 
climate policy. The following brief overview of salient positions is based on an 
analysis of programmatic statements in official publications, press releases 
and newsletters of the relevant organizations (the various ministries, 
Sachverständigenrat für Umwelt, Rat für Nachhaltige Entwicklung, Agenda-
Transfer, Agentur für Nachhaltigkeit, Verband Entwicklungspolitik deutscher 
Nichtregierungsorganisationen—VENRO, Service Agency Communities in 
One World—InWEnt).76 
(1) Government 
Since the 1990s, governments (no matter whether conservative or ‘red-green’) 
have preferred, in balance, EM. The acceptance of a salient responsibility to 
curb greenhouse gas emissions in international negotiations has not been 
translated into an intra-governmental or national discourse on who will have 
to shoulder the burden of related policies in the short to medium term per-
spective. In its 2002 Report the Council of Environmental Advisors (SRU) 
seems to warn the government of too far-reaching commitments at the inter-
national level. The Council did this in a very cautious statement, embedded 
in complex syntax: “As to the problem of burden-sharing between industrial-
ized and developing countries, German politics should be guided by an 
egalitarianism moderated through the acknowledgment of temporal scopes of 
                                                   
76 For an analysis of the German climate change discourse, see also Weingart, Engels and 
Pansegrau 2002. 
 – 64 – 
adaptation when international distribution of emission rights are concerned” 
(SRU 2002: §74; author’s translation).77 
In (global) sustainable development policy mainly three ministries have a 
decisive role: environment, economy and economic cooperation (with develop-
ing countries). All of them support the idea of a special responsibility of 
industrialized countries to curb CO² emissions and support developing 
countries in their efforts to enter the road to sustainable development. While 
the Ministry of the Environment mainly highlights the global ecological and 
national economic benefits of such a policy, the Ministry of Economy, as a 
rule, supports this policy as long as it does not lead to negative competition 
effects for Germany’s business sector. It is mainly the Ministry of Economic 
Cooperation that emphasizes the general moral duty of Germany to reduce 
CO² emissions and to support vulnerable countries—although not neglecting 
to point out positive long-term economic and security effects for Germany. 
The ‘interior’ equity consequences of CO² reduction policies are most explic-
itly thematized by the Ministry of Economy, yet in a biased way by pointing 
at negative economic effects on individual industries and not mentioning 
effects on various social groups.78 With respect to the consequences inside 
Germany, the environmental ministry (as well as the Ministry of Economic 
Cooperation) is much less specific.79 Usually it points at the general benefits 
of an ecology-driven innovation policy and, more specifically, at the potential 
increase in exports and employment in business sectors related to energy 
saving. Social distributional effects of global environmental commitments are 
                                                   
77 In spite of this cautious hint to the responsibilities of developing countries to contribute 
to global CO² reductions, the SRU explicitly supports a progressive climate policy, charac-
terizing the requirements of the Kyoto Protocol as a first step into a reduction policy with 
more demanding goals (SRU 2002: §74). 
78 The EU-funded research project ‘Environmental Policy, Social Exclusion and Climate 
Change—EPSECC’ investigated for Germany, Greece, Switzerland and UK whether poli-
cies aiming at mitigating global climate change could be made more efficient and fair if 
policy measures were adjusted to the specific living conditions, needs and capabilities of 
socially excluded or weak groups. The general result of the study was that a socially dif-
ferentiated (‘targeted’) climate protection policy could even contribute to the integration of 
these groups; this would entail a complex, long-term policy of empowerment. Concrete 
climate change policies, however, have been designed so far—the study was completed in 
1999—almost without any consideration of social aspects (Umwelt, BMU, No. 10/2000, 
pp. 520-521; see also Umweltbundesamt: R & D Project No. 296 41 125 and http://www. 
warwick.ac.uk/PAIS/epsecc/descript.htm>). 
79 This also holds true for the German government’s contribution to the International 
Conference for Renewable Energies in Bonn, see BMU and BMZ 2004. 
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rarely discussed in detail.80 This was (indirectly) done most specifically in the 
case of the eco-tax81 and with respect to some regulations concerning energy 
saving. It was, for instance, announced that the amendment of the Renew-
able Energy Law limits additional costs at € 1.10 per month for private 
electricity consumers (Umwelt, BMU, No. 12/2003: 649).82 On a general level 
a lot of discussion is concerned with the economic and sectoral effects of the 
CO² emission trading system, but much less with social-distributional ef-
fects. 
(2) Economic interest groups 
Reference to national equity concerns is made frequently to ward off antici-
pated disadvantages for certain sectors or branches in national and interna-
tional competition. Aspects of social distributional fairness inside Germany 
are discussed neither by traditional associations nor by those representing 
‘green’ enterprises. National (social) equity arguments are most frequently 
used by the coal sector and related industries. They refer to the great impor-
tance of this sector for a stable and secure national energy supply (especially 
after the decision to phase out nuclear energy), the (high and increasing) 
export of German coal mining and utility technologies,83 and the threat of 
losing jobs.84 This industry is not only heavily subsidized85 but also enjoys 
preferential rules with respect to the eco-tax. Due to its strong political 
influence, it remains more or less spared from CO² reduction regulations, 
                                                   
80 An analysis on the basis of various studies on the socioeconomic effects of climate change 
policy came to the result that more or less positive macro-economic effects could be ex-
pected if additional investments in measures/technologies to raise energy efficiency were 
made. In balance, the effects would be clearly positive if the assessment was to take fur-
ther aspects into consideration, such as decrease of negative external effects, stimulation 
of technological innovation, first-mover advantage, etc. (BMU 2000c: 34-36, 42-49). 
81 For general information, see <http://www.foes.de>. 
82 The already mentioned RWI study estimates additional costs per average household of at 
least € 2 per month (Wirtschaftswoche, No. 16, 8 April 2004, p. 26). The total savings for 
the country (including avoided health damages, harvest losses, etc.) resulting from this 
policy instrument are calculated to amount to € 2.4 billion in 2001, i.e., about € 65 per 
household and year (UBA 2002a: 8). 
83 “Germany’s pioneering role is due to the territorial unity of mining and the associated 
exploitation technologies” (RNE 2003: 37). The share of German mining technology in the 
world market is about 30 percent; the mining machine industry has about 12,000 em-
ployees (2001); the mining sector itself about 66,700 employees. 
84 For a comprehensive discussion of the German coal industry see Rat für Nachhaltige 
Entwicklung 2003. 
85 In 2003, government subventions of hard coal were € 2.7 billion. 
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although it is just the CO² emissions from this sector that make it highly 
unlikely that Germany will reach the national reduction target. 
(3) Trade Unions 
They use almost the same arguments as economic interest groups. However, 
among all actor groups they put the greatest emphasis on potential ‘loser’ 
sectors—especially the coal mining industry—and detrimental socioeconomic 
consequences of climate policy inside Germany, in particular, loss of jobs 
and negative distributional effects for workers and the weaker social groups. 
This is often combined with demands on the government to mitigate these 
effects with just transition policies (cf. Beisheim 2004: 174 ff.; DIW, WI and 
WZB 2000). 
(4) Environmental Non-Governmental Organizations (ENGOs) 
Aside from some small ‘radical’ (but politically almost non-influential) and 
Third World organizations, the mainstream usually does not ‘overstretch’ the 
equity issue in favor of global fairness, but they also do not bring up the 
tensions between global and national fairness. However, they often point at 
socio-ecological inequities inside Germany resulting from existing environ-
mental policies (favoring, in their opinion, industrial interests).86 The trans-
national and global players among ENGOs (see, for example, GERMAN-
WATCH, Climate Alliance) strongly support the idea of global equity at the 
global governance level, again without addressing its distributional effects at 
the national level. By the way, this loose or lacking connection with country 
affairs contributes to the increasing criticism of lacking accountability, 
responsiveness and legitimacy of NGO involvement (especially of interna-
tional and transnational NGOs) in global governance (Beisheim 2004, Ot-
taway 2001). 
(5) National Bodies 
Neither the Council for Sustainable Development (RNE) nor the German 
Advisory Council on Global Environmental Change (WBGU)87 published 
                                                   
86 In spite of this criticism, Germany has no (country-wide) ‘environmental justice move-
ment’ (see Rehbinder 2004; Maschewsky 2001). 
87 Wissenschaftlicher Beirat Globale Umweltveränderungen (WBGU). 
 – 67 – 
studies or statements on the consequences of global climate policy for na-
tional equity. Even in its special report of 2002 (WBGU 2002), in which 
WBGU recommended a charge on the use of global commons (especially for 
the use of airspace by aviation and the use of oceans by shipping), and in its 
recommendations concerning the international conference ‘Renewables 2004’ 
(WBGU 2004a), the distributional effects were rarely discussed.88 Comparing 
the two councils, it seems that the Council for Sustainable Development 
(RNE) considers national equity effects of globally oriented policies slightly 
more than the WBGU Advisory Council. This can be most clearly deducted 
from its proposals concerning guidelines for a modern coal policy. Although 
RNE is a proponent of an even more progressive climate policy by the federal 
government,89 its proposals concerning structural changes in the coal-mining 
sector (with respect to progress in climate policies the most problematic area 
in Germany) are quite moderate. This, however, can be attributed only partly 
to (national) equity concerns; political-pragmatic aspects concerning the 
chances to implement structural changes in a politically still rather powerful 
sector seem to play a bigger role here (cf. RNE 2003).90 
(6) Political Parties 
All political parties represented in the Bundestag acknowledge, in principle, 
the duty of industrialized countries to reduce CO² emissions and to support 
                                                   
88 In its study on the fight against poverty with the help of environmental protection policy 
(published in October 2004), the WBGU recommends to oblige the industrial countries to 
pay adequate compensation for their contribution to climate damages based on their 
emissions since 1990. The WBGU considers it a priority goal of the world community to 
reduce the massive disparities in the distribution of wealth. It also points at the positive 
effects efforts to alleviate poverty and to protect global public goods have for the industrial 
world (e.g., opening of new markets, reducing the danger of ‘environmental refugees’). The 
WBGU estimates that about US $400 billion per year in support of developing countries 
would suffice to reach the goals of protecting biodiversity and coping with the climate 
challenge (the cost of fighting poverty are not included); according to the WBGU the in-
ternational community should be able to cover expenditures at this level (WBGU 2004b). 
The publications of the WBGU are available in German and English: <http://www. 
wbgu.de>. 
89 “The German Government should make further efforts to enforce the Kyoto Protocol. The 
German Government is encouraged to make intensive efforts to cut greenhouse gases by 
40 percent nationally, and by 30 percent Europe-wide by 2020. For reasons of climate 
protection, however, it would appear necessary in the long-term to achieve emission cuts 
of 70 to 80 percent in the industrialised nations. Threshold and perhaps even developing 
countries should therefore be involved with initial obligations” (RNE 2003: 52-53). 
90 The rather noncommittal attitude of the SRU towards equity issues has been already 
mentioned. The recently (March 2004) established Parliamentary Advisory Council on 
Sustainability (Parlamentarischer Beirat Nachhaltigkeit) has not yet published a state-
ment on these issues. 
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developing countries. When it comes down to Germany’s obligations in this 
area, one can say that the impetus of commitments is strongest in the Green 
Party and decreases in the following order: Social-Democratic Party (SPD), 
Conservatives (CDU/CSU), Liberals (FDP). However, with the exception of the 
Greens, questions of global equity play only a minor role in the discourses of 
the various political parties. Mainly discussed are (potential) economic effects 
of policy instruments and international commitments on certain business 
sectors and not equity issues as such. In discussions on national equity 
issues, the Greens (like many NGOs) take a particularly ambivalent stance. 
On the one hand, of all political parties they criticize most strongly tenden-
cies of ‘environmental injustice’ in domestic environmental policy while, on 
the other hand, they—as all others—largely ignore equity problems that 
might ensue for Germany as a consequence of global climate protection and 
sustainable development policy. 
(7) Public Media 
As applies for all other relevant social and political actor groups, domestic 
equity issues play only a very marginal role in the public media. There has 
been no real public discourse on these issues.91 While the discussion on 
possible climate change consequences is broadly reported and the need for 
more stringent mitigation activities is generally acknowledged, with respect to 
concrete German climate policy, the focus is mainly on positive and negative 
effects for the economic sector. 
4.2 The Equity Issue in Local Agenda 21 Activities 
About 2470 local communities were or are engaged in a Local Agenda 21 (LA 
21) process.92 The following statements are based on the analysis of various 
surveys (e.g., three surveys by Difu of 1996, 1997, and 1998; by ICLEI 2002; 
                                                   
91 The discussion on ‘environmental justice,’ which is particularly pronounced in the USA, 
is almost non-existent in the German media. In general, the number of reports on envi-
ronmental matters (weekly and monthly magazines) decreased in 2003, the main focus 
being instead on energy and climate related topics (see iwd No. 6, 2 February 2004: ‘Um-
weltpresse 2003’) 
92 These local authorities formally decided to establish LA 21s; so far, only about 150 LA 
21s have been prepared and ‘enacted.’ However, the real picture is more complicated: 
many local communities are engaged in SD-related activities without using the LA 21 la-
bel, and not all of the local communities having formally decided to establish an LA 21 
program are still busy in this area. 
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and by Servicestelle/InWent 2003 as well as surveys conducted by state 
agencies93) and studies (e.g., UBA 2002a, 2002b, and studies by Difu/ICLEI 
and IFEU/BKR; see also <http://www.iclei.org/la21survey>; Rösler/Trapp 
2000).94 
• The main focus of LA 21 activities is on environmental problems 
within the local area (see also Servicestelle Kommunen in der Einen 
Welt 2002: 32). 
• Among environmental protection activities the issues of climate protec-
tion as well as energy and transport (including reduction of energy and 
resource consumption) dominate.95 
• Activities with a systematic focus on developing countries play, if at 
all, only a marginal role.96 
• Most climate-policy related activities are guided by local public inter-
ests rather than a true global perspective; global justice considerations 
are almost entirely excluded (see also UBA 2002a: 50-51). 
• The idea of SD is frequently interpreted as promotion of ‘local public 
interest’ (UBA 2002a: 179); and there is a strong tendency to put im-
                                                   
93 For example, Bavaria (<http://www.agenda21.bayern.de>; (<http://www.bayern.de/lfu/ 
komma21>) and Baden-Wurttemberg (http://www.lfu.badenwuerttemberg.de/lfu/abt2/ 
agenda/index.html>). See also <http://www.fh-erfurt.de/vt/projekte/la21/projekt.htm>. 
94 The analysis was supplemented by telephone interviews with relevant researchers of Difu 
and ICLEI. There is no special study focusing on equity and equity-related aspects, and, 
according to the interviewees, no such study is planned in the foreseeable future. 
95 Local community activities and opportunities concerning renewable energies are de-
scribed in ‘Erneuerbare Energien für die Kommunen. Handlungsbedarf, Chancen und 
Good-Practice-Beispiele’ (see <http://www.forumue.de/forumaktuell/publikationen/ 
00000066.html>). At the Municipal Leaders Conference on Renewable Energies (‘Local 
Renewables 2004’), which took place shortly before the ‘Renewables 2004’ Conference in 
Bonn, mayors and representatives of cities and municipalities of the world adopted a ‘Lo-
cal Governments’ Renewables Declaration’ on May 31. In this declaration they committed 
themselves, inter alia, to promote renewable energies in their regions, giving special con-
sideration to the needs of developing countries and the poor. The declaration explicitly 
states: “We will take global equity and the global impacts of local policy into considera-
tion, and work in partnership with cities and local communities in other parts of the 
world.” With respect to sustainability the signatories declare, inter alia, “We will take so-
cial and health aspects into consideration, ensure the participation of our citizens, ad-
dress equity and gender aspects, and seek to link our energy policies with poverty allevia-
tion. … We will take economic aspects into consideration, prioritise cost-effective solu-
tions … and combine our energy policies with regional economic development and job 
creation.” 
96 An analysis of LA 21 activities in Bavaria—one of the most active states in this area—
comes, inter alia, to the conclusion that although climate protection is one of the most 
popular issues, ‘one world’ and ‘global justice’ issues play only a marginal role. A general 
trend of decreasing participation in LA 21 activities is observed (Bayerisches Staatsminis-
terium für Umwelt, Gesundheit und Verbraucherschutz 2004). 
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provement of the living conditions in one’s own (rich) country at the 
center of local SD activities (UBA 2002a: 4). 
• Even in so-called One World Activities (established by 78 percent of 
the local communities participating in LA 21 processes), equity con-
cerns are addressed mostly in the conventional way implying a moral 
obligation to support developing countries.97 However, there frequently 
are activities directly supporting various groups, organizations, vil-
lages, etc. in Third World countries, such as charity markets, donation 
campaigns, fair-trade shops, city partnerships, direct support of devel-
opmental or humanitarian projects, etc. Among the German states 
North Rhine-Westphalia takes the lead when it comes to considering 
global perspectives. This may have been caused by the great emphasis 
the North Rhine-Westphalian government put on global issues in its 
support of LA 21 activities and its State Agenda 21 process. 
The analysis of LA activities in climate policy with a focus on equity issues 
leads to the conclusions that 
• the principle of global fairness in climate policy is not contested but 
rarely informs concrete climate/energy-related activities; 
• the distributional effects of a climate policy focused on the needs of 
‘the South’ within the local community are not thematized; 
• the main driving force in climate policy activities is ‘local self-
interest.’98 
From a political-strategic perspective, the analysis suggests the following 
conclusion: A political campaign addressing and demonstrating the (socio-
economic) distributional effects of a climate policy based on global fairness 
standards could lead to an erosion of the still rather strong commitment of 
                                                   
97 This statement does not intend to belittle the strong commitment of local actors in actual 
support of developing countries. Their efforts are all the more to be praised because the 
social and economic problems of local communities have become more severe over recent 
years due to the economic crisis, reduced local tax revenue and financial transfers by the 
state governments as well as additional (obligatory) tasks imposed on them by the federal 
government, and their diminishing influence on some relevant emitters due to the liberal-
ized energy market (e.g., public utilities) (see Kopatz 2003; see also the restriction analy-
sis for local “One World” activities in the Inwent newsletter, Dialog Global, No. 3/2003, 
which also points out decreasing participation, motivation and political support as well as 
lacking personal resources). 
98 See also the critical evaluation of a German LA 21 process (in the city of Munster) by an 
expert group from Latin America that drew conclusions like “the aspect of global respon-
sibility did not play any role in the LA process” (p. 6); projects such as the energy saving 
program “did not surpass the narrow local perspective” (p. 24); cf. Institut für Theologie 
und Politik 2002). 
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the public to a progressive national climate policy. From this also follows: as 
long as the population believes in a win-win constellation—meaning that the 
direct (e.g., subsidies for energy saving measures) and indirect positive effects 
(e.g., increasing employment,99 modernization of economy, amenity, health, 
life expectancy, other welfare gains and avoided defensive costs such as 
expenditures for flood protection) of the national climate policy will predomi-
nate—they will also accept and support the idea of strict global standards of 
justice, implying Germany’s responsibility to be among the leaders in global 
climate policy. 
To conclude, all actor groups and the public share the following charac-
teristics: 
• General acceptance of the universal (abstract) principle of interna-
tional justice as the guiding principle of climate policy, however 
• the equity principle is rarely specified with respect to which element of 
justice it refers to: equality, needs, compensation, or a combination of 
elements. This vagueness provides flexibility in the political debate and 
public discourse, and in international negotiations; 
• equity intra muros, i.e., inside Germany (as affected by the 
global/universal principles, international and national commitments, 
and various national policy programs to curb climate-relevant emis-
sions) is rarely discussed and poorly investigated (i.e., according to 
‘burden per capita,’ differentiated by socioeconomic criteria); 
• there is not any leading paradigm structuring consistently the pro-
grammatic arguments of various groups with respect to equity: (1) the 
SD concept is accepted by all groups, however, it is a vague and evolv-
ing concept with different meanings, depending on the version pre-
ferred; and according to the requirement to give equal consideration to 
environmental, social, and economic concerns it rather complicates 
equity-related decisions than facilitating them; (2) the EM concept 
treats equity generally as an outcome category and not as a guiding 
objective of environmental policy measures; in concrete policy-making 
equity concerns are treated from the perspective of ‘enlightened oppor-
                                                   
99 A recent study (2004) estimates that renewable energy policy has created about 118,700 
jobs, an increase of 52,100 compared to 1998 (Umwelt/BMU No. 6/2004: 333). However, 
there are studies that challenge these results as being too optimistic. They criticize, for 
instance, the neglect of so-called negative budget effects caused by rather high subven-
tions for renewable energy. It is claimed that the total employment effects could, in bal-
ance, be even negative (Pfaffenberger, Nguyen and Gabriel 2003). 
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tunism,’ i.e., as a restriction to be aware of in developing and imple-
menting EM policy strategies; (3) the idea of public interest (bonum 
commune), in its present form, obviously strengthens intra muros eq-
uity concerns but widely neglects extra muros (global) equity concerns. 
Although this bias is challenged increasingly, (national) public interest 
remains the meta-norm in the public discourse for legitimization of 
public policies and system performance, especially for the distribution 
of costs and benefits and the acceptance of individual burdens for the 
sake of ‘others.’ 
5. Discussion 
In Germany, there is a rather broad consensus among the relevant actor 
groups and the general public that highly industrialized countries have a 
moral obligation to take a lead in policies coping with global climate change, 
to take the costs of these efforts, to support developing countries in adapting 
to or mitigating negative climate change consequences, to allow them a due 
development process, and to grant them fair access to the international 
process of decision making on climate change policy. 
This consensus is based on the widely shared beliefs that 
• climate change is already taking place, which will result in one of the 
greatest global challenges to mankind in the foreseeable future; 
• anthropogenic emission of greenhouse gases (esp. CO²) is the major 
driving force behind climate change; 
• the increased concentrations of GHGs (greenhouse gases) in the at-
mosphere are mainly the result of historical and current emissions of 
developed countries; 
• in a global perspective the effects of climate change will, in balance, be 
negative and the majority of negative impacts will happen in develop-
ing countries; 
• developed countries have sufficient mitigation capacity (technical 
know-how, financial resources, etc.), while the developing countries 
have little or no capacity to confront the challenges of climate change; 
• the atmosphere is a global common good and therefore there must be 
a fair and equity-based principle of sharing this good. 
The acknowledgment that developed countries bear responsibility for climate 
change results in the acceptance of a principal duty to support the develop-
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ing world with respect to the costs of damages, adaptations and measures to 
mitigate climate change. However, although the principle of equal per capita 
emission ‘rights’ of all countries is increasingly accepted, there is no clear-cut 
acceptance of, or even support for, a compensation formula based on that 
principle. There also exists no public discourse about this special issue of 
global justice. The discourse on Germany’s responsibility toward developing 
countries did not go beyond a more or less vague acceptance of a general 
moral duty to contribute actively and progressively to an effective global 
climate change policy, ensuring Germany’s place among the forerunner 
countries. This notion of moral duty embraces not only active support for 
developing countries by various means100 but also the tendency to refrain 
from requiring these countries to reduce their GHG emissions. It was only 
recently that, in preparation for COP 10 in Buenos Aires, the necessity of 
GHG reductions by large developing countries with a fast-growing economy 
was mentioned by the German government—emphasizing at the same time 
the need of more and drastic emissions reductions in industrial countries 
(Umwelt, BMU Nos. 7-8, 2004, p. 414). 
According to Ikeme (2003), the North and the South act on different con-
ceptions of equity and environmental justice in confronting the issue of 
climate change: “The focus of the South has been on equality, distributive 
injustice and corrective justice for historical emissions … The North, on the 
other hand, focuses mainly on the most economically efficient path for mini-
mizing climate impact and delivering global ecological health and stability … 
This has resulted in the North and the South broadly subscribing to oppos-
ing burden sharing formulas. It is commonly recognized that equal rights per 
capita entitlements is the most favored allocation option by the South, while 
the grandfathering rule is generally preferred by most countries of the North 
…” (Ikeme 2003: 200). Germany’s position is somewhere in between these 
two different conceptions: an ‘ecological debt’ and the idea of equal rights to 
the assimilative capacity of the atmosphere is accepted, but it is left open 
how far this historical (and continuing) burden should be transformed with 
concrete measures of corrective and compensatory justice. This ambiguous 
position, which—except for some few actor groups—is broadly shared by the 
                                                   
100 In German climate change policy the main focus is on promotion of renewable energies 
combined with enhanced energy efficiency (cf. Umwelt, BMU, Nos. 7-8, 2004, pp. 398-
410). 
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German public, provides both the stimulus and the legitimization for engag-
ing in progressive (compared to many other industrialized countries) interna-
tional climate-related activities by the German government. 
Would the Germans, by and large, be prepared to accept more demand-
ing duties and corresponding policy objectives than the government is plan-
ning? Is there a larger reservoir of ‘good will’ to carry the burden of global 
climate policies than the government assumes to exist? The answer is not 
easy because the analysis of the various surveys and LA 21 activities (see 
section 4) demonstrates that the attitudes and behavior of the public and the 
majority of relevant actor groups are also characterized by ambiguity with 
respect to climate-related mitigation and adaptation policy. While only 35 
percent (2004 survey) of the public were satisfied with the role Germany 
played in international climate negotiations and almost 56 percent of the 
sample would like to see Germany in Europe take the leadership in global 
climate policy, the issue of improving environmental policy in developing 
countries ranked very low, and the willingness to accept additional personal 
burdens for the sake of environmental improvements has dropped compared 
to previous years. Furthermore, less than half of the Germans (48 percent) 
would accept higher taxes in favor of environmental protection measures.101 
This feature—high approval of fair and strict climate change policies in 
general combined with rather strong rejection of corresponding measures 
and their ensuing financial burdens—is systematically reflected in the other 
items of the various representative surveys analyzed in section 4. 
The analysis of LA 21 activities—in which, as a rule, citizens with a rela-
tively high interest in sustainability issues participate—revealed a quite 
similar picture: Climate protection ranks high in both general consent and 
concrete activities. However, most of the activities are guided by local public 
interests.102 Activities focusing systematically on developing countries play 
only a marginal role and equity concerns are addressed mostly in a symbolic 
manner of acknowledging a moral obligation to support these countries. 
                                                   
101 Nine percent of the public would be “very much prepared” and 39 percent would be 
“rather prepared” to accept higher taxes; 21 percent clearly reject this idea and 31 per-
cent would rather reject higher taxes (BMU 2004). 
102 See also the detailed analysis of LA 21 activities in 17 local communities, which also 
confirmed that instead of a true global perspective local public interests are dominant 
(UBA 2002b: 27). 
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Thus, the results of the analysis of public attitudes and activities suggest 
that a broad majority of the Germans would not agree with or actively sup-
port a more demanding governmental policy towards global equity if they had 
to bear the additional costs themselves. This is in line with general findings 
of research in morals and politics that consensus on the existence of a 
problem or a moral obligation to act need not create consensus on which 
action is to be taken and when. Still, the results of the surveys do not neces-
sarily imply that greater parts of the public would actively oppose a stronger 
governmental policy towards global equity. As is known from political theory, 
‘diffuse support’ (cf. Easton 1965; Lipset 1981) of a political system and/or of 
general norms may provide governments with more leeway for action as 
could be deduced from public attitudes towards specific issues. And, since it 
is highly accepted as a general moral duty that rich countries should support 
the poor countries, especially if the problems of poorer countries are mainly 
an outcome of the rich countries’ benefits, it seems reasonable to assume a 
rather high degree of diffuse support for (and ‘silent acceptance’ of) govern-
mental activities even if they are not in accordance with people’s individual 
preferences.103 
The degree to which ethical norms in public affairs enjoy explicit and dif-
fuse support is the result of a complex process. One of the relevant factors is 
certainly the anticipation of the consequences the realization of the norm at 
issue would have for other norms and preferences. Actors apparently make 
choices between consequential calculations and normative appropriateness 
(Hurrell 2002: 144). But which norm is really at stake when it comes to more 
demanding policies against global climate change? If there is more than one 
relevant norm, I suggest that in such a case of a norm conflict, the more 
fundamental norm of the set will be chosen, especially if its related conse-
quences largely comply with actual preferences of needs of the group or the 
individual.104 
As demonstrated in section 2.2, the normative concept of ‘public interest’ 
plays a strong role in German politics (for legitimization of policies and their 
effects), especially when justice or equity issues are involved. Compared to 
                                                   
103 For a general discussion of the interrelationship of consensus and acceptance in politics, 
see Neidhardt (2000). 
104 On multiple and conflicting images of justice of individuals and the problem of inclu-
sion/exclusion of ‘others, see Montada 1997. See also Linos and West (2003); Rasinski, 
Smith and Zuckerbraun (1994); Noël and Thérien (1995); Rayner (1991). 
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global or cosmopolitan norms of justice, it is (still) much more a territorial 
(national) concept. It emphasizes the needs and interests of the people ‘here 
and now’ instead of those ‘there and later’ (of an imagined world community 
and future generations). Obviously, in an arising conflict between the two 
types of norms, the ‘public interest’ will still be the decisive one in the public 
debate and for political decision making. 
The still dominant role of (national) ‘public interest’ in global matters sets 
limits for policy approaches striving at global justice. These limits are not 
fixed once and for all. They are flexible depending on the public discourse 
and various other factors that cannot be discussed here (cf. Albrow 1996; 
Kersting 2000). However, it could be said that, in general, politically relevant 
problems of acceptance would arise if equity rules legitimized by the public 
interest concept were stretched too much in favor of ‘outsiders’, even if their 
demands were legitimized by an acknowledged global equity norm. 
Is the German government approaching these limits with its global cli-
mate change policy? The results of the survey (see section 4)—indicating, 
inter alia, rather low and at the same time decreasing public support for 
costly policies and a weak global orientation in LA 21 activities—seem to 
indicate this. At least, it will become harder to get consent for additional 
expenditures in favor of ‘global welfare.’105 
But was the hitherto broad agreement with the government’s global cli-
mate policy goals actually based on a true public consent? I contend it was, 
at best, an uninformed consent. A legitimizing consent (i.e., providing legiti-
macy for important political measures) requires, among other things, that the 
actors concerned are adequately informed about the implications of their 
consent. In this respect, the broad approval of the government’s climate 
change policy is not based on a completely informed consensus. The public, 
in general, does not have the information required to assess all relevant 
individual and group-related consequences of climate change policy. There 
clearly is a great lack of information on the distributional effects of the vari-
ous (also planned) policies within Germany. 
Both the government and the proponents of a strong global climate 
change policy provide the public only with sparse information—especially in 
                                                   
105 Studies by Eichenberger and Frey (2002: 275) have shown that “… most people do not 
behave in a purely egoistic way. This applies especially to situations in which moral and 
altruistic behavior only implies low cost.” 
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advance—about the distributional effects of present and planned policies and 
commitments made in international negotiations, while plenty of information 
is given about potential benefits. In sharp contrast to the salient role global 
equity concerns are playing in the political discourse on climate change, the 
issue of equity within Germany is almost neglected by most of the actor 
groups as well as academic circles (for one of the few exceptions, see Sachs, 
Loske and Linz 1998).106  
Would there be a remarkable decline of public agreement with the gov-
ernment’s climate change policy,107 if the public had complete and adequate 
knowledge about the equity effects within Germany? This is a highly specula-
tive question and therefore I will only address those factors that are suppos-
edly relevant for this issue in a general way. 
(1) Cost-Benefit Balance 
In general, most climate-related policies seem to have regressive distribu-
tional effects at the national level.108 Yet these effects are seemingly quite 
small, even in the case of the most-contested eco-tax. Moreover, the absolute 
                                                   
106 The little interest science takes in equity issues related to the various environmental 
instruments is in strong contrast to the salient role these issues played in the 1970s and 
1980s. For two of the standard books of that time, see Zimmermann (1985); Schnaiberg, 
Watts and Zimmermann (1986); see also Knoepfel’s (1986) discussion on the role of dis-
tributional issues in air quality control policies. 
 A recent publication by the German Association for Promoting Ecological Tax Reform 
(Förderverein Ökologische Steuerreform/FÖS) admits negative (regressive) effects of the 
eco-tax for lower income groups, but highlights the generally positive effects the eco-tax 
also has for socially weak groups—especially if the positive economic and ecological side-
effects (reduced pollution loads, creation of new jobs) are included in the assessment (cf. 
<http://www.foes-ev.de/downloads/sozialeWirkungen.pdf>; information on the effects of 
the ecological tax reform on the behavior of businesses and households, based on a re-
cent study, are available at <http://www.ecologi.de> and <http://www.ecologic-events. 
de/oekosteuer>; see also a study from 2001 on the effects of the ecological tax reform in 
Germany: DIW-Wochenbericht, 14/2001, pp. 220-225). 
107 On the equity effects of the recently introduced CO² emission trading system there is not 
yet any detailed information available. A recent study of the Deutsches Institut für 
Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW) (cf. Energie-Impulse, No. 4/2004, pp. 1-2) points out that for 
the future development of energy prices not only the availability of energy resources will 
be decisive but maybe even more so for future climate politics and the applied policy in-
struments. In particular the EU emissions trading system, which for the first time estab-
lishes market-prices for CO² emissions, could have drastic effects on energy prices (fossil 
fuels). It is, for instance, estimated that with a price of € 20 per ton of CO² prices for hard 
coal and lignite would rise by a factor of two. If € 50 would have to be paid per ton of CO², 
these prices would increase by a factor of up to 4.3 (compared to a CO² price of zero eu-
ros). Of course, ceteris paribus the competitiveness of low-emission energies, such as re-
newable energies, would then improve enormously. 
108 Taken into account are both the effects of previous policies and of the demanding goals 
the German government announced for the ‘post-Kyoto phase’ after 2012. 
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additional financial burden on the average household seems to have been, in 
monetary terms, rather small. Turning to a socioeconomic macro-perspective 
and including a broader set of assessment criteria, then the overall effects of 
German climate change policy have been obviously positive109: employment 
figures rose; new, modern and internationally competitive business branches 
were established; the dependency on fossil resources was lowered and will 
continue to decrease; and the ecological impacts of the policies are, as a rule, 
much lower compared to conventional ones. Furthermore, a reduced depend-
ency on the world energy market goes along with Germany’s reduced eco-
nomic-political vulnerability.110 All in all, Germany’s climate change policy 
comes close to a combined win-win strategy and no-regret policy. 
(2) Situational Context Variables 
Although there is no clear-cut relationship between economic performance 
and public support for environmental policy, cross-national studies and the 
German case have shown that a prospering economy is, as a rule, highly 
supportive of a progressive environmental policy (cf. Jänicke and Weidner 
1997; Weidner and Jänicke 2002). For about a decade the economic situa-
tion in Germany has been worsening, causing high unemployment and a 
crisis of the social security institutions: There have been deep cuts affecting 
the once closely knitted ‘social security net.’ The basic foundations of the 
social welfare/solidarity system are eroding—also due to the increasing 
political influence of neo-liberal ideology. 
A large part of the population sees the macro-economic future as any-
thing but rosy, and a general mood of ‘relative deprivation’ (cf. Runciman 
                                                   
109 Learning from past experiences may also have had an influence: The (once unique) 
precautionary principle (cf. Cavender-Bares, Jäger and Ell 2001) as one of the three basic 
principles of German environmental policy—although heavily contested by business and 
parts of the scientific community—in a long-term perspective proved to be a ‘rational one,’ 
avoiding environmental deterioration without hampering economic development, in some 
cases even creating new business opportunities. Similar benefits can be attributed to the 
role as pioneer or forerunner Germany played in some policy areas (especially in air pollu-
tion control) (cf. Weidner 1995).  
110 Every now and then democratic-normative reasons are also used in favor of measures 
related to climate change policy; see for instance the statement by a member of the Ger-
man parliament (Bundestag) in a debate on climate protection: “Ich finanziere doch lieber 
den Handwerker, der auf meinem Dach Wärmedämmung anbringt, als fundamental-
istische Strukturen in Saudi-Arabien über das Begleichen meiner Ölrechnung” (Das Par-
lament, No. 50/51, 16/13 December 2004, p. 1) (“I’d rather pay the man insulating my 
roof than support fundamentalist structures in Saudi-Arabia by paying my oil bill”; au-
thor’s translation). 
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1966; Gurr 1970) is spreading.111 These developments may contribute to the 
declining willingness to pay for environmental protection and the growing 
attitude that environmental commitment should pay. Considering these 
developments, it seems to be a plausible inference that the willingness to 
contribute to global equity will also decline, if the actual (or perceived) cost-
benefit balance should favor ‘the others.’ 
On the other hand, various national and global ecological, economic and 
political events of the last decade have raised the public consciousness of an 
‘enlightened rationality’ seeing the benefits in contributing to a progressive 
global climate change policy: for instance, the steep rise in energy prices, 
which once again demonstrated the dependency on foreign energy resources 
and the vulnerability of the German economy, or the increasing frequency of 
extreme weather conditions which were widely believed to be a result of man-
made climate change. 
Actually none of these contradictory developments seems to have a domi-
nant influence on the public attitude towards climate change policy. How-
ever, the results of the analysis of public surveys on environmental policy 
and of LA 21 activities seem to indicate that the worsening socioeconomic 
situation leads to a more prominent position of equity concerns within Ger-
many at the expense of equity issues and fair burden-sharing among coun-
tries. In short: there still is a broad support of progressive climate change 
policy (and no denial of a moral obligation to support developing countries) 
but the willingness to bear individually additional costs for such a policy is 
declining rather strongly. 
(3) Welfare State Model 
In the past decade Germany has been pushing for a more progressive global 
climate change policy than many other industrial countries. The majority of 
the population not only accepted the government’s policy but even expected 
from them to do more at home and abroad. The central preconditions for this 
                                                   
111 The recent ‘Data Report 2004’ (Statistisches Bundesamt 2004) on the development of 
living conditions, structural changes and the subjective well-being of the Germans comes 
to an overall negative assessment of current trends: There has not only been an increase 
of the so-called poverty quota since 2002 but also a rise in the inequity quota (measured 
by the gini index), i.e., the asymmetries in income distribution have increased. These 
trends in the deterioration of living conditions contribute to the (monitored) decline of 
subjectively perceived well-being among Germans in recent times. 
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support were widespread and mutually shared beliefs that there is indeed a 
man-made climate challenge and that the highly developed countries should 
take on most of the burden to mitigate it. The public surveys indicate that 
there is a broad (indirect) consent to the articles and programmatic state-
ments dealing with these aspect in the UNFCC of 1992 (especially articles 3.1 
and 3.2), the Berlin Mandate adopted by the first Conference of the Parties 
(COP-1) to the UNFCC in spring 1995 (especially article 2(a)), the Kyoto 
Protocol of 1997, and—although weaker and on a much less well-informed 
basis—the European Community’s Triptique Approach to burden-sharing 
among the EU member states.112 
The broad approval of fair global burden-sharing on the basis of equal 
per capita rights to the common good ‘atmosphere’ could be traced back to 
norms, values and beliefs rooted in the welfare state (including social market 
economy) as a model of social order and integration (cf. Alber 2001; Esping-
Anderson 1990). 
The German welfare state model is a system in which the government as-
sumes the main responsibility for providing basic social and economic secu-
rity for the state’s population. Among its core norms are: the elimination of 
‘unfair’ inequalities by way of distributional and re-distributional policies, the 
provision of equal opportunities and the support of those who have not been 
able to achieve a certain standard of living on their own. Thus, re-
distribution of income and wealth, guided by the maxims of social solidarity, 
public interest and democratic capability, are highly internalized by the 
Germans, although the growing ‘crisis’ of the welfare state and the pressure 
exerted by ‘globalization’ on established institutions has furthered the influ-
ence of neo-liberal ideology, and especially since the 1990s discernible shifts 
towards retrenchment and restructuring of the welfare system (though not its 
abolishment) have taken place.113 However, as an ‘idea’ it still plays an 
important role in political conflicts and the public discourse, and so do the 
norms and values associated with this model (cf. Alber 2001: 97 ff.). One of 
the core principles—the idea that the privileged people bear responsibility for 
                                                   
112 For the content of the various international agreements mentioned, see Ringius, Tor-
vanger and Underdal (2002), especially pp. 13 ff. 
113 For a broad and in-depth discussion of the current challenges to the preconditions and 
norms of (global and national) solidarity see the various relevant contributions (especially 
by Münkler, Offe, Kaufmann, van den Daele, Döbert, Habermas, Stichweh and Berger) in 
Beckert et al. (2004); see also Streeck (2001). 
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the (socioeconomically) weak—is deeply internalized. Together with other 
norms of the national welfare model it seems to be decisive in structuring the 
average attitudes of the population towards the various types of strategies 
that can be taken to solve global environmental problems.114 
Equity, to conclude, is a highly acclaimed and deeply engrained value in 
the German society, from which follows that there is a very broad consensus 
that equity should also guide policies concerned with the global commons. 
However, as yet it has not reached the standing of a true (‘thick’) universal 
norm, independent of changing context conditions affecting the allocation of 
costs at home. Apparently, the willingness to support additional globally 
oriented policies starts to drop rather rapidly once a certain degree of indi-
vidual cost burden has been reached. This threshold value is not fixed and 
not solely defined in monetary terms: it is made up of a variety of interrelated 
factors, such as an assessment of the seriousness of the problem and the 
potential costs and benefits of mitigation policies; the current individual state 
of welfare and its future prospects; a sense of general moral obligation to 
contribute to problem-solving efforts; the perception of fairness of burden 
sharing implied by governmental global climate policy; 115 characteristics of 
the public discourse on the issue, and; expectations about ‘reciprocity,’ i.e., 
assumptions about the future attitude and behavior of the recipient (‘benefit-
ing’) countries. 
The analysis of public opinion surveys and LA 21 activities suggest a fac-
tor constellation, in which the (shifting) threshold value may already have 
been reached, at least the mobilizing and legitimating power of the ‘moral 
factors’ has lost momentum. Consequently, if the government wants to 
increase significantly its commitment to global climate change policy, it will 
have to prove more than in former times that its policy will also increase 
                                                   
114 Harris (2004: 255) found in his study that “… the Europeans have generally been more 
generous than the Americans are in helping the world’s poor, much as they are more gen-
erous in helping their own poor.” This proposition is supported by findings of cross-
cultural research on the relationship of the design of the social system and the degree of 
support for re-distribution policy. The strongest support for a governmental equality pol-
icy exists in the well-established Scandinavian welfare states, the weakest in Anglo-
American countries. Germany ranks in between. Moreover, the social systems vary con-
siderably when it comes to acknowledging the legitimacy of inequality. U.S. citizens, for 
instance accept much higher income differences as being adequate (fair) than Scandina-
vians or Germans (cf. Alber 2001: 93; see also Liebig and Wegener 1995). 
115 See Ringius, Tovanger and Underdal (2002) for a general discussion of the role of fairness 
principles in global climate change policy; see also Albin (1993) on the role of different 
fairness concepts in negotiation. 
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individual and public welfare within Germany. From this follows that the 
regressive distributional effects of climate policies will increasingly become 
critical information, weakening the leverage of proponents of a more forceful 
global climate change policy. Therefore, it seems to be plausible that neither 
the current (‘red-green’) government nor environmental NGOs will set the 
issue of equity within Germany on the political agenda. This assumption 
seems to hold if one considers that up to now they have not thematized 
national equity effects of climate policy in any way that is worth mentioning. 
Instead, they have strongly emphasized the great benefits of climate policy for 
the environment, the economy at large and political security—all of which are 
objectives that are more fundamental to the concept of ecological moderniza-
tion than that of sustainable development. 116 
In a balancing view, the German government’s morally ambiguous cli-
mate change policy has succeeded so far in combining both, global and 
national ‘rationality’: With its strong commitment for a globally concerted 
policy of targeting the industrial countries’ greenhouse gas emissions, based 
on a SD rhetoric, the government effectively contributes to the creation of a 
global governance system that includes developing countries—a precondition 
for the regime’s long-term success. Furthermore, the government’s proactive 
and pioneering role increases its possibilities to shape the regime’s design in 
a way that is compatible with the national political strategy. This strategy, 
which is guided by the EM concept, strives at the promotion of the national 
public interest thereby allowing for legitimacy and public support. Whether 
the strategy will be successful will largely depend on the development of a 
workable global regime that gives room for Germany’s (EM) policies. Thus, 
both levels are highly interdependent, and it depends on the government’s 
skill to balance partly contradictory demands. So far, it has been rather 
successful. After Russia ratified the Kyoto Protocol in November 2004, there 
were a sufficient number of major CO2 emitting signatories for the agreement 
to become legally binding for all signatory states as of February 16, 2005 
despite the adamant resistance of the U.S. government to the agreement. 
This means that the prospects of a continuous rise of demand for energy-
                                                   
116 Lafferty and Meadowcroft (2000: 453) came to the conclusion that in Germany there is no 
“hegemonic discourse”. This finding holds true for the rhetoric and programmatic level 
that is characterized by a mix of both discourses (the SD and the EM discourse). How-
ever, the concrete policies and the public attitudes with respect to climate change policy 
clearly show the preponderance of the ecological modernization concept. 
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saving and efficiency-increasing technologies in the world market will im-
prove further. Within Germany, a structural change towards a climate-
sensitive energy policy has been adopted at rather low social cost and with 
quite high public acceptance. Yet, whether these favorable conditions will 
prevail, depends much more than before on the government’s ability to 
manage the equity issue within Germany which will definitely grow in impor-
tance. 
References 
Alber, J. (2001): ‘Hat sich der Wohlfahrtsstaat als soziale Ordnung bewährt?’ In: 
K. U. Mayer (ed.), Die beste aller Welten? Marktliberalismus versus Woh-
fahrtsstaat. Eine Kontroverse. Frankfurt am Main and New York: Campus, 
pp. 59-112. 
Albin, C. (1993): ‘The Role of Fairness in Negotiation.’ In: Negotiation Journal 9 (3), 
pp. 223-244. 
Albin, C. (2003): ‘Getting to Fairness: Negotiations over Global Public Goods.’ In: I. 
Kaul, P. Conceição, K. Le Goulven, and R. U. Mendoza (eds.), Providing Global 
Public Goods. Managing Globalization. New York, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, pp. 263-279. 
Albrow, M. (1996): The Global Age: State and Society beyond Modernity. Cambridge, 
UK: Polity Press. 
Albrow, M. (1998): Abschied vom Nationalstaat. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp. 
Andersen, M. S. and Massa, I. (2000): ‘Ecological modernization—origins, dilemmas 
and future directions.’ In: Journal of Environmental Policy & Planning 2 (4), 
pp. 337-345. 
Babiker, M., Eckaus, R. (2000): Rethinking the Kyoto Emission Targets. Report 65, 
MIT Joint Program on the Science and Policy of Global Change. Cambridge, MA: 
MIT. 
Ballestrem, K. (ed.) (2001): Internationale Gerechtigkeit. Opladen: Leske + Budrich. 
Barry, B. (1991): Liberty and Justice. Oxford: Clarendon. 
Bayerisches Staatsministerium für Umwelt, Gesundheit und Verbraucherschutz 
(2004): Befragung zur Kommunalen Agenda 21. Ergebnisse, Standpunkte und 
Schlussfolgerungen aus der Evaluierung 2002/2003. Munich: Bayerisches 
Staatsministerium für UGV. 
Beckert, J., Eckert, J., Kohli, M. and Streeck, W. (eds.) (2004): Transnationale 
Solidarität. Chance und Grenzen. Frankfurt am Main and New York: Campus. 
Beisheim, M. (2004): Fit für Global Governance? Transnationale Interessengruppen-
aktivitäten als Demokratisierungspotential—am Beispiel Klimapolitik. Opladen: 
Leske + Budrich. 
Beuermann, C. (2000): ‘Germany: Regulation and the Precautionary Principle.’ In: 
W. M. Lafferty and J. Meadowcroft (eds.) (2000): Implementing Sustainable Devel-
opment. Strategies and Initiatives in High Consumption Societies. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, pp. 85-111. 
Beuermann, C. and Jäger, J. (1996): ‘Climate Change Policy in Germany: How Long 
will any Double Dividend Last?’ In: T. O’Riordan and J. Jäger (eds.), Politics of 
Climate Change: A European Perspective. London: Routledge, pp. 186-227. 
Blümling, S. (2000): Kommunaler Klimaschutz in Deutschland. Hamburg: Dr. Kovač. 
 – 84 – 
BMU (Bundesministerium für Umwelt, Naturschutz und Reaktorsicherheit) (1994): 
Umwelt 1994. Politik für eine nachhaltige, umweltgerechte Entwicklung. Bonn: 
BMU (Drucksache 12/8451). 
BMU (Bundesministerium für Umwelt, Naturschutz und Reaktorsicherheit) (2000a): 
Aus Verantwortung für die Zukunft. Umweltpolitik als globale Herausforderung. 
Bonn: BMU. 
BMU (Bundesministerium für Umwelt, Naturschutz und Reaktorsicherheit) (2000b): 
Umweltbewußtsein in Deutschland 2000. Ergebnisse einer repräsentativen Be-
völkerungsumfrage. Berlin: BMU. 
BMU (Bundesministerium für Umwelt, Naturschutz und Reaktorsicherheit) (2000c): 
Ökonomische Effekte der Klimaschutzpolitik—Diskussion und Bewertung der 
Kosten und Nutzen. Berlin: BMU. 
BMU (Bundesministerium für Umwelt, Naturschutz und Reaktorsicherheit) (2002a): 
German Environmental Report 2002. Berlin: BMU. 
BMU (Bundesministerium für Umwelt, Naturschutz und Reaktorsicherheit) (2002b): 
Umweltbewußtsein in Deutschland 2002. Ergebnisse einer repräsentativen Bevöl-
kerungsumfrage. Berlin: BMU. 
BMU (Bundesminister für Umwelt, Naturschutz und Reaktorsicherheit) (2003): 
Erneuerbare Energien in Zahlen. Berlin: BMU. 
BMU (Bundesminister für Umwelt, Naturschutz und Reaktorsicherheit) (2004): 
Umweltbewusstsein in Deutschland 2004. Ergebnisse einer repräsentativen Be-
völkerungsumfrage. Berlin: BMU. 
BMU and BMZ (Bundesministerium für Umwelt, Naturschutz und Reaktorsicherheit 
and Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung) 
(2004): renewables 2004. Conference Issue Paper, no place: BMU/BMZ. 
BMU and UBA (Bundesministerium für Umwelt, Naturschutz und Reaktorsicherheit 
and Umweltbundesamt) (eds.) (1999): Lokale Agenda 21 im europäischen Ver-
gleich. Bonn and Berlin. 
BMU and UBA (Bundesministerium für Umwelt, Naturschutz und Reaktorsicherheit 
and Umweltbundesamt) (2000): Wegweiser ‘Lokale Agenda 21.’ Literatur, An-
sprechpartner, Internetadressen. Berlin: BMU. 
BMZ (Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung) 
(2002): Von Rio nach Johannesburg. Ausgewählte Handlungsfelder der deut-
schen Entwicklungspolitik seit der Konferenz von Rio de Janeiro (UCED) 1992—
eine Bestandsaufnahme. Bonn: BMZ. 
Boehmer-Christiansen, S. (2003): ‘Science, Equity, and the War against Carbon.’ In: 
Science, Technology & Human Values, 28 (1), pp. 69-92. 
Boehmer-Christiansen, S. and Kellow, A. (2002): International Environmental Policy: 
Interests and the Failure of the Kyoto Process. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. 
Böhringer, C., Finus, , M. and Vogt, C. (2002): Controlling Global Warming: Perspec-
tives from Economics, Game Theory and Public Choice. Cheltenham, UK: Edward 
Elgar. 
Brown, D. A. (2002): American Heat: Ethical Problems with the United States’ Re-
sponse to Global Warming. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield. 
Brunold, A. (2003): ‘Nachhaltige Entwicklung als Herausforderung und Konzept 
einer innovativen kommunalen Außenpolitik: die Lokale Agenda 21.’ In: NORD-
SÜD aktuell, 17 (2), pp. 301-311. 
BUND (Bund für Umwelt und Naturschutz Deutschland) and Misereor (ed.) (1996): 
Zukunftsfähiges Deutschland. Ein Beitrag zu einer globalen nachhaltigen Entwick-
lung. Berlin, Basel etc.: Birkäuser Verlag. 
 – 85 – 
Bundesministerium des Innern (1976): Umweltbericht ’76. Fortschreibung des Um-
weltprogramms der Bundesregierung vom 14. Juli 1976. Stuttgart etc.: Kohl-
hammer. 
Bundesregierung (1997): Towards Sustainable Development in Germany. Bonn: 
BMU. 
Bundesregierung (2002): Perspektiven für Deutschland. Unsere Strategie für eine 
nachhaltige Entwicklung. Bonn: Bundesregierung (download: <http://www. 
dialog-nachhaltigkeit.de). 
Bundesregierung (2004): Perspektiven für Deutschland. Unsere Strategie für eine 
nachhaltige Entwicklung. Berlin: Bundesregierung (<http://www.bundesregie 
rung.de/Anlage740735/pdf_datei.pdf>). 
Calliess, C. (2001): Rechtsstaat und Umweltstaat—Zugleich ein Beitrag zur Grund-
rechtsdogmatik im Rahmen mehrpoliger Verwaltungsverhältnisse. Tübingen: 
Mohr Siebeck. 
Carter, N. (2001): The Politics of the Environment. Ideas, Activism, Policy. Cambridge, 
UK: Cambridge University Press. 
Cavender-Bares, J., Jäger, J. and Ell, R. (2001): ‘Developing a Precautionary Ap-
proach: Global Environmental Risk Management in Germany.’ In: The Social 
Learning Group (eds.), Learning to Manage Global Environmental Risks, Vol. 1. 
Cambridge, MA and London, UK: MIT Press, pp. 61-91. 
Christoff, P. (1996): ‘Ecological Modernization, Ecological Modernities.’ In: Environ-
mental Politics, 5, pp. 476-500. 
Dahinden, U. (2000): Demokratisierung der Umweltpolitik. Ökologische Steuern im 
Urteil von Bürgerinnen und Bürgern. Baden-Baden: Nomos. 
Deutscher Bundestag (1997): Konzept Nachhaltigkeit. Fundamente für die Gesell-
schaft von morgen. Zwischenbericht der Enquetekommission ‘Schutz des Men-
schen und der Umwelt’ des 13. Deutschen Bundestages. Zur Sache 1/97. Bonn: 
Bundestag. 
Deutscher Bundestag (ed.) (1988): Verankerung des Umweltschutzes im Grundge-
setz: Öffentliche Anhörung des Rechtsausschusses des Dt. Bundestages am 14. 
Oktober 1987. Bonn. 
Diefenbacher, H. (2001): Gerechtigkeit und Nachhaltigkeit. Zum Verhältnis von Ethik 
und Ökonomie. Darmstadt: Wiss. Buchgesellschaft. 
DIW, WI and WZB (Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, Wuppertal-Institut 
für Klima, Umwelt, Energie and Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialfor-
schung) (2000): Verbundprojekt ‘Arbeit & Ökologie’: Abschlußbericht. Berlin and 
Wuppertal. 
Dodds, F. (ed.) (2000): Earth Summit 2002. A New Deal. London: Earthscan. 
Drechsler, H., Hilligen, W. and Neumann, F. (eds.) (1995): Stichwort ‘Gemeinwohl.’ 
In: Gesellschaft und Staat. Lexikon der Politik. Munich: Vahlen, pp. 331-333. 
Dworkin, R. (1983): A Matter of Principle. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University 
Press. 
Easton, D. (1965): A System’s Analysis of Political Life. New York: John Wiley. 
Eckersley, R. (2004): ‘Soft Law, Hard Politics and the Climate Change Treaty.’ In: C. 
Reus-Smit (ed.), The Politics of International Law. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Eichenberger, R. and Frey, B. S. (2002): ‘Democratic Governance for a Globalized 
World.’ In: Kyklos 55(2), pp. 265-88. 
Elliott, L. (2002): ‘Global Environmental Governance.’ In: R. Wilkinson and S. 
Hughes (eds.), Global Governance. Critical Perspectives. London, New York: 
Routledge, pp. 57-74. 
 – 86 – 
Elster, J. (1992): How Institutions Allocate Scarce Goods and Necessary Burdens. 
Cambridge, Mass.: Cambridge University Press. 
Esping-Anderson, G. (1990): The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism. Cambridge, UK: 
Polity Press 
Esty, D. C. (2001): ‘A Term’s Limits.’ In: Foreign Policy, September/October, pp. 74-
75. 
Fraenkel, E. (1964): Deutschland und die westlichen Demokratien. Stuttgart: Kohl-
hammer. 
Fraenkel, E. and Bracher, K. D. (eds.) (1970): Staat und Politik. Frankfurt am Main: 
Fischer. 
Franklin, J. (ed.) (1997): Equality. London: Institute for Public Policy Research. 
Gallopín, G. (2000): Sustainable development society and the environment: a concep-
tual framework for tracking the linkages. Stockholm: Stockholm Environment In-
stitute. 
Gallopín, G. C. and Nillsson, M. (1998): Unfolding Global Futures. A Context for 
Swedish Climate Policy? Klimatdelegationen 4893. Stockholm: Naturvårdsverket 
Förlag. 
German Bundestag (ed.) (1991): Protecting the Earth: A Status Report with Recom-
mendations for a New Energy Policy. Third Report of the Enquete Commission of 
the 11th German Bundestag, Preventive Measures to Protect the Earth’s Atmos-
phere, Vol. II. Bonn: Deutscher Bundestag. 
Görres-Gesellschaft (ed.) (1986): Staatslexikon. Recht, Wirtschaft, Gesellschaft, Vol. 2. 
Freiburg/Basel/Wien: Herder. 
Grundmann, R. (1999): Transnationale Umweltpolitik zum Schutz der Ozonschicht. 
USA und Deutschland im Vergleich. Frankfurt am Main and New York: Campus. 
Grunenberg, H. and Kuckartz, U. (2003): Umweltbewusstsein im Wandel. Opladen: 
Leske + Budrich. 
Gurr, T. R. (1970): Why Men Rebel. Princeton, NJ: Harvard University Press. 
Habisch, A. (2001): ‘Armut als elementare Beziehungslosigkeit.’ In: K. Ballestrem 
(ed.), Internationale Gerechtigkeit. Opladen: Leske + Budrich, pp. 257-272. 
Hajer, M. (1995): The Politics of Environmental Discourse. Ecological Modernization 
and the Policy Process. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Harris, P. G. (2001): International Equity and Global Environmental Politics: Power 
and Principles in U.S. Foreign Policy. Aldershot: Ashgate. 
Harris, P. G. (2002): ‘Sharing the Burdens of Environmental Change: Comparing EU 
and U.S. Policies.’ In: Journal of Environment & Development, 11 (4), pp. 380-
401. 
Harris, P. G. (2004): ‘International Development Assistance and Burden Sharing.’ In: 
N. Vig and M. G. Faure (eds.): Green Giants? Environmental Policies of the United 
States and the European Union. Cambridge, MA and London, UK: MIT Press, 
pp. 253-275. 
Hauff, V. (ed.) (1987): Unsere gemeinsame Zukunft. Der Bericht der Weltkommission 
für Umwelt und Entwicklung. Greven: Eggenkamp. 
Helm, C. and Simonis, U. E. (2001): ‘Verteilungsgerechtigkeit in der Internationalen 
Umweltpolitik. Theoretische Fundierung und exemplarische Formulierung.’ In: 
C. Leggewie and R. Münch (eds.), Politik im 21. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt am Main: 
Suhrkamp, pp. 211-227. 
Herring, P. (1972): ‘Public Interest.’ In: D. L. Stills (ed.), International Encyclopaedia 
of the Social Sciences, Vol. 13. Reprint of the 1968 edition. New York/London: 
Free Press, pp. 170-174. 
 – 87 – 
Hibst, P. (1991): Utilitas publica—Gemeiner Nutzen—Gemeinwohl. Untersuchungen 
zur Idee eines politischen Leitbegriffs von der Antike bis zum späten Mittelalter. 
Frankfurt am Main: Lang. 
Hilliges, G. (no date): ‘Local Agenda 21—Foundations for a Sustainable Develop-
ment?’ In: anon., Practical Work in Bremen’s Development Cooperation. No place, 
pp. 5-7. 
Homann, K. (1996): ‘Sustainability. Politikvorgabe oder regulative Idee?’ In: L. 
Gerken (ed.), Ordnungspolitische Grundfragen einer Politik der Nachhaltigkeit. 
Baden-Baden: Nomos, pp. 33-48. 
Huber, J. (1995): Nachhaltige Entwicklung. Strategien für eine ökologische und soziale 
Erdpolitik. Berlin: edition sigma. 
Hurrell, A. (2002): ‘Norms and Ethics in International Relations.’ In: W. Carlsnaes, T. 
Risse, B. A. Simmons (eds.), Handbook of International Relations. London etc.: 
Sage, pp. 137-154. 
ICLEI (International Council for Local Environmental Initiatives) (2002): Local 
Agenda 21 Report Results. Download: <http://www.iclei.org/rioplusten/survey_ 
results.html>. 
IDARio (Interdepartementaler Ausschuss) (2001): Politik der nachhaltigen Entwick-
lung in der Schweiz: Standortbestimmung und Perspektiven. Zürich: IDARio. 
Institut für Theologie und Politik (ed.) (2002): Veränderungen müssen im Norden 
beginnen. ExpertInnen aus Lateinamerika untersuchen den Lokale Agenda-
Prozess in Münster/ Westfalen. Münster: Institut für Theologie und Politik. 
IFOK (Institut für Organisationskommunikation) (2004): Momentaufnahme Nachhal-
tigkeit und Gesellschaft. Entwurfsfassung für den Rat für Nachhaltige Entwick-
lung vom 4. März 2004. Bensheim/Berlin: IFOK. 
Ikeme, J. (2003): ‘Equity, Environmental Justice and Sustainability: Incomplete 
Approaches in Climate Change Politics.’ In: Global Environmental Change 13, 
pp. 195-206. 
IPCC (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change) (2001a): Third Assessment Report 
of Working Group I: Summary for Policymakers. www.ipcc.ch 
IPCC (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change) (2001b): Climate Change 2001. 
Third Assessment Report. Synthesis Report. Cambridge. 
Jänicke, M. (1984): Umweltpolitische Prävention als ökologische Modernisierung und 
Strukturpolitik. WZB discussion paper IIUG dp 84-1, Berlin: Wissenschaftszent-
rum Berlin für Sozialforschung. 
Jänicke, M. (2000): Ökologische Modernisierung als Innovation und Diffusion in 
Politik und Technik: Möglichkeiten und Grenzen eines Konzepts. FFU-report 00-
01, Freie Universität Berlin. Berlin: Forschungsstelle für Umweltpolitik. 
Jänicke, M. and Jörgens, H. (eds.) (2000): Umweltplanung im internationalen Ver-
gleich. Strategien der Nachhaltigkeit. Berlin/Heidelberg/New York: Springer. 
Jänicke, M. and Volkery, A. (2002): Agenda 2002ff. Perspektiven und Zielvorgaben 
nachhaltiger Entwicklung für die nächste Legislaturperiode. Kurzgutachten für 
die Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung & Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung. Bonn: FES & HBS. 
Jänicke, M. and Weidner, H. (eds.) (1997): National Environmental Policies. A Com-
parative Study of Capacity-Building. Berlin/Heidelberg/New York: Springer. 
Jänicke, M., Reiche, D. and Volkery, A. (2002): ‘Rückkehr zur Vorreiterrolle?—
Umweltpolitik unter Rot-Grün.’ In: Vorgänge 1, pp. 50-61. 
Johnson, A. K. (1998): ‘The Influence of Institutional Culture on the Formation of 
Pre-Regime Climate Change Policies in Sweden, Japan and the Unites States.’ 
In: Environmental Values, 7 (2), pp. 223-44. 
Jonas, H. (1984): Das Prinzip Verantwortung. Versuch einer Ethik für die technische 
Zivilisation. Frankfurt am Main: Insel. 
 – 88 – 
Kasemir, B. et al. (2000): ‘Citizens’ perspectives on climate change and energy use.’ 
In: Global Environmental Change 10, pp. 169-184. 
Kaul, I., Conceição, P., Le Goulven, K., and Mendoza, R. U : (eds.) (2003): Providing 
Global Public Goods. Managing Globalization. New York, Oxford: Oxford Universi-
ty Press. 
Kersting, W. (2000): Theorien der sozialen Gerechtigkeit. Stuttgart: Metzler. 
Kielmansegg, P. Graf (1996): ‘Integration und Demokratie.’ In: M. Jachtenfuchs and 
B. Kohler-Koch (eds.): Europäische Integration. Opladen: Leske + Budrich, 
pp. 47-71. 
Klima-Bündnis and Allianza del Clima (2000): Municipal Climate Protection Profiles. 
Status Report 2000 of the Climate Alliance of European Cities. Frankfurt am 
Main: Klima-Bündnis. 
Klima-Bündnis and Allianza del Clima (2003): Klima-Bündnis. Jahresbericht 
2002/2003. Frankfurt am Main: Klima-Bündnis. 
Kluger, J. and Lemonick, M. D. (2001): ‘A Climate of Despair. Special Report “Global 
Warming.”’ In: Time Magazine, April 23, 2001, pp. 50-59. 
Knaus, A. and Renn, O. (1998): Den Gipfel vor Augen. Unterwegs in eine nachhaltige 
Zukunft. Marburg: Metropolis. 
Knoepfel, P. (1986): ‘Discussion: Distributional Issues in Regulatory Policy Imple-
mentation—the Case of Air Quality Control Policies.’ In: A. Schnaiberg, N. Watts 
and K. Zimmermann (eds.), Distributional Conflicts in Environmental-Resource 
Policy. Aldershot: Gower, pp. 363-79. 
Kopatz, M. (ed.) (2003): Referenzziel Nachhaltigkeit. Kommunen als Mitgestalter einer 
Nachhaltigen Entwicklung. Berlin: edition sigma. 
Kraft, M. E. (2002): ‘Environmental Policy and Politics in the United States: Toward 
Environmental Sustainability?’ In: U. Desai (ed.), Environmental Politics and Pol-
icy in Industrialized Countries. Cambridge, MA and London: MIT Press, pp. 29-
69. 
Kremser, W. (1977): ‘Die Idee der nachhaltigen Nutzung als Grundlage ökologischen 
Denkens in der Forstwirtschaft.’ In: Der Forst- und Holzwirt 32, pp. 117-21. 
Lafferty, W. and Eckerberg, K. (1998): From the Earth Summit to Local Agenda 21: 
Working Towards Sustainable Development. London: Earthscan.  
Lafferty, W. M. and Meadowcroft, J. (eds.) (2000): Implementing Sustainable Develop-
ment. Strategies and Initiatives in High Consumption Societies. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
Langhelle, O. (2000): ‘Why Ecological Modernisation and Sustainable Development 
should not be Conflated.’ In: Journal of Environmental Policy & Planning 2 (4), 
pp. 303-322. 
Langhelle, O. (1999): ‘Sustainable Development: Exploring the Ethics of Our Common 
Future.’ In: International Political Science Review, 20 (2), pp. 129-149. 
Liebig, S. and Wegener, B. (1995): ‘Primäre und sekundäre Ideologien. Ein Vergleich 
von Gerechtigkeitsvorstellungen in Deutschland und den USA.’ In: H.-P. Müller 
and B. Wegener (eds.): Soziale Ungleichheit und Soziale Gerechtigkeit, Opladen: 
Leske + Budrich, pp. 265-293. 
Linos, K. and West, M. (2003): ‘Self-interest, Social Beliefs, and Attitudes to Re-
distribution. Re-addressing the Issue of Cross-national Variation.’ In: European 
Social Review 19 (4), pp. 393-409. 
Lipset, M. (1981): Political Man. The Social Bases of Politics. 3rd edition. Baltimore: 
Johns Hopkins University Press. 
Loske, R. (1997): ‘Nachhaltigkeit als Modernisierungsstrategie. Das Beispiel Klima-
schutz.’ In: L. Mez and H. Weidner (eds.), Umweltpolitik und Staatsversagen. Ber-
lin: edition sigma, pp. 101-107. 
 – 89 – 
Lowi, T. (1972): ‘Four Systems of Policy, Politics and Choice.’ In: Public Administra-
tion Review 32 (4), pp. 298-310. 
Lundqvist, L. J. (2000): The Informational Spread of Ecological Modernisation Ideas. 
Paper prepared for the International Workshop on Diffusion of Environmental 
Policy Innovations, Berlin, 8-9 December 2000. 
Lundqvist, L. (2004): Sweden and Ecological Governance. Straddling the Fence. 
Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press. 
Maschewsky, W. (2001): Umweltgerechtigkeit, Public Health und soziale Stadt. Frank-
furt am Main: VAS. 
Meadowcroft, J. (2002): The Next Steps: A Climate Change Briefing for European 
Decision-Makers. European University Institute/Robert Schuman Centre for Ad-
vanced Studies, Policy Paper RSC 02/13. Fiesole, Italy. 
Meyers Kleines Lexikon (1987): Stichwort ‘Philosophie.’ Published by Redaktion für 
Philosophie des Bibliographischen Instituts. Mannheim/Vienna/Zurich: Biblio-
graphisches Institut. 
Mez, L. (1995): ‘Reduction of exhaust gases at large combustion plants in the Federal 
Republic of Germany.’ In: M. Jänicke and H. Weidner (eds.), Successful Environ-
mental Policy: A Critical Evaluation of 24 Cases. Berlin: edition sigma, pp. 173-
186. 
Mez, L. (2003): ‘Ökologische Modernisierung und Vorreiterrolle in der Energie- und 
Umweltpolitik? Eine vorläufige Bilanz.’ In: C. Egle, T. Ostheim and R. Zohlnhöfer 
(eds.), Das rot-grüne Projekt. Eine Bilanz der Regierung Schröder 1998-2002. 
Wiesbaden: Westdeutscher Verlag, pp. 329-350. 
Mez, L. (2004): Energy and Climate Change Policy in Germany—Perspectives on 
Equity. Paper presented at the Tamaki Foundation Project Meeting ‘Environ-
mental Equity in Law and Policy in Japan, Germany, and the US’, Salzburg, 
September 26-30, mimeo. 
Mez, L. and Weidner, H. (eds.) (1997): Umweltpolitik und Staatsversagen—
Perspektiven und Grenzen der Umweltpolitikanalyse. Festschrift für Martin Jäni-
cke zum 60. Geburtstag. Berlin: edition sigma. 
Miller, C. A. and Edwards, P. N. (eds.) (2001): Changing the Atmosphere: Expert 
Knowledge and Environmental Governance. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Miller, D. and Walzer, M. (eds.) (1995): Pluralism, Justice and Equality. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. 
Minsch, J. (1994): ‘Nachhaltige Entwicklung—Zur Karriere eines Begriffs.’ In: M. 
Flury (ed.): Bevölkerungsentwicklung, Lebensstil und Umweltverantwortung. 
Bern: Interfakultäre Koordinationsstelle für Allgemeine Ökologie, pp. 127-147. 
Mol, A. P. J. and Sonnenfeld, D. A. (eds.) (2000): Ecological Modernisation Around the 
World. Perspectives and Critical Debates. London and Portland: Frank Cass. 
Montada, L. (1997): ‘Psychologische Grenzziehungen als Begrenzung der subjektiven 
und sozialen Geltung von Moral und Gerechtigkeit.’ In: W. Lütterfelds and T. 
Mohrs (eds.): Eine Welt—Eine Moral? Eine kontroverse Debatte. Darmstadt: Wis-
senschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, pp. 36-59. 
Münkler, H. and Fischer, K. (Hg.) (2002): Gemeinwohl und Gemeinsinn. Rhetoriken 
und Perspektiven sozialmoralischer Orientierung. Berlin: Akademischer Verlag. 
Neidhardt, F. (2000): ‘Formen und Funktionen gesellschaftlichen Grundkonsenses.’ 
In: G. F. Schuppert and C. Bumke (eds.), Bundesverfassungsgericht und gesell-
schaftlicher Grundkonsens. Baden-Baden: Nomos, pp. 15-30. 
Neidhardt, F. (2002): ‘Öffentlichkeit und Gemeinwohl. Gemeinwohlrhetorik in Pres-
sekommentaren.’ In: H. Münkler and K. Fischer (eds.): Gemeinwohl und Gemein-
sinn. Rhetoriken und Perspektiven sozial-moralischer Orientierung. Berlin: Aka-
demischer Verlag, pp. 157-175. 
 – 90 – 
Neumayer, E. (1999): Weak versus Strong Sustainability. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. 
Noël, A. and Thérien, J.-P. (1995): ‘From domestic to international justice: the 
welfare state and foreign aid.’ In: International Organization 49, 3, pp. 523-553. 
Oberthür, S. and Ott, H. (1999): The Kyoto Protocol. International Climate Policy for 
the 21st Century. Berlin etc.: Springer. 
OECD (Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development) (1993): Paris: 
OECD. 
OECD (Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development) (2001): Environ-
mental Outlook. Paris: OECD. 
OECD (Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development) (2002): Govern-
ance for Sustainable Development. Five OECD Case Studies. Paris: OECD. 
Olson, M. (1965): The Logic of Collective Action. Public Goods and the Theory of 
Groups. Boston: Harvard University Press. 
O’Riordan, T. and Jäger, J. (eds.) (1996): Politics of Climate Change: A European 
Perspective. London etc.: Routledge. 
Ossenbühl, F. (1994): ‘Gemeinwohl.’ In: O. Kimminich, H. Freiherr von Lersner and 
P.-C. Storm (eds.): Handwörterbuch des Umweltrechts, Vol. I. Berlin: Erich 
Schmidt, pp. 857-860. 
Ott, H. E., and Sachs, W. (2000): Ethical Aspects of Emissions Tradings. Wuppertal 
papers No. 110. Wuppertal: Wuppertal Institut. 
Ottaway, M. (2001): ‘Corporatism Goes Global: International Organizations, Nongov-
ernmental Organization Networks, and Transnational Business.’ In: Global Gov-
ernance 7 (3), pp. 265-292. 
Paterson, M. (2001): ‘International Justice and Global Warming.’ In: B. Holden (ed.), 
The Ethical Dimensions of Global Change. New York: St.  Martin’s Press, pp. 181-
201. 
Pearce, D. and Barbier, E. B. (2000): Blueprint for a Sustainable Economy. London: 
Earthscan. 
Pfaffenberger, W., Nguyen, K. and Gabriel, J. (2003): Ermittlung der Arbeitsplätze 
und Beschäftigungswirkungen im Bereich Erneuerbarer Energien. Bericht für 
die Hans-Böckler-Stiftung. Bremen: Bremer Energie Institut. 
Rasinski, K. A., Smith, T. W. and Zuckerbraun, S. (1994): ‘Fairness Motivations and 
Tradeoffs Underlying Public Support for Government Environmental Spending in 
Nine Nations.’ In: Journal of Social Issues 50 (3), pp. 179-197. 
Rawls, J. (1971): A Theory of Justice. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. 
Rayner, S. (1991): ‘A Cultural Perspective on the Structure and Implementation of 
Global Environmental Agreements.’ In: Evaluation Review 15 (1), pp. 75-102. 
Rehbinder, E. (2004): Environmental Justice in Germany: Geographical Distribution 
of Environmental Quality, Fairness of Regulatory Burdens, and Responsibility 
for Future Generations. Paper presented at the Tamaki Foundation Project Meet-
ing ‘Environmental Equity in Law and Policy in Japan, Germany, and the US’, 
Salzburg, September 26-30, mimeo. 
Renn, O. (2001): ‘Ethische Anforderungen an eine Nachhaltige Entwicklung: Zwi-
schen globalen Zwängen und individuellen Handlungsspielräumen.’ In: G. Altner 
and G. Michelsen (eds.): Ethik und Nachhaltigkeit. Frankfurt am Main: VAS, 
pp. 64-99. 
Reuke, L., Schäfer, C. and Albers, S. (2003): Zur Entwicklungszusammenarbeit der 
Bundesländer: Erklärungen und Leistungen. Bonn: Germanwatch e. V. (see also 
www.germanwatch/ch.org/ez/bulae03.htm). 
Ringius, L., Torvanger, A. and Underdal, A. (2002): ‘Burden Sharing and Fairness 
Principles in International Climate Policy.’ In: International Environmental Agree-
ments: Policies, Law and Economy 2, pp. 1-22. 
 – 91 – 
RNE (Rat für Nachhaltige Entwicklung (2003): The Perspectives for Coal in a Sus-
tainable Energy Industry. Texte No. 4, October. Berlin: RNE. 
Roemer, J. (1996): Theories of Distributive Justice. Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univer-
sity Press. 
Rösler, C. and Trapp, J. H. (2000): ‘Die Berücksichtigung sozialer Aspekte im Rah-
men der Lokalen Agenda 21.’ In: Informationen zur Raumentwicklung 1, pp. 1-8. 
Rose, A. and Stevens, B. (1998): ‘A Dynamic Analysis of Fairness in Global Warming 
Policies: Kyoto, Buenos Aires, and Beyond.’ In: Journal of Applied Economics 1 
(2), pp. 329-362. 
Rose, A., Stevens, B., Edmonds, J. and Wise, M. (1998): ‘International Equity and 
Differentiation in Global Warming Policy.’ In: Environmental and Resource Eco-
nomics 12, pp. 25-51 
Rothstein, B. (1998): ‘Political Institutions: An Overview.’ In: R. E. Goodin and H.-D. 
Klingemann (eds.), A New Handbook of Political Science. Oxford: Oxford Univer-
sity Press, pp. 133-166. 
Runciman, W. G. (1966): Relative Deprivation and Social Justice. London etc.: Rout-
ledge. 
Sachs, W. (2002): Von Rio nach Johannesburg—mit einem Umweg über New York, 
11. September 2001. Wuppertal papers No. 119. Wuppertal: Wuppertal-Institut 
für Klima, Umwelt, Energie. 
Sachs, W., Loske, R. and Linz, M. (1998): Greening the North. A Post-Industrial 
Blueprint for Ecology and Equity. London: zed Books. 
Scharpf, F. W. (1999): Regieren in Europa. Effektiv und demokratisch? Frankfurt am 
Main and New York: Campus. 
Schmidt, M. G. (1990): ‘Die Politik des mittleren Weges. Besonderheiten der Staatstä-
tigkeit in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland.’ In: Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte B 
9-10, pp. 23-31. 
Schnaiberg, A., Watts, N. and Zimmermann, K. (eds.) (1986): Distributional Conflicts 
in Environmental-Resource Policy. Aldershot: Gower. 
Schreurs, M. (2002): Environmental Politics in Japan, Germany and the United States. 
Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press. 
Schuppert, G. F. (2002): ‘Gemeinwohl, das Oder: Über die Schwierigkeiten, dem 
Gemeinwohlbegriff Konturen zu verleihen.’ In: G. F. Schuppert and F. Neidhardt 
(eds.) Gemeinwohl—Auf der Suche nach Substanz. Berlin: edition sigma, pp. 19-
64. 
Schuppert, G. F. and Neidhardt, F. (eds.) (2002): Gemeinwohl—Auf der Suche nach 
Substanz. Berlin: edition sigma. 
Servicestelle Kommunen in der Einen Welt (ed.) (2002): Give me hope, Jo’hanna?! 
Bonn: Servicestelle. 
Servicestelle Kommunen in der Einen Welt and Inwent (eds.) (2003): Globales Han-
deln lokal verankern. Befragung 2002 der Kommunen und Nichtregierungsorgani-
sationen zum Stand der lokalen Agenda 21 und der Eine-Welt-Arbeit in Deutsch-
land. Bonn: Servicestelle (download: www.service-eine-welt.de). 
Shue, H. (1993): ‘Subsistence Emissions and Luxury Emissions.’ In: Law and Policy 
15, pp. 39-59. 
Shue, H. (1999): ‘Global Environment and International Inequality.’ In: International 
Affairs 75, 3, pp. 531-545. 
Simonis, U. E. (1996): Weltumweltpolitik. Grundriß und Bausteine eines neuen Politik-
feldes. Berlin: edition sigma. 
Sommer, G. and Westphalen, R. Graf von (eds.) (1999): Staatsbürgerlexikon. Munich 
and Vienna: Oldenbourg. 
 – 92 – 
Sprenger, R.-U. (2004): Coping with actual and potential losers of environmental 
policy reforms in the business sector: Germany, Japan, and the US compared. 
Paper presented at the Tamaki Foundation Project Meeting ‘Environmental 
Equity in Law and Policy in Japan, Germany, and the US’, Salzburg, September 
26-30, mimeo. 
SRU (Rat von Sachverständigen für Umweltfragen) (1994): Umweltgutachten 1994. 
Für eine dauerhaft-umweltgerechte Entwicklung. Stuttgart: Metzler-Poeschel. 
SRU (Rat von Sachverständigen für Umweltfragen) (1996): Umweltgutachten 1996. 
Zur Umsetzung einer dauerhaft-umweltgerechten Entwicklung. Stuttgart: Metz-
ler—Poeschel. 
SRU (Rat von Sachverständigen für Umweltfragen) (1998): Umweltgutachten 1998. 
Umweltschutz. Erreichtes sichern—neue Wege gehen. Stuttgart: Metzler-Poeschel. 
SRU (Rat von Sachverständigen für Umweltfragen) (2000): Umweltgutachten 2000. 
Schritte ins nächste Jahrtausend. Stuttgart: Metzler-Poeschel. 
SRU (Rat von Sachverständigen für Umweltfragen) (2002): Umweltgutachten 2002. 
Für eine neue Vorreiterrolle. Stuttgart: Metzler-Poeschel. 
SRU (Rat von Sachverständigen für Umweltfragen) (2004): Umweltgutachten 2004. 
Umweltpolitische Handlungsfähigkeit sichern. Baden-Baden: Nomos. 
Statistisches Bundesamt (ed.) (2002): Datenreport 9. Zahlen und Fakten über die 
Bundesrepublik Deutschland. Munich: Statistisches Bundesamt. 
Stolleis, M. (1975): ‘Gemeinwohl.’ In: H. Kunst, R. Herzog and W. Schneemelcher 
(eds.), Evangelisches Staatslexikon, 2nd edition. Stuttgart/Berlin: Kreuz Verlag, 
pp. 802-804. 
Streeck, W. (2001): ‘Wohlfahrtsstaat und Markt als moralische Einrichtungen: Ein 
Kommentar.’ In: K.-U. Mayer (ed.), Die beste aller Welten? Marktliberalismus ver-
sus Wohlfahrtsstaat. Eine Kontroverse. Frankfurt am Main and New York: Cam-
pus, pp. 135-167. 
Tóth, F. L. (1999): ‘Fairness Concerns in Climate Change.’ In: F. L. Tóth (ed.), Fair 
Weather? Equity Concerns in Climate Change. London: Earthscan, pp. 1-10. 
Tremmel, J. (2003): Nachhaltigkeit als politische und analytische Kategorie. Der 
deutsche Diskurs um nachhaltige Entwicklung im Spiegel der Interessen der Ak-
teure. Munich: Ökom. 
Turner, R. K. (ed.) (1993): Sustainable Environmental Economics and Management. 
Principles and Practice. London and New York: Belhaven Press. 
UBA (Umweltbundesamt) (1993): Umweltschutz—ein Wirtschaftsfaktor. Berlin: 
Umweltbundesamt. 
UBA (Umweltbundesamt) (ed.) (1995): Das Leitbild der nachhaltigen Entwicklung in 
der wissenschaftlichen und politischen Diskussion. UBA-Texte 43/95. Berlin: 
Umweltbundesamt. 
UBA (Umweltbundesamt) (1997): Nachhaltiges Deutschland: Wege zu einer dauerhaft 
umweltgerechten Entwicklung. Berlin: Erich Schmidt (2nd edition 1998). 
UBA (Umweltbundesamt) (ed.) (2002a): Erfolgreich durch Umweltschutz. Mit Nachhal-
tigkeit den Wirtschaftsstandort stärken. Berlin: Umweltbundesamt. 
UBA (Umweltbundesamt) (ed.) (2002b): Lokale Agenda 21 im Kontext der kommuna-
len Steuerungsinstrumente auf kommunaler Ebene. UBA-Texte 34/02. Berlin: 
Umweltbundesamt. 
UBA (Umweltbundesamt) (ed.) (2002c): Langfristszenarien für eine nachhaltige 
Energienutzung in Deutschland. Zusammenfassung. Forschungsbericht 
200 97 104/UBA-FB 000314/Kurz. Berlin: Umweltbundesamt. 
UBA (Umweltbundesamt) (2003): UBA Jahresbericht 2003. Berlin: Umweltbundes-
amt. 
 – 93 – 
Walzer, M. (1983): Spheres of Justice: A Defence of Pluralism and Equality. Oxford: 
Basil Blackwell. 
Walzer, M. (1994): Thick and Thin. Moral Argument at Home and Abroad. Notre Dame: 
University of Notre Dame Press. 
WBGU (Wissenschaftlicher Beirat Globale Umweltveränderungen) (2001): Welt im 
Wandel—Neue Strukturen globaler Umweltpolitik. Jahresgutachten 2000. Ber-
lin/Heidelberg/New York: Springer. 
WBGU (Wissenschaftlicher Beirat Globale Umweltveränderungen) (2002): Entgelte 
für die Nutzung globaler Gemeinschaftsgüter. Berlin: WBGU. 
WBGU (Wissenschaftlicher Beirat Globale Umweltveränderungen) (2003): Über Kioto 
hinaus denken—Klimaschutzstrategien für das 21. Jahrhundert. Sondergutach-
ten 2003. Berlin: WBGU. 
WBGU (Wissenschaftlicher Beirat Globale Umweltveränderungen) (2004a): Erneuer-
bare Energien für eine nachhaltige Entwicklung: Impulse für die renewables 
2004. Berlin: WBGU. 
WBGU (Wissenschaftlicher Beirat Globale Umweltveränderungen) (2004b): Welt im 
Wandel. Armutsbekämpfung durch Umweltpolitik. Zusammenfassung für Ent-
scheidungsträger. Berlin: WBGU. 
WCED (World Commission on Environment and Development) (1987): Our Common 
Future. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press. 
Weale, A. (1992): The New Politics of Pollution. Manchester: Manchester University 
Press. 
Weidner, H. (1995): Twenty-five Years of Modern Environmental Policy in Germany. 
WZB discussion paper FS II 95-301, Berlin: Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für 
Sozialforschung. 
Weidner, H. (1997): Performance and characteristics of German environmental 
policy: Overview and expert commentaries from 14 countries. WZB discussion 
paper FS II 97-301. Berlin: Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung. 
Weidner, H. (1999): ‘Umweltpolitik: Entwicklungslinien, Kapazitäten und Effekte.’ In: 
M. Kaase and G. Schmid (eds.): Eine lernende Demokratie—50 Jahre Bundesre-
publik Deutschland. WZB-Jahrbuch 1999. Berlin: edition sigma, pp. 425-460. 
Weidner, H. (2002a): Gemeinwohl und Nachhaltigkeit—ein prekäres Verhältnis. WZB 
discussion paper FS II 02-303, Berlin: Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozial-
forschung. 
Weidner, H. (2002b): ‘Wie nachhaltig ist das Gemeinwohl?’ In: G. F. Schuppert and 
F. Neidhardt (eds.), Gemeinwohl—Auf der Suche nach Substanz. Berlin: edition 
sigma, pp. 127-55. 
Weidner, H. (2002c): ‘Environmental Policy and Politics in Germany.’ In: U. Desai 
(ed.), Environmental Politics and Policy in Industrialized Countries. Cambridge, 
MA: MIT Press, pp. 149-201. 
Weidner, H. and Brandl, S. (2001): Synopse zu Arbeit und Nachhaltigkeit in Zu-
kunftsstudien. WZB discussion paper P 01-511. Berlin: Wissenschaftszentrum 
Berlin für Sozialforschung. 
Weidner, H. and Jänicke, M. (2002): Capacity Building in National Environmental 
Policy. A Comparative Study of 17 Countries. Berlin/Heidelberg/New York: 
Springer. 
Weingart, P., Engels, A., Pansegrau, P. (2002): Von der Hypothese zur Katastrophe. 
Der anthropogene Klimawandel im Diskurs zwischen Wissenschaft, Politik und 
Massenmedien. Opladen: Leske + Budrich. 
Weizsäcker, C. C. von (2001): ‘Der kapitalistische Wachstumsprozeß der Weltwirt-
schaft.’ In: C. Leggewie and R. Münch (eds.): Politik im 21. Jahrhundert. Frank-
furt am Main: Suhrkamp, pp. 15-26. 
 – 94 – 
Wiegand, E. (2001): ‘Climate Change, Equity, and International Negotiations.’ In: U. 
Luterbacher and D. F. Sprinz (eds.), International Relations and Global Climate 
Change. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Wolf, R. (1991): ‘Im Fiaker der Moderne. Von den Schwierigkeiten ökologischer 
Gerechtigkeit.’ In: Kritische Justiz 3, pp. 351-62. 
Yearley, S. (1996): Sociology, Environmentalism, Globalization: Reinventing the Globe. 
London etc.: Sage. 
Young, I. M. (1990): Justice and the Politics of Difference. Princeton: Princeton Uni-
versity Press. 
Zimmermann, K. (1985): Umweltpolitik und Verteilung. Eine Analyse der Verteilungs-
wirkungen des öffentlichen Gutes Umwelt. Berlin: Erich Schmidt. 
